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Abstract
Forensic science casework involves making a series of choices. The difficulty in making these
choices lies in the inevitable presence of uncertainty, the unique context of circumstances
surrounding each decision and, in some cases, the complexity due to numerous, interrelated
random variables. Given that these decisions can lead to serious consequences in the admin-
istration of justice, forensic decision making should be supported by a robust framework that
makes inferences under uncertainty and decisions based on these inferences. The objective of
this thesis is to respond to this need by presenting a framework for making rational choices
in decision problems encountered by scientists in forensic science laboratories.
Bayesian inference and decision theory meets the requirements for such a framework.
To attain its objective, this thesis consists of three propositions, advocating the use of (1)
decision theory, (2) Bayesian networks, and (3) influence diagrams for handling forensic
inference and decision problems.
The results present a uniform and coherent framework for making inferences and decisions
in forensic science using the above theoretical concepts. They describe how to organize each
type of problem by breaking it down into its different elements, and how to find the most
rational course of action by distinguishing between one-stage and two-stage decision problems
and applying the principle of expected utility maximization.
To illustrate the framework’s application to the problems encountered by scientists in
forensic science laboratories, theoretical case studies apply decision theory, Bayesian net-
works and influence diagrams to a selection of different types of inference and decision
problems dealing with different categories of trace evidence. Two studies of the two-trace
problem illustrate how the construction of Bayesian networks can handle complex inference
problems, and thus overcome the hurdle of complexity that can be present in decision prob-
lems. Three studies—one on what to conclude when a database search provides exactly one
hit, one on what genotype to search for in a database based on the observations made on
DNA typing results, and one on whether to submit a fingermark to the process of comparing
it with prints of its potential sources—explain the application of decision theory and influ-
ence diagrams to each of these decisions. The results of the theoretical case studies support
the thesis’s three propositions.
Hence, this thesis presents a uniform framework for organizing and finding the most
rational course of action in decision problems encountered by scientists in forensic science
laboratories. The proposed framework is an interactive and exploratory tool for better
understanding a decision problem so that this understanding may lead to better informed
choices.
iii
Re´sume´
Le travail d’un(e) expert(e) en science forensique exige que ce dernier (cette dernie`re) prenne
une se´rie de de´cisions. Ces de´cisions sont difficiles parce qu’elles doivent eˆtre prises dans
l’ine´vitable pre´sence d’incertitude, dans le contexte unique des circonstances qui entourent la
de´cision, et, parfois, parce qu’elles sont complexes suite a` de nombreuse variables ale´atoires
et de´pendantes les unes des autres. E´tant donne´ que ces de´cisions peuvent aboutir a` des
conse´quences se´rieuses dans l’administration de la justice, la prise de de´cisions en science
forensique devrait eˆtre soutenue par un cadre robuste qui fait des infe´rences en pre´sence
d’incertitudes et des de´cisions sur la base de ces infe´rences. L’objectif de cette the`se est
de re´pondre a` ce besoin en pre´sentant un cadre the´orique pour faire des choix rationnels
dans des proble`mes de de´cisions rencontre´s par les experts dans un laboratoire de science
forensique.
L’infe´rence et la the´orie de la de´cision baye´sienne satisfont les conditions ne´cessaires pour
un tel cadre the´orique. Pour atteindre son objectif, cette the`se consiste de trois propositions,
recommandant l’utilisation (1) de la the´orie de la de´cision, (2) des re´seaux baye´siens, et
(3) des re´seaux baye´siens de de´cision pour ge´rer des proble`mes d’infe´rence et de de´cision
forensiques.
Les re´sultats pre´sentent un cadre uniforme et cohe´rent pour faire des infe´rences et des
de´cisions en science forensique qui utilise les concepts the´oriques ci-dessus. Ils de´crivent
comment organiser chaque type de proble`me en le de´composant dans ses diffe´rents e´le´ments,
et comment trouver le meilleur plan d’action en faisant la distinction entre des proble`mes
de de´cision en une e´tape et des proble`mes de de´cision en deux e´tapes et en y appliquant le
principe de la maximisation de l’utilite´ espe´re´e.
Pour illustrer l’application de ce cadre a` des proble`mes rencontre´s par les experts dans
un laboratoire de science forensique, des e´tudes de cas the´oriques appliquent la the´orie de
la de´cision, les re´seaux baye´siens et les re´seaux baye´siens de de´cision a` une se´le´ction de
diffe´rents types de proble`mes d’infe´rence et de de´cision impliquant diffe´rentes cate´gories de
traces. Deux e´tudes du proble`me des deux traces illustrent comment la construction de
re´seaux baye´siens permet de ge´rer des proble`mes d’infe´rence complexes, et ainsi surmonter
l’obstacle de la complexite´ qui peut eˆtre pre´sent dans des proble`mes de de´cision. Trois
e´tudes—une sur ce qu’il faut conclure d’une recherche dans une banque de donne´es qui
fournit exactement une correspondance, une sur quel ge´notype il faut rechercher dans une
banque de donne´es sur la base des observations faites sur des re´sultats de profilage d’ADN,
et une sur s’il faut soumettre une trace digitale a` un processus qui compare la trace avec
des empreintes de sources potentielles—expliquent l’application de la the´orie de la de´cision
et des re´seaux baye´siens de de´cision a` chacune de ces de´cisions. Les re´sultats des e´tudes des
cas the´oriques soutiennent les trois propositions avance´es dans cette the`se.
Ainsi, cette the´se pre´sente un cadre uniforme pour organiser et trouver le plan d’action le
plus rationnel dans des proble`mes de de´cisions rencontre´s par les experts dans un laboratoire
de science forensique. Le cadre propose´ est un outil interactif et exploratoire qui permet de
mieux comprendre un proble´me de de´cision afin que cette compre´hension puisse aboutir a`
des choix qui sont mieux informe´s.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 General context
A forensic scientist contributes to judicial decision making by presenting the value of sci-
entific observations and analytical results to the court. Through laboratory analyses and
comparisons of trace evidence, she1 seeks to establish associations or disassociations,2 de-
termine the components of an unknown substance,3 or evaluate the observations and results
in view of different possible activities.4 Her goal in performing each of these tasks is to help
the court form an opinion on the disputed facts.
However, there is one major challenge in her work: forensic science casework inevitably
involves uncertainty. This uncertainty is reflected in questions such as:
 What traces did the perpetrator leave behind on a crime scene, victim or item col-
lected by the investigators? Or, what traces did a crime scene or victim leave on the
perpetrator?
 What activity caused the transfer of these traces?
 If the traces are latent, where are they located?
 If an analytical method is applied, is the result error-free?
To deal with this uncertainty, the forensic scientist makes inferences based on her knowledge,
past experience, observations and the results of any analytical methods she may have applied.
Yet, once she has made these inferences, what does she do with them? Formally, infer-
ences take the form of a probability distribution over a random variable of interest. They
give a piece of information. They do not tell the forensic scientist,
 what traces to recover, collect, analyze and compare with reference material;
 which examination techniques and analytical methods to apply;
 what conclusion to draw based on the observations and results of each of the applied
methods; or
1Or he. For better readability of this thesis, we shall consider a female forensic scientist, and further on,
a female factfinder and decision-maker, and a male perpetrator and suspect. There is no sex discrimination
whatsoever intended by this choice. It will simply make this thesis easier to read.
2According to Edmond Locard’s famous exchange principle, the author of a crime inevitably leaves
behind traces indicating his presence on the crime scene, and, at the same time, takes away material from
the scene, also indicating his presence on the crime scene (Locard, 1940).
3For example, whether this substance contains an illegal drug, or whether fire residues contain traces of
an ignitable liquid.
4For example, from the glass fragments on a suspect’s shirt, whether this suspect smashed a window
or whether he was a witness standing at least 2 meters away, or from semen collected on a victim’s body,
whether the agressor had sexual intercourse with the victim.
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 what profile to search for in a database to try to find a potential source.
Making inferences is the first step in a process that continues on to use the information from
the inference to make better informed decisions (Biedermann, 2007; Taroni et al., 2010).
The interpretation of scientific evidence is therefore not only about making inferences:
the inferences made by forensic scientists on the presence, nature, relevance, quality, quantity
or origin of a trace form the basis for making and justifying the subsequent course of action.
Hence:
[t]hough logically independent, inference and decision are connected because the results
of the former are the point of departure of the latter. (Taroni et al., 2012)
Decision-making is a new area of research in forensic science. It is emerging in a wide
range of forensic fields, covering decisions investigators make on a crime scene, decisions
scientists make in a forensic science laboratory, and decisions based on forensic intelligence.
This thesis focuses on decisions that a forensic scientist must make while processing traces
in a forensic science laboratory.5 These decisions range from whether the laboratory should
process a particular trace to what conclusions can be drawn from the obtained results.
Several research studies have explored how forensic scientists make such decisions (e.g.,
Dror et al., 2005, 2006; Dror and Charlton, 2006; Dror and Rosenthal, 2008; Hall and Player,
2008; Langenburg et al., 2009; Charlton et al., 2010; Helsloot and Groenendaal, 2011; Dror
et al., 2011; Dror and Hampikian, 2011; Ulery et al., 2012). No doubt incited by notorious
errors made by forensic scientists (e.g., the Mayfield6 case, the American Innocence Project7)
and the general trend of increasingly questioning their decisions (e.g., National Research
Council (NRC) of the National Academies, 2009), these studies have focused on what factors
influence forensic scientists’ decision-making process. Most of them came to the conclusion
that forensic scientists can make inconsistent decisions, in the sense that a same forensic
scientist faced with the same data can make different, or even contradicting choices, when
the decision is made at two different points in time and/or with different, usually biasing,
contextual information.8 This conclusion is particularly troublesome when one considers the
influential, or even biasing (Kassin et al., 2013), effect that forensic conclusions can have
on trial outcomes. According to these studies, there is apparently a great need for forensic
scientists to make more consistent choices.
At this point, let us make the distinction between two different approaches to studying
decision making. What the above cited studies did, was to describe how people make deci-
sions. This is known as the descriptive approach to decision making. Another approach,
called a normative approach, explores what the most rational course of action would be
based on logic and within a strict mathematical framework (Lindley, 1985). So, a descriptive
approach describes how people act, and a normative approach provides a standard on how
people ought to act—this standard should result in better decisions if implemented (Lindley,
2006). The question is, should we study decision making using a descriptive or a normative
approach? As Edwards (1991 - 1992) puts it,
[s]hould we simply accept the fact that unaided human intuition does not conform
to formal rules of thought? Or should we provide the thinker with aids based on
5For further information on research concerning the other types of decisions, see for example Hazard
et al. (2011) for an investigator’s decisions on a crime scene, and Ribaux and Margot (2003) for how to use
forensic intelligence in view of making decisions.
6The FBI erroneously identified Brandon Mayfield as the source of a fingermark re-
covered on the crime scene of the Madrid bombings in 2004. See, for example,
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/LAW/01/06/mayfield.report/ (last visited on 31.05.2013).
7By performing DNA analyses, the Innocence Project has exonerated over 300 wrongfully convicted
individuals (http://www.innocenceproject.org/, last visited on 31.05.2013). In 2009, more than half of the
exonerated individuals had been wrongfully convicted because of unvalidated or improper forensic science.
8It is worth noting that most of these inconsistent decisions were made for difficult decision problems,
that is, decisions concerning low quality traces. Yet, low quality traces are a reality in forensic science, and
are presented in court as evidence, so that these decisions are of the utmost importance because they may
determine whether the true perpetrator is found and convicted of the crime.
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those formal rules and instruction about how to use both rules and aids, and thus
help the thinker to avoid cognitive illusions? (. . . ) As I understand it, legal inference
and decision is an inherently normative enterprise. Its goal is to promote clarity and
cogency of thought and decision about real and practical problems, not to enshrine the
error-inducing impacts of ignorance. (Edwards, 1991 - 1992, p.1056)
Since we want forensic scientists to make consistent choices, this thesis adopts an entirely
normative approach. A normative approach provides the tools to aid the decision-maker in
organizing her thoughts for making consistent decisions.
Sofar only a handful of studies describe a normative approach to a selection of isolated
forensic decision problems (Taroni et al., 2005, 2006b, 2007, 2010; Shen et al., 2006; Bieder-
mann et al., 2008a, 2012a; Mazumder, 2010). Research in forensic decision making using a
normative approach is therefore at its very beginnings.
Globally, there are two types of decision problems between which we will distinguish in
this thesis: one-stage decision problems and two-stage decision problems. A one-
stage decision problem is a decision for which the decision-maker can directly quantify the
satisfaction obtained from this decision’s outcome. For example, if the decision-maker has
a choice of choosing between three doors, behind which, one hides a prize and the others
hide nothing, choosing the one with the prize will make her happy, and choosing one of the
other two will make her feel disappointed. The outcome of her choice of door directly leads
to her happiness or disappointement. A two-stage decision problem, on the other hand,
is a decision for which the decision-maker’s satisfaction does not directly depend on this
decision’s outcome, but depends on the outcome of a subsequent decision. For example,
if before choosing a door, our decision-maker has the choice of spending 10$ to obtain a
clue that may provide information on which door hides the prize, then her satisfaction from
this decision does not depend on whether she bought the clue or not, but again on whether
the door she ultimately chooses is the one with the prize. For this decision problem, the
question of interest is whether the information provided by the clue is worth the 10$ it costs
to obtain it. This thesis will examine both one-stage and two-stage decision problems in
forensic science.
1.2 Objective of this thesis
The objective of this thesis is to show how to confront some decision problems encountered by
scientists in forensic science laboratories. The focus of this thesis is on how a forensic scientist
should make these decisions so that her choices are rational, and not on the description of
how a forensic scientist currently makes them. The idea is that once we have a model for
making rational choices, it can help forensic scientists make more consistent decisions by
providing a structure for organizing the different elements that should have an impact on
the scientist’s choice.
The range of decisions made in a forensic science laboratory is very broad. They range
from whether to perform a particular laboratory analysis on a trace or item collected on a
crime scene, to what conclusion to draw from the obtained results. In addition, different
laboratory methodologies apply to each different category of trace evidence (e.g., finger-
marks, biological traces, gunshot residues), so that each category of trace evidence has its
own particular decision problems. Comparing the current publications in forensic science
that present a normative approach to some of these individual decision problems amongst
each other shows a lack of uniformity on how to address these problems. The aim of this
thesis is therefore not to address each of these decisions separately, but to provide a uniform
framework that applies to all of them.
Every decision can be categorized as either a one-stage or a two-stage decision problem.
This thesis will therefore distinguish between these two types of decision problems, and show
how to confront each type in forensic science. For this, three forensic science questions have
been chosen to illustrate the theoretical concepts and their applications in forensic science:
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 one-stage decision problems:
– What genotype to search for in a database based on the observations made on
electropherograms (EPGs) obtained from DNA analyses of low-template DNA
traces?
– What to conclude when a database search provides exactly one hit?
 two-stage decision problem:
– Submit a fingermark to the process of comparing it with prints of its potential
sources?
The thesis consists of three propositions on how to handle forensic inference and decision
problems, notably:
Proposition 1: Decision theory provides a framework for organizing a broad range of de-
cision problems encountered by scientists in forensic science laboratories dealing with
different categories of trace evidence.
Proposition 2: Bayesian networks (BNs) provide a means for handling new complex infer-
ence problems encountered by forensic scientists.
Proposition 3: Influence diagrams (IDs) provide forensic scientists with a practical tool
for structuring and providing the elements required for making coherent choices in
forensic decision problems.
Separate studies, in the form of research articles, will try to support each of these proposi-
tions.
1.3 Outline
This thesis has three parts: the first considers the theoretical aspects of inference and deci-
sion methodologies, the second the practical aspects of implementing these methodologies in
forensic science, and the third consists of papers applying these methodologies in case studies.
PART I: THEORETICAL ASPECTS summarizes the background knowledge form-
ing the basis for the practical aspects in Part II. This part contains four chapters:
Chapter 2: Justification for a Bayesian and Decision-theoretic Framework ex-
plains the concept of a normative framework and the fundamental notions of a co-
herent approach to judicial decision making. These notions cover the principles of
interpretation of scientific evidence and introduce the concept of decision theory. The
mathematical notation in this chapter is limited to probabilities, leaving the mathe-
matical notation of decision theory for Chapter 3.
Chapter 3: Decision Theory presents the fundamental notions of statistical decision the-
ory.
Chapter 4: Graphical Models presents graphical probabilistic models, notably Bayesian
networks and influence diagrams.
Chapter 5: Current State of the Art of Decision-theoretic Models in Forensic
Science gives an overview and summary of the scientific literature on normative ap-
proaches to forensic decision problems.
PART II: PRACTICAL ASPECTS explains the contributions of this thesis. It contains
three chapters:
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Chapter 6: Thesis presents the three propositions of interest, advocating the use of deci-
sion theory, Bayesian networks and influence diagrams for handling forensic inference
and decision problems. The objective of the practical aspects of this thesis is to study
these propositions.
Chapter 7: Results and Discussion summarizes the results of the studies for the propo-
sitions presented in Chapter 6 by explaining how to confront one-stage and two-stage
decision problems in forensic science. The separate studies referred to in this chapter
figure in Part III.
Chapter 8: Conclusions summarizes the dissertation’s contributions and describes the
implications of the results in a larger context of forensic science and of its role in
judicial decision making.
PART III: PUBLISHED PAPERS contains the case studies applying decision theory,
Bayesian networks and influence diagrams to different forensic inference and decision prob-
lems. Its five chapters are in the form of separate research papers, published or in the process
of being published, in peer-reviewed journals:
Chapter 9: Modeling the forensic two-trace problem with Bayesian networks
presents a generic Bayesian network for a forensic inference problem known as the
two-trace problem.
Chapter 10: Bayesian networks and the value of the evidence for the forensic
two-trace transfer problem explains how to contruct Bayesian networks for more
complex inference problems of a two-trace scenario.
Chapter 11: The database search problem: A question of rational decision mak-
ing presents the application of decision theory and influence diagrams to the decision
of individualizing a person as the trace’s source when this person is found as a single
hit in a database search.
Chapter 12: Decision analysis for the genotype designation in low-template-
DNA profiles presents the application of decision theory and influence diagrams
to the decision of choosing the genotype to search for in a database of DNA profiles
from potential sources.
Chapter 13: Decision-theoretic reflections on processing a fingermark presents the
application of decision theory and influence diagrams to the decision of submitting a
fingermark to the comparison process with prints of its potential sources.
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Chapter 2
Justification for a Bayesian and
Decision-theoretic Framework
2.1 Decisions in forensic science
The decisions can lead to serious consequences in the administration of justice, such as
determining whether the true perpetrator is found and convicted of the crime, or whether
an innocent person is acquitted.1 These decisions are therefore of the utmost importance
and must be made based on coherent foundations that can be used to justify the resulting
choices in a court of law.
Yet, the decisions that forensic scientists must make inevitably come with the following
challenges:
 they must be made in the presence of uncertainty ;
 each is made in a unique context, formed by the circumstances of the particular case;
 they can be complex due to numerous pieces of information (say, variables) that are
not necessarily independent of each other.
To handle these challenges, forensic decision making should be supported by a robust frame-
work that makes:
(i) inferences under uncertainty, and
(ii) decisions based on these inferences.
As discussed in Section 1, only a normative approach makes sense for such a framework if
we want it to help forensic scientists make more consistent, or as Lindley (1985) calls them,
coherent decisions.
2.2 A normative framework for ensuring coherence
Due to the inevitable presence of uncertainty when making the decisions,
it will not be possible to say that a decision is right but only that these decisions
cohere, or not. It is the relationships between events or decisions that matter, not the
individual events or decisions. (Lindley, 1985, p. 22)
1See, for example, footnote 7 on page 2 concerning the American Innocence Project.
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A normative framework provides constraints that ensure coherence in decision making. Es-
sentially, these constraints demand that the decision-maker’s degrees of belief in uncertain
events, as well as her degrees of satisfaction with the choices’ possible consequences, obey
the laws of probability.2 It has been shown that making coherent decisions is beneficial
to the decision-maker, because it prevents her from obtaining sure losses3 (Ramsey, 1931;
de Finetti, 1980, 1970; Cornfield, 1967; Lindley, 1985, 2006; Parmigiani and Inoue, 2009).
By providing a logical foundation, a normative approach therefore offers the potential for
improving the decisions made (Lindley, 2006). It gives the forensic scientist a transpar-
ent and rational foundation which she can use to organize her thoughts and to justify her
choices. Note that the aim of a normative approach is not to replace the forensic scientist
as the decision-maker, but rather to provide her with tools, or a standard on how a decision
in a particular scenario should be made, that she can use to make coherent decisions.4
The next step is to define this normative framework. Statisticians and legal scholars have
shown that a Bayesian5 framework provides the most adequate normative model for judicial
decision making (e.g., Lindley, 1977a; Kaye, 1979; Fienberg and Schervish, 1986; Robertson
and Vignaux, 1993; Redmayne, 2001), and, as a consequence, also for representing the value
of scientific evidence (e.g., Finkelstein and Fairley, 1970; Lindley, 1975, 1977b; Evett, 1983;
Aitken and Stoney, 1991; Saks and Koehler, 1991; Robertson and Vignaux, 1995a,b; Evett
and Weir, 1998; Aitken and Taroni, 2004). A Bayesian framework is adequate for dealing
with the uncertainty present in judicial decision making because it provides a coherent
way of describing the uncertainty in a particular case, and a means to logically update
an individual’s degrees of belief in the light of new information (e.g., evidential testimony)
(Finkelstein and Fairley, 1970). In addition, it provides a framework not only for making
inferences, but also for making decision. The next two sections summarize these ideas.
2.3 Subjective probabilities and Bayes’ theorem for mak-
ing inferences
In a judicial setting, the factfinder (judge or jury) faces two opposing parties, each relating
a different story of a past event. The factfinder can never know with certainty what truly
2The basic laws of probability are:
1. Convexity Law: A probability of an event X, denoted by Pr(X), is a real number 0 ≤ Pr(X) ≤ 1. If
X is known to be true, Pr(X) = 1, and if X is known to be impossible, Pr(X) = 0.
2. Addition Law: The probability of one of two events occurring, say event X or event Y , is:
Pr(X or Y ) = Pr(X)+Pr(Y )−Pr(XY ). If the two events are mutually exclusive, then Pr(X or Y ) =
Pr(X)+Pr(Y ). If they are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, then Pr(X or Y ) = Pr(X)+Pr(Y ) = 1.
3. Multiplication Law: The probability of two events occurring together, say events X and Y , is:
Pr(X and Y ) = Pr(Y ∣X) × Pr(X).
3Sure losses occur when there is a Dutch book. A Dutch book is a combination of bets whose probabilities
do not obey the laws of probability and are therefore incoherent. For example, if events X, Y and Z are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive (i.e., not more than one of them can occur, but one of them must occur),
then betting odds of 3 to 1 against X (i.e., Pr(X) = 1
4
), 2 to 1 against Y (i.e., Pr(Y ) = 1
3
) and evens against
Z (i.e., Pr(Z) = 1
2
) constitute a Dutch book because Pr(X) + Pr(Y ) + Pr(Z) = 13
12
is greater than 1 and
therefore violates the Addition Law (see footnote 2 in this chapter). A person who bets on each of these
events so as to be sure to bet on the winning event, and places the stakes in function of the betting odds so
that each should break even in the long run, will always lose a certain amount of money: for example, placing
a stake of 3$ on event X, 4$ on event Y and 6$ on event Z means the person pays a total of 3$+4$+6$ = 13$,
yet, if X occurs, this person wins 4×3$ = 12$, if Y occurs 3×4$ = 12$, and if Z occurs 2×6$ = 12$, producing
a sure loss of 1$ (this numerical example is based on the example presented in Taroni et al. (2001, p. 148)).
4When a normative approach is used to provide such a standard for a practical application, literature
calls this approach a prescriptive approach to decision making (e.g., Lindley, 1985; Kaye, 1986; Lindley,
2006).
5The term Bayesian describes a method of inference that updates personal beliefs about an event after
observing a set of data. This method is named after Reverend Thomas Bayes, who first described this
reasoning process in 1763 (Bayes, 1763), establishing what is now known as Bayes’ Theorem (Eq. (2.1)).
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happened (Kaplan, 1968). The factfinder is uncertain, and her degree of uncertainty is
different for each case. Given a case’s circumstancial information and the stories presented
by the parties, the factfinder or the parties formulate propositions6 regarding the disputed
issue. For the evaluations that follow to be coherent, these propositions must be mutually
exclusive7. For example, in a criminal trial where the uncertain event is whether the
defendant committed the crime, these propositions are:
proposition 1: the defendant committed the crime,
proposition 2: the defendant did not commit the crime; someone else in the population of
potential suspects committed the crime.
The factfinder cannot state that one of these propositions is certain to be true, or certain
to be false, for her.8 Thus she must have a degree of belief in each one that is somewhere
inbetween these two extremes.
In the Bayesian framework, subjective (or personal) probabilities quantify these de-
grees of belief (de Finetti, 1980, 1993; Ramsey, 1931; Savage, 1972; Jeffrey, 2004). These
probabilities should by no means be understood as arbitrary. By definition, they are con-
ditional on an individual’s knowledge and experience, and describe a personal relationship
between this individual and her outside world (e.g., Lindley, 1978). Their key advantage
over a frequentist interpretation of probabilities (i.e., calculating the frequency of an out-
come from a sequence of repetitions of similar events), is that subjective probabilities can
describe a person’s belief in the truth of events that occur only once, for which a strictly
frequentist definition seems inadequate. The particular offense that the defendant is charged
with is such a one-time event. The uncertainty surrounding it is therefore a subjective, or
personal, notion representing a particular person’s state of mind. Only subjective probabil-
ities make sense for quantifying this degree of belief (Finkelstein and Fairley, 1970; Lindley,
1977a; Taroni et al., 2001).
A quantitative measure of an individual’s subjective probabilities exists by comparing
that individual’s belief in an event to the betting conditions which the individual chooses
for and against that event (de Finetti, 1993, 1970).9 If these quantitative assessments are
coherent, it has been shown that subjective probabilities obey the laws of probability. This
justifies their use in a normative framework for making coherent decisions, where obeying
the laws of probability is a requirement (see Section 2.2).
According to the definition of subjective probabilities, all probabilities are conditional
because they are conditioned on a person’s knowledge. Notationwise, Pr(·∣·) will denote
a conditional probabiltity. This expression designates the conditional probability of the
element(s) to the left of the vertical bar, given the element(s) to the right of the vertical
bar. For example, if we denote by I a person’s knowledge at a given point in time, by Θ1
proposition 1, and by Θ2 proposition 2, Pr(Θ1∣I) and Pr(Θ2∣I) denote this person’s degrees
of belief in Θ1 and Θ2 at the point in time described by I.
As the factfinder hears evidential testimony, this testimony will modify the factfinder’s
knowledge by adding new pieces of information concerning the case. As a result, the
factfinder’s degrees of belief in the propositions may change. The Bayesian framework’s
principal property is that of providing a logical means to update an individual’s initial de-
grees of belief to take into account a new piece of information. For this, Bayes’ theorem (a
logical consequence of the laws of probability) describes the relationship between the prob-
ability of a proposition without the new information and the probability of this proposition
with the new information. Mathematically, if we denote a new piece of information here by
E (the mathematical notation will be extended and described in more detail in Section 3.2),
6A proposition is any statement about an event that is either true or false.
7Several propositions are mutually exclusive if never more than one is true.
8According to Cromwell’s rule it is unsatisfactory to speak of absolute certainty or impossibility of events
if this is not demonstratable by logic (Lindley, 2006).
9Another way of ensuring that the probabilities assigned by an individual reflect that individual’s true
degrees of belief is by using a quadratic scoring rule to penalize the assigned values that deviate from the true
beliefs (e.g., de Finetti, 1970). Biedermann et al. (2013) re-explain this idea in a more recent publication.
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Bayes’ theorem for discrete probability distributions10 describes the relationship between
Pr(Θ1∣E, I) and Pr(Θ1∣I) as:
Pr(Θ1∣E, I) = Pr(E∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I)
Pr(E∣I) . (2.1)
Likewise the relationship between Pr(Θ2∣E, I) and Pr(Θ2∣I) is:
Pr(Θ2∣E, I) = Pr(E∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I)
Pr(E∣I) . (2.2)
This updating process may be repeated as many times as necessary to take into account
every new piece of information.
In both of these equations, one may assign Pr(E∣I) by using the rule of the extension
of the conversation11:
Pr(E∣I) = Pr(E∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I) + Pr(E∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I) . (2.3)
Or, one may avoid assigning Pr(E∣I) by dividing Eq. (2.1) by Eq. (2.2). This produces the
odds form of Bayes’ theorem:
Pr(Θ1∣I)
Pr(Θ2∣I)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
prior odds
× Pr(E∣Θ1, I)
Pr(E∣Θ2, I)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
Bayes factor
= Pr(Θ1∣E, I)
Pr(Θ2∣E, I)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
posterior odds
. (2.4)
The posterior odds are equal to the product of the prior odds and the Bayes factor12. Thus,
this equation provides a clear distinction between the contribution of the prior odds and the
contribution of the new piece of information to the posterior odds of a pair of propositions.
Note that in this equation, Θ1 and Θ2 may represent either a simple
13 proposition or a set
of multiple14 propositions. When Θ1 and Θ2 each represent a simple proposition, the Bayes
factor is equal to the likelihood ratio (Berger, 2010), that is, the ratio of the probability
of E given that Θ1 is true (i.e., the likelihood of Θ1 given E) and the probability of E given
that Θ2 is true (i.e., the likelihood of Θ2 given E), in light of the knowledge contained in
I.15 When either Θ1 or Θ2 is a set of multiple propositions, or both are a set of multiple
10Bayes’ theorem also applies to continuous probability distributions. However, this thesis considers
only discrete probability distributions, so the equations for continuous probability distributions have been
ommitted to avoid unnecessary mathematical notation and developments.
11The extension of the conversation (also referred to as the law of total probability) allows one
to assign the probability of an event by breaking it down into conditional probabilities including another
event. These conditional probabilities are sometimes easier to assign than the probability of the event on its
own. For example, the probability of X may be assigned by considering its conditional probabilities on the
mutually exclusive and exhaustive events Y1, . . . , Yn: Pr(X) = ∑ni=1 Pr(X ∣Yi)Pr(Yi).
12By definition, the Bayes factor is equal to the ratio dividing the posterior odds by the prior odds.
13Proposition Θj , j = 1,2, is a simple proposition when the probability of E is the same for all possible
scenarios given I and given that Θj is true.
14Proposition Θj , j = 1,2, consists of a subset of multiple propositions when the probability of E is different
for different possible scenarios given I and given that Θj is true. In this case, each of the different possible
scenarios is a different proposition, and Pr(E∣Θj , I) must be assigned using the rule of the extension of the
conversation (Eq. (2.3)) for these different propositions given Θj .
15Mathematically, the Bayes factor for simple propositions is equal to:
Bayes factor = Pr(Θ1∣E, I)
Pr(Θ2∣E, I) × Pr(Θ2∣I)Pr(Θ1∣I)
= Pr(E∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I)
Pr(E∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I) × Pr(Θ2∣I)Pr(Θ1∣I)
= Pr(E∣Θ1, I)
Pr(E∣Θ2, I) ,
which is the likelihood ratio.
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propositions, the probability of E for the set of multiple propositions must be assigned using
the rule of the extension of the conversation to take into account each of the sub-propositions.
In this case, the Bayes factor depends on probabilities of the propositions, in addition to the
probabilities of E given each of the propositions.16
The odds form of Bayes’ theorem highlights what the value of a piece of evidence is with
regard to the propositions of interest in a case: the value of the evidence is equal to the
Bayes factor. The Bayes factor shows by how much one must modifiy the prior odds to
take into account the information denoted by E. A Bayes factor greater than one means
that this information supports Θ1, a Bayes factor less than one means that this information
supports Θ2, and a Bayes factor equal to one means that this information does not support
either proposition more than the other.17 The more the Bayes factor is different from one
(in either direction), the more important is the contribution of E for assessing the posterior
odds. This valuable insight on the value of the evidence, and on how to combine it with a
factfinder’s previous knowledge and beliefs, has given the Bayesian approach support among
legal scholars, statisticians and forensic scientists (e.g., Lindley, 1975, 1977b; Lempert, 1977;
Redmayne, 2001; Kaye, 1979; Evett, 1983, 1984, 1986; Evett et al., 1987; Evett, 1990; Aitken
and Stoney, 1991; Saks and Koehler, 1991; Robertson and Vignaux, 1993; Champod and
Taroni, 1993, 1994; Robertson and Vignaux, 1995a,b; Evett et al., 1998; Taroni et al., 1998,
2002; Aitken and Taroni, 2004, 2008; Aitken et al., 2010; Nordgaard and Rasmusson, 2012).
In forensic science, the Bayesian framework has formed the basis for a model of case
assessement and interpretation that promotes the use of a Bayes factor, in particular a
likelihood ratio, for representing the value of scientific evidence (Cook et al., 1998a,b, 1999;
Evett et al., 2000b,c). This model shows that a logical approach for interpreting scientific
evidence (Evett and Weir, 1998; Jackson, 2000; Evett et al., 2000c):
(i) depends on the conditioning information I, which consists of the case’s circumstances,
and on the assumptions made in the model;
(ii) must consider at least two mutually exclusive propositions; and
(iii) consists of assigning the probability of the evidence given each of these propositions
(i.e., for forming a likelihood ratio).
After providing a sound foundation, this logical approach now draws the attention of
forensic scientists to more subtle considerations for implementing it in practice. First of all,
the Bayes factor is a function of the propositions Θ1 and Θ2, which means that it will vary
for different formulations of these propositions. This can be confusing if one is not aware of
the different possible formulations and how they affect the evaluation of the Bayes factor.
In particular, one can formulate these propositions at different levels in the hierarchy of
propositions, and, in a multiple trace problem, they may differ in the number of traces they
consider. The hierarchy of propositions distinguishes between (Cook et al., 1998b):
16Mathematically, the Bayes factor for a pair of propositions composed each of a set of multiple propositions
is equal to:
Bayes factor = Pr(E∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I)
Pr(E∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I) × Pr(Θ2∣I)Pr(Θ1∣I)
= ∑ni=1 Pr(E∣Θ1,i, I)Pr(Θ1,i∣I)∑mk=1 Pr(E∣Θ2,k, I)Pr(Θ2,k ∣I) × Pr(Θ2∣I)Pr(Θ1∣I) .
17If the Bayes factor is equal to one, the posterior odds are equal to the prior odds. In this case, E does
not provide the court with any useful information, and is considered to be logically irrelevant (Lempert,
1977). Lempert (1977) speaks of logically relevant evidence when its Bayes factor is different from one,
an idea directly translated from the US Federal Rule of Evidence 401 into the mathematical language of the
Bayesian framework:
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.
11
CHAPTER 2. JUSTIFICATION FOR A BAYESIAN AND
DECISION-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
 source level propositions stating whether a trace comes from a particular item or
person;
 activity level propositions describing the activities that may have caused the transfer
of the traces;
 offense level propositions stating whether an individual committed the crime (e.g.,
the propositions on page 9 are offense level propositions);
and, for DNA traces (Evett et al., 2002):
 sub-source level propositions stating whether DNA comes from a particular person.
In a multiple trace problem, the formulation of the propositions may include either all of
the traces or only one trace (Meester and Sjerps, 2003, 2004a). For each different pair
of propositions, the Bayes factor will involve different parameters, and therefore lead to
different values. Second, the mathematical expressions become increasingly complex and
less transparent for non-statisticians as they take into account more and more variables
that are not necessarily independent of each other. Third, observations, analytical results
and traces rarely come alone so that the evaluation of the value of these results requires
combining several observations, analytical results and traces that may not be independent
of each other. Up to now, research has not addressed these points in a satisfactory way.
Some of these points will be discussed in further detail in Part II. The next section shows
how to extend Bayesian reasoning to decision making.
2.4 Maximizing the expected utility for making deci-
sions
A factfinder’s ultimate task is to reach a decision. In the criminal case discussed in the
previous section, this decision is either to convict or to acquit the defendant: the factfinder
wants to convict a guilty defendant and acquit an innocent defendant. Yet, as seen in the
previous section, the uncertainty inherently present prevents the factfinder from ever being
sure about the defendant’s guilt or innocence (Kaplan, 1968). Probability theory, used for
describing this uncertainty, does not tell the factfinder how to decide.
The normative theory of decision making that directly follows from probability theory is
the principle of maximizing the expected utility (e.g., Good, 1952; Savage, 1972; Raiffa
and Schlaifer, 1961; Lindley, 1977a; Edwards, 1991 - 1992). According to Good (1952):
once the theory of probability is taken for granted, the principle of maximizing the
expected utility per unit time is the only fundamental principle of rational behavior.
(p. 111)
Here rational behavior is understood as the coherent behavior described in Section 2.2.
According to Lindley (1997), the principle of maximizing the expected utility is the
only decision rule that guarantees coherence. According to Edwards (1991 - 1992):
any decision rule meaningfully different from expected utility maximization can be
shown to be inferior to it, in the sense that any other decision rule will implement the
decision maker’s values less well in the long run. (p. 1059)
Hence, coherent decision making that implements the decision-maker’s values as well as pos-
sible is equal to making decisions according to the principle of maximizing the expected
utility.
The principle of maximizing the expected utility is the following: the decision-maker
perceives different degrees of satisfaction for the decision’s different possible consequences,
and wants to make the choice that provides her with the greatest satisfaction. However, not
knowing which consequence each of the possible choices will lead to, she can only choose
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the course of action she expects to provide her with the greatest satisfaction, by using her
probabilities for the uncertain event as the weights for the degrees of satisfaction associated
with the possible consequences. Hence, she evaluates the expected satisfaction for each of
the choices, and chooses the one with the maximum expected satisfaction. This procedure
for making choices is the most widely applied principle in decision theory (e.g., Peterson,
2009), and is the only one that will be discussed in this thesis. If one measures the degrees
of satisfaction using utilities (Section 3.3), this idea comes down to maximizing the
expected utility. Analogously, if one measures the degrees of dissatisfaction using losses
(Section 12.2.3), we speak of minimizing the expected loss. Section 3 presents the
mathematical meaning of these notions. For now, it suffices to say that utilities and losses
quantify the degrees of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, respectively, and that decision theory
advocates maximizing the expected satisfaction, or minimizing the expected dissatisfaction.
Kaplan (1968) recognized that this principle could be applied to judicial decision mak-
ing. For a criminal trial, he considered the losses associated with convicting and acquitting
the defendant: the losses associated with convicting a guilty and acquitting an innocent
defendant are set to 0, so that the decision problem reduces to defining the loss of convicting
an innocent defendant and the loss of acquitting a guilty defendant (Table 2.1). Applying
Table 2.1: A regret matrix for the decision of convicting or acquitting the defendant. The columns represent
the propositions, the rows the actions, and the table is filled out with the losses associated to each of the
possible consequences. The best consequences are those with a loss of 0, here either convicting a guilty
defendant or acquitting an innocent person. The loss values associated to the other two possible consequences
are positive numbers that reflect the extent of the loss associated with each of the false verdicts.
Θ1: guilty Θ2: innocent
convict 0 loss of convicting innocent
acquit loss of acquitting guilty 0
the principle of minimizing the expected loss, the factfinder convicts the defendant if the
expected loss of acquitting is greater than the expected loss of convicting. Mathematically,
if the probability Pr(Θ1∣E, I) from the previous section denotes the factfinder’s final prob-
ability that the defendant is guilty, and with Pr(Θ2∣E, I) = 1 − Pr(Θ1∣E, I), we obtain the
following decision rule:
convict if and only if:
Pr(Θ1∣E, I) × loss of acquitting guilty > [1 − Pr(Θ1∣E, I)] × loss of convicting innocent .
Mathematical reformulation of this equation leads to a threshold probability for Pr(Θ1∣E, I)
marking the transition point on a scale from 0 to 1 where the factfinder should switch from
acquitting the defendant to convicting the defendant:
convict if and only if:
Pr(Θ1∣E, I) > 1
1 + loss of acquitting the guiltyloss of convicting the innocent . (2.5)
Hence, the application of the principle of expected utility maximization provides a threshold
probability for choosing a verdict based on the relative magnitude of the losses assigned
to the possible erroneous verdicts. For example, if these losses have the same value, then
the threshold probability (Eq. (2.5)) is 0.5. This corresponds to the “preponderance of
evidence” rule applied in civil cases. For criminal cases, the loss of convicting an innocent
person has long been considered to be greater than the loss of acquitting a guilty person
(e.g., Blackstone (1765-1769), Hale (1847), and Fortescue (F. Grigor transl. 1917) cited by
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Kaplan, 1968, p. 1077),18 leading to a higher threshold probability.19
The application of such a threshold minimizes the expected loss. It is important to note
that this does not always minimize the actual loss (Kaye, 1997, 1999). Yet, as Kaye (1999)
puts it,
it is hard to know what rule would do better. (p. 25)
According to Edwards (1991 - 1992):
we like the decisions that control our lives to be wise. That is, we want these decisions
to implement our values as well as they can be made to do so. In a world of fallible
inferences, we can accomplish this only by maximizing expected utility; fact-finding
specifies the probabilities that define expectations. (p. 1060)
Given that we want judicial decision making to implement society’s values as well as possible,
decision theory provides the most adequate normative model for decision problems in law.
According to Kaye (1988):
This Bayesian decision theory, or some less elaborate variant on it, has proved fruitful
in the study of the burden of persuasion. As with Bayesian inference, its usefulness in
describing the decision-making of jurors and mock jurors has been the subject of many
empirical studies. Likewise, (. . . ) many a law review article has drawn on the power
of decision theory to analyze the burden of persuasion. (p. 12)
On the one hand, legal scholars have recognized the potential of Bayesian inference and
decision theory as a normative model for the legal fact-finding process. On the other hand,
forensic scientists have recognized the potential of Bayesian inference for handling forensic
inference problems, yet have not yet fully recognized the potential of decision theory as a
normative model for making and justifying decisions made by forensic scientists.20 Yet, by
definition, forensic science is the application of scientific knowledge to legal problems.21 It
is therefore only a logical extension that the principles that form a normative model for the
legal fact-finding process should also apply to forensic science.
Like the factfinder, forensic scientists must make decisions in the presence of uncertainty.
No decision rule can guarantee that the scientist makes the correct choice in every case.
As a consequence, the most that a court of law can ask of the forensic scientist is that her
decisions are coherent given her state of knowledge and objectives at the moment of making
the decision. The application of decision theory assures coherent decision making. Hence,
forensic decision problems will be modeled using decision theory.
18The cited texts of Blackstone, Hale and Fortescue are freely available on the internet at the following
websites:
 Blackstone, W. Commentaries of the Laws of England, Book 4, Chapter 27, 1765-1769, made avail-
able by the Lonang Institute: http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla-427.htm (last visited on
23.06.2013);
 Hale, M. Historia placitorium coronae: The history of the pleas of the crown, Volume 2, W. Stokes
and E. Ingersoll ed., Robert H. Small, Philadelphia, 1847: p. 288, made available by Google Books:
http://books.google.ch/books?id=gB4eAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs ge summary r&ca
d=0#v=onepage&q&f=false (last visited on 23.06.2013);
 Fortescue, J. Commendation of the Laws of England, F. Grigor translation, Sweet & Maxwell,
Ltd, London, 1917: p. 45, digitalized version by Microsoft Corporation in coopera-
tion with Cornell University Libraries, 2007, made available by Cornell University Library:
http://archive.org/stream/cu31924021661909#page/n65/mode/2up (last visited on 23.06.2013).
19For further discussions on this threshold probability and its implications for judicial decision making,
see for example Kaplan (1968); Kaye (1986); Connolly (1987); Kaye (1997, 1999).
20There have been a few publications that go in this direction, yet they are scarce and only apply to a few
isolated decision problems (Chapter 5).
21Merriam-Webster dictionary, at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/forensic (last visited on
31.05.2013).
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Decision Theory
Decision theory focuses on choosing and justifying a rational course of action on the basis of
the inferences made in the presence of uncertainty (e.g., Savage, 1951, 1972; Edwards, 1954;
Pratt et al., 1964). The difficulty of decision making under uncertainty is that an unknown
condition determines the consequence of the chosen action. This condition, called the state
of nature (or the state of the world), is beyond the control of the decision-maker and
unknown to the decision-maker at the time of making the decision (and may remain unknown
even after making the decision). If the decision-maker knew the state of nature, she would
be able to predict each action’s consequence with certainty and choose the action whose
consequence brings her the most satisfaction. However, without this perfect knowledge, she
can only consider her probabilities for the various states of nature, and not which one of
them is true. She must thus act under uncertainty. Decision theory’s major feature is that of
combining probabilities for measuring this uncertainty with utilities or losses decribing the
decision-maker’s preferences among the decision’s possible consequences. By weighing the
utility or loss of each consequence with its probability of occurring, the rational1 decision-
maker makes the choice that maximizes her expected utility (or minimizes her expected
loss).
3.1 Origins
The study of rational decision making is nothing new. The first notions of utility date back
to Blaise Pascal’s argumentation in 1670 (known as “Pascal’s wager”) on why people should
choose to believe in God.2 Decision theory, or more specifically the theory of expected
utility maximization, has its roots in the solution to Nicolas Bernoulli’s St. Petersburg
Paradox (Lengwiler, 2009).3 Yet, it wasn’t until the 1940s that the theory became more
1Rational is a synonym to coherent. Rational decision making therefore means making decisions
according to the principle of maximizing the expected utility, and a rational decision-maker is one who
acts according to this principle.
2According to Pascal, the disutility of living as if God did not exist when he actually does exist is so great
(eternal damnation in hell) that people should live as though God exists, even if the prior probability of
God’s existence is considered very small, and even though the utility during a person’s lifetime is considered
greater if the person lives as though God didn’t exist, than if the person leads a religious life. Though this
argumentation led to many philosophical debates, it was the first description of a decision based on the
expected utility of the possible consequences (Lengwiler, 2009).
3The St. Petersburg Paradox refers to gamble in which a fair coin is tossed: if it lands on tails, the game
is over, but if it lands on heads, the coin is tossed again, and the game is repeated until the coin lands on
tails. The gambler’s gain depends on the number of tosses, doubling with each toss (for example, if 1 toss
gives a gain of 2 CHF, 2 tosses gives a gain of 4 CHF, 3 tosses a gain of 8 CHF, and so on). The question
is, how much is the gambler willing to pay to participate in this gamble? The paradox consists of the fact
that the expected value of the gamble (obtained by summing the products of the value of the expected gain
and the probability of that gain) is infinity, however, no person is willing to bet their entire fortune on this
gamble. Gabriel Cramer (in 1728) and Daniel Bernoulli (in 1738) argued that this paradox could be solved
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concrete, when von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) postulated a series of axioms that
utilities need to follow (Section 3.3). Savage (1972) then extended these ideas by eliciting a
set of axioms that form the basis of Bayesian decision theory. In addition to von Neumann
and Morgenstern (The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1947)) and Savage (The
Foundations of Statistics (1954)), the major contributions came from Ramsey (Truth and
Probability (1926)), and Wald (Statistical Decision Functions (1950)). A clear explanation
of each of these contributions can be found in Parmigiani and Inoue (2009).
3.2 Mathematical notation
There are four distinct spaces (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961), denoted here as follows:
 an action space A: This space consists of an exhaustive4 list of mutually exclusive5
actions denoted a1, a2, . . . , am.
 a state space Θ: This space contains the possible states of nature. Here, these are
discrete so that Θ is partitioned into n possible states denoted Θ1,Θ2, . . . ,Θn.
 a test space T : This space consists of an exhaustive list of mutually exclusive actions
that can be undertaken to obtain more information, t1, t2, . . . , tp, and the possibility
of not undertaking any action to obtain more information, denoted t0.
 a space of possible test results E: This space contains the possible results obtained
from performing an action in T , and these results are denoted Eth1 ,Eth2 , . . . ,Ethqh , h =
0,1,2, . . . , p, with qh denoting the number of possible results obtained from performing
action th.
The combination of A with Θ, that is A × Θ, produces a fifth space:
 the space of the actions’ possible consequences C: The consequence C(ai,Θj),
abbreviated by Cij , denotes the consequence of the decision-maker choosing action ai,
i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m}, when Θj , j ∈ {1,2, . . . , n}, is true.
Further random variables will be denoted with capital roman or greek letters according
to the same scheme as Θ: the capital letter without subscripts denotes the variable’s set
of possible states, and the capital letter with a subscript one of its states. For Boolean
variables6, the capital letter describing the random variable denotes the state “true” of this
variable, and this capital letter preceded by the symbol “¬” denotes its negation, that is,
the state “false” of this variable. The results presented in this thesis consider only discrete
random variables so that each has a predefined number of exhaustive and mutually exclusive
states. In some cases, the same capital letter will be used to denote multiple appearances of
a particular variable in a problem, and in these cases, prime marks or superscripts will be
used to distinguish between them.
Each variable is characterized by a probability distribution representing the degree of
belief the decision-maker has in each of the states being true at a given point in time. These
degrees of belief are described by subjective (or personal) probabilities (de Finetti, 1980),
as described on page 9.
by considering expected utilities instead of expected values (Bernoulli, 1954): Cramer proposed to calculate
the utility as the square root of the monetary gain, and Bernoulli proposed the logarithm of the gain as the
utility function.
4The list is exhaustive when the decision-maker inevitably chooses one of the actions in the list. Note
that if it is possible for the decision-maker to do nothing, then this possibility must be defined as one of the
actions for the action space to be exhaustive.
5The actions are mutually exclusive if the decision-maker can never choose more than one of them at
one time.
6A Boolean variable is a variable with two possible states: “true” and “false”.
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To quantify the decision-maker’s preferences among the actions’ possible consequences,
utilities or losses will be used, denoted by the following expressions:
 u(ai,Θj) = u(Cij) is the utility of consequence Cij , i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1,2, . . . , n};
 l(ai,Θj) = l(Cij) is the loss of consequence Cij , i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1,2, . . . , n}.
The decision-theoretic analysis of a problem will compute the expected utility u¯(ai∣·), or
the expected loss l¯(ai∣·), of each of the possible actions ai ∈ A, with the information available
to the decision-maker at the time of making the decision to the right of the conditioning
bar. For example, u¯(a1∣I) is the decision-maker’s expected utility for performing action a1
given the information contained in I.
The rest of the symbols used follow conventional mathematical notation.
3.3 Utilities
Utilities measure the desirability of each of the possible consequences Cij , i = 1,2, . . . ,m, j =
1,2, . . . , n, based on the decision-maker’s objectives and personal preferences. A utility
function u ∶ C → R represents the desirability of each possible consequence Cij as a numerical
value. It is a subjective notion (again in the sense of personal, not arbitrary), meaning
that decision-makers with different objectives and preferences may have different preference
orderings of the possible consequences.
If we consider that each possible action ai, i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m}, leads to a particular prob-
ability distribution over C, then the decision-maker’s preference ordering of Cij leads the
decision-maker to have a preference ordering of these possible probability distributions.
These probability distributions can be seen as gambles specifying the probabilities of ob-
taining each of the possible consequences Cij .
Utility theory states that a probability distribution (or gamble) 1, denoted here as g1,
is preferred to a probability distribution (or gamble) 2, denoted here as g2, if and only if
the expected utility of the consequence obtained by probability distribution (or gamble) 1
is greater than the expected utility of the consequence obtained by probability distribution
(or gamble) 2:
g1 ≻ g2 ⇔ u¯(g1) > u¯(g2) ,
where the symbol ≻ means “is preferred to”.
To ensure that there exists a unique utility function possessing this property, the following
axioms should be satisfied (e.g., DeGroot, 1970; Berger, 2010):
Axiom 1: It is possible for the decision-maker to order the possible probability distributions
(gambles) from best to worst, or to explicitly state her indifference between two,
or several, of them: i.e., for each g1 and g2, either g1 ≻ g2 (g1 is preferred to g2),
g1 ≺ g2 (g2 is preferred to g1), or g1 ∼ g2 (the decision-maker is indifferent between
g1 and g2).
Axiom 2: These preferences respect the property of transitivity: i.e., if g1 ⪯ g2 and g2 ⪯ g3,
then g1 ⪯ g3 must be true, where the symbol ⪯ means “is not preferred to”.
Axiom 3: The preferences between two probability distributions (gambles) do not change
when these are represented as compound gambles7: i.e., if g1 ⪯ g2, then pg1 + (1−
p)g ⪯ pg2+(1−p)g for any probability distribution (gamble) g and any probability
p.
7A compound gamble between two probability distributions (gambles) means that one of them will occur
with a probability p and the other with a probability (1 − p).
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Axiom 4: If g1 ⪯ g2 ⪯ g3, then there must exist two probabilities p1, p2 ∈ (0,1) so that
p1g1 + (1 − p1)g3 ⪯ g2 and g2 ⪯ p2g1 + (1 − p2)g3. This means that all gambles are
comparable with each other in the sense that no gambles are infinitely desirable
or infinitely undesirable.
Following from these axioms, one can prove that there exists a unique number p ∈ (0,1)
for any consequences C1, C2 and C3, where C1 ⪯ C2 ⪯ C3, so that the decision-maker
is indifferent between a gamble that produces consequence C2 with certainty and a gamble
that produces consequence C1 with probability p and consequence C3 with probability (1−p)
(DeGroot, 1970):
C2 ∼ pC1 + (1 − p)C3 . (3.1)
When this is satisfied it can be proved that (DeGroot, 1970):
u(C2) = p × u(C1) + (1 − p) × u(C3) . (3.2)
Such a utility function is unique up to a linear transformation (e.g., DeGroot, 1970; Berger,
2010).
These axioms thus provided decision theory with a means for quantifiying and unifying
the satisfaction obtained from each of the possible consequences on a single scale. Further,
the comparison of gambles defines coherent numerical values for a decision-maker’s utili-
ties. This is best seen by considering a utility scale from 0 to 1, where the most desirable
consequence (which we shall denote by C+) has a utility of 1:
u(C+) = 1 .
Analogously, the least desirable consequence (denoted by C−) has a utility of 0:
u(C−) = 0 .
The utilities of the remaining consequences u(Cij), i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1,2, . . . , n},
are somewhere between 0 and 1. The decision-maker can find their numerical values by
comparing the following two gambles (e.g., Pratt et al., 1964):
gamble 1: obtain consequence Cij for sure,
gamble 2: obtain the most desirable consequence C+ with a probability of Pr(C+) and the
least desirable consequence C− with a probability of Pr(C−) = 1 − Pr(C+).
Which gamble does the decision-maker prefer? If Pr(C+) is very small, the decision-maker
will choose gamble 1. If Pr(C+) is very large, she shall choose gamble 2. Thus, there
must be a single value for Pr(C+) marking the turning point somewhere between these two
probabilities, where the decision-maker will be indifferent between gambles 1 and 2. This
value for the probability of Pr(C+) is equal to the decision-maker’s utility for consequence
Cij . In other words:
u(Cij) = u(C+) × Pr(C+) + u(C−) × (1 − Pr(C+))= 1 × Pr(C+) + 0 × (1 − Pr(C+))= Pr(C+) . (3.3)
For example, a utility of u(Cij) = 0.7 signifies that the decision-maker is indifferent between
obtaining consequence Cij for sure and a gamble that gives her the best possible consequence
with a probability of 0.7 and the worst possible consequence with a probability of 0.3. A
decision-maker’s utilities must satisfy all possible pairs of gambles for these utilities to be
coherent and lead to coherent choices of actions.
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3.4 Losses
A loss is defined as a non-negative number, equal to the difference between the utility of the
best possible consequence C+ and the utility of the consequence for which the loss is being
evaluated Cij (e.g., Berger, 2010):
l(Cij) = u(C+) − u(Cij) . (3.4)
Translating the utility scale into losses according to Eq. (11.11), produces a scale ranging
from 0 to describe the most desirable consequence:
l(C+) = u(C+) − u(C+)= 1 − 1= 0 , (3.5)
to 1 to describe the least desirable consequence:
l(C−) = u(C+) − u(C−)= 1 − 0= 1 .
From Eq. (11.11) and (3.5), it follows that the loss assigned to consequence Cij is equal to:
l(Cij) = 1 − u(Cij),
which, according to Eq. (3.3), is equal to
l(Cij) = 1 − Pr(C+) ,= Pr(C−) .
Thus, the loss assigned to consequence Cij is equal to the probability Pr(C−) which makes
the decision-maker indifferent between obtaining consequence Cij for sure, and a gamble
leading to the least desirable consequence C− with a probability of Pr(C−) and to the most
desirable consequence C+ with a probability of Pr(C+) = 1 − Pr(C−). For example, a loss
of l(Cij) = 0.7 means that the decision-maker is indifferent between obtaining consequence
Cij for sure and obtaining the worst possible consequence with a probability of 0.7 and a
gamble that gives her the best possible consequence with a probability of 0.3.
3.5 One-stage decision problems
In a one-stage decision problem, the decision consists of choosing an action in A based on
the decision-maker’s current knowledge of the state of nature. In this case, the decision-
maker has a utility or loss function over all of the possible consequences in C. A rational
decision-maker will choose the action that maximizes the satisfaction she expects to obtain.
In terms of utilities, this corresponds to choosing the action that maximizes the expected
utility:
arg max
i
u¯(ai∣·) = arg max
i
n∑
j=1u(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣·) ,
and in terms of losses, the action that minimizes the expected loss:
arg min
i
l¯(ai∣·) = arg min
i
n∑
j=1 l(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣·) .
This action is called the Bayes action (e.g., Berger, 2010).
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3.6 Two-stage decision problems
The probability distribution over Θ is conditioned on the decision-maker’s information. In
Section 2.3, the letter I denoted the information the decision-maker has at a given point in
time. In this section, let this point in time be when the decision-maker is first faced with
the decision of choosing an action in A. In a two-stage decision problem, the question of
interest is, “Should the decision-maker make this decision with her current knowledge I,
or should she acquire an additional piece of information before making this decision?” The
decision-maker therefore faces a sequence of two decisions:
(1) the preliminary decision of choosing an action in T , and
(2) the terminal decision of choosing an action in A.
Note that making the terminal decision is a one-stage decision problem, because when the
decision-maker comes to this point (after having made the preliminary decision), she will
effectively be facing a one-stage decision problem. Thus, solving the terminal decision prob-
lem follows the principle of maximizing the expected utility (minimizing the expected loss),
as described in Section 3.5. The focus of a two-stage decision problem is on how to make
the preliminary decision of obtaining an additional piece of information.
A rational decision-maker (i.e., a decision-maker wanting to maximize the satisfaction
she expects to obtain from choosing an action in A) will acquire an additional piece of
information if its expected value is greater than the cost of aquiring it. This requires a
quantification of the expected value of the additional piece of information.
Decision theory defines the expected value of information, denoted EV OI(th), as
the difference between the maximum expected utility with the information obtained from
performing action th and the maximum expected utility without this information (or the
difference between the minimum expected loss without the information obtained from per-
forming action th and the minimum expected loss with this information) with regard to the
terminal decision.
Consider for example the preliminary decision of choosing between t0 (not obtaining any
additional information) and t1 (performing a particular action that produces an additional
piece of information). For a decision-maker who defined her preferences in terms of utilities,
the maximum expected utility if she chooses t0 is:
8
maxi u¯(ai∣Et01 , I) = maxi n∑
j=1u(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣Et01 , I)
= maxi n∑
j=1u(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣I) , (3.6)
since Et01 is a dummy variable that does not contain any information (i.e., it is the outcome
of choosing action t0, which is to do nothing, and nothing comes from doing nothing). If
the decision-maker chooses t1, the maximum expected utility becomes the weighted average
of the maximum expected utilities for each of the different possible realizations of this new
piece of information (which is still unknown at the moment when the decision-maker must
decide to acquire or not acquire this information):
q∑
k=1 1maxi u¯(ai∣Et1k , I)Pr(Ek ∣I) =
q∑
k=1 1maxi
n∑
j=1u(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣Et1k , I)Pr(Et1k ∣I) , (3.7)
where Pr(Θj ∣Et1k , I) is the updated probability of Θj upon learning Et1k , that is, the pos-
terior probability of Θj . The mathematical relationship between the posterior probability
Pr(Θj ∣Et1k , I) and the prior probability Pr(Θj ∣I) is given by Bayes’ theorem (Eq. (2.1)).
8For preferences defined in losses, the reasoning that leads to the EV OI(t1) is analogous to the reasoning
presented here for utilities. The formula for losses is presented hereafter in Eq. (3.10).
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Inserting Eq. (2.1) into Eq. (3.7) produces:
q∑
k=1 1maxi u¯(ai∣Et1k , I)Pr(Et1k ∣I) =
q∑
k=1 1maxi
n∑
j=1u(Cij)Pr(E
t1
k ∣Θj , I)Pr(Θj ∣I)
Pr(Et1k ∣I) Pr(Et1k ∣I)= q∑
k=1 1maxi
n∑
j=1u(Cij)Pr(Et1k ∣Θj , I)Pr(Θj ∣I) . (3.8)
The EV OI(t1) is the difference between Eqs. (3.8) and (3.6):
EV OI(t1) = q∑
k=1 1maxi u¯(ai∣Et1k , I)Pr(Et1k ∣I) −maxi u¯(ai∣I) (3.9)= q∑
k=1 1maxi
n∑
j=1u(Cij)Pr(Et1k ∣Θj , I)Pr(Θj ∣I) −maxi n∑j=1u(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣I) .
For a decision-maker who defined her preferences in terms of losses, an analogous line of
reasoning leads to the following expression for the EV OI(t1):
EV OI(t1) = mini l¯(ai∣I) − q∑
k=1 1mini l¯(ai∣Et1k , I)Pr(Et1k ∣I) (3.10)= mini n∑
j=1 l(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣I) −
q∑
k=1 1mini
n∑
j=1 l(Cij)Pr(Et1k ∣Θj , I)Pr(Θj ∣I) .
The EV OI(t1) is always greater than or equal to zero, reflecting the informative value
of additional information (e.g., Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961; Good, 1967; Watson and Brown,
1978; DeGroot, 1984). If this value is greater than the cost of performing t1, the decision-
maker should acquire the additional information. If this value is less than the cost, the
rational decision-maker would choose not to acquire the information. In other words,
the decision-maker in this decision problem seeks to maximize the expected net gain
(ENG(th), h = 0,1) (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961) (sometimes also referred to as the ex-
pected profit (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007)). She should therefore choose:
arg max
h
ENG(th) = arg max
h
[EV OI(th) − c(th)] , h = 0,1 , (3.11)
where c(th) denotes the absolute value of the cost of choosing action th. The cost c(t0) is
equal to 0, and the cost c(t1) to the cost of performing t1 that will produce information Et1k .
Note that to evaluate the ENG(th), c(th) and the EV OI(th) must be quantified in the
same units (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961; Lindley, 1997). Equation (3.11) is readily extendable
to h = 0,1,2, . . . , p for solving a preliminary decision with multiple possible tests9 producing
different types of information.
3.6.1 Optimal sample size
Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) originally developed the above equations (Eqs. (3.9)-(3.11)) for
determining the optimal sample size. In a sampling problem, the decision-maker wishes to
determine the proportion of units in a confined entity that have a particular characteristic.
The classic case is that there is a group of N discrete units, all identical except for the
presence or absence of the trait of interest (i.e., the trait for which the decision-maker
wishes to determine the proportion in the group). The decision-maker has the possibility of
examining individual units. Assuming that no errors are possible in this examination process,
she will determine with certainty whether or not the trait is present in these examined units.
Thus, examining every single unit in the group allows the decision-maker to determine the
9Note that the word “test” is used here in a decision-theoretic sense to refer to any possible action
belonging to space T (see Section 3.2). In the context of forensic science, these “tests” take the form of
examinations and analyses.
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proportion with certainty. However, a cost associated with the examination of a unit, and
the decision-maker’s limited resources do not allow her to examine every single one. The
question is therefore, “How many units should the decision-maker examine?”
This is a two-stage decision problem where making a statement on the proportion is the
terminal decision, and choosing the sample size is the preliminary decision (Lindley, 1997).
Let h = 0,1, . . . ,N denote the possible sample sizes (i.e., the number of units to examine),
and th the action of examining h items. First, as h increases, the ENG(th) will increase
because the information obtained from the samples will allow the decision-maker to make
a better informed terminal decision with a greater expected utility (or a smaller expected
loss). However, at some point, this increase in expected utility (or decrease in expected loss)
will be smaller than the cost of examining an additional unit. At this point, the ENG(th)
decreases with increasing h, due to the sampling cost. The optimal sample size is the h for
which the ENG(th) is maximal (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961; Lindley, 1997).
This line of reasoning applies to both fixed sample size problems (i.e., choosing the sample
size before sampling any items) and sequential analysis problems (redoing the calculation
after each sample to decide whether to stop sampling and make the terminal decision, or
continue sampling). For further explanations concerning these two approaches, see Taroni
et al. (2010, Section 7.4).
3.6.2 The special case of perfect information
If the information provided by Et1k tells the decision-maker with certainty what the true
state of nature is, then we speak of perfect information, and the EV OI(t1) reduces to:
n∑
j=1 maxi u(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣I) −maxi n∑j=1u(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣I) ,
for utilities, and to:
mini
n∑
j=1 l(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣I) − n∑j=1 mini l(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣I) ,
for losses. This value is called the expected value of perfect information. It quantifies
how much perfect knowledge of the state of nature is worth in the decision problem. For
a rational decision-maker, it corresponds to the maximum amount that she would pay to
obtain additional information before making the terminal decision (Raiffa and Schlaifer,
1961).
However, in practice information is never perfect, that is, it will always leave some doubt
on the true state of nature. To differentiate between the expected value of perfect information
and the EV OI(th) that is not perfect, literature calls the EV OI(th) in Eqs. (3.9) and
(3.10) for h = 1 the expected value of partial information (Lindley, 1985; Taroni et al.,
2010), the expected value of sample information (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961), and
the expected benefit (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007; Korb and Nicholson, 2011). Because in
practice information is never perfect, the EV OI(th) will refer to this value in the rest of
this thesis.
3.7 Sensitivity analyses
The most rational course of action defined by the above equations depends on: (i) the
decision-maker’s utility (or loss) function, and (ii) the probability distributions over Θ andE . In one-stage decision problems, the utility (or loss) function determines a threshold proba-
bility of Θj marking the transition point between two different Bayes actions. Equation (2.5)
in Section 2.4 is an example for such a threshold in judicial decision making. Choosing a par-
ticular action is therefore equivalent to assigning a particular probability distribution over
the possible states of nature (Edwards, 1988). If this probability distribution, for example
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Pr(Θ1∣Ethkh), kh = 1, . . . , qh, depends on multiple parameters that define the relationship
between Θ1 and E
th
kh
, then the Bayes action also depends on the values assigned to these
parameters. In both cases, variations in these probability assignments and parameter values
may lead to different Bayes actions. For this reason,
[a] decision analysis that does not include a set of sensitivity analyses would be regarded
by virtually any practitioner as woefully incomplete if the issue at hand were of any
importance or difficulty. (Edwards, 1988, p. 338)
Sensitivity analyses study the impact of the values and probabilities in a decision
model on the Bayes action. The aim is to determine the range of values a particular param-
eter or probability can take and still lead to the same Bayes action. These ranges of values
highlight the critical thresholds that will cause the Bayes action to change. These thresholds
make up a decision strategy, that states under what circumstances to choose which action.
This information makes the decision-maker aware of when she must assign the value of a
parameter or probability with high numerical precision, and when a simple order of magni-
tude suffices for a coherent decision analysis. The aim of a decision-theoretic analysis of a
problem is therefore to determine the decision strategy.
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Graphical Models
Applying probability calculus and decision theory to real problems can become complicated
and time consuming when the problem contains many variables, and/or intricate depen-
dence relationships among these variables. Graphical models provide a means to organize a
problem by representing it in a qualitative structure (e.g., Cowell et al., 2007a). Bayesian
networks are graphical models for making inferences according to the laws of probability, and
influence diagrams are graphical models that represent both probability distributions and
utilities (or losses) for computing expected utilities (losses) in addition to making inferences
(e.g., Jensen and Nielsen, 2007; Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008).
4.1 Bayesian networks
A Bayesian network (BN), sometimes referred to as a normative expert system, imple-
ments probability theory in graphical models composed of (Kim and Pearl, 1983):
 nodes in the form of circles (◯) to represent random variables; and
 arrows to denote the probabilistic relationships between these nodes to form a di-
rected acyclic graph (DAG)1.
The nodes can represent discrete and continuous random variables, yet this thesis considers
only discrete variables. Hence, each node contains the variable’s exhaustive list of mutually
exclusive states (Section 3.2). Each node has a probability distribution over its states.
A probability table associated with each node allows the user to define these probability
distributions:
 if the node has no arrows pointing to it, then this node is called a root node and the
user specifies the probability of each of its possible states; and
 if the node has one or several arrows pointing to it from other nodes, then this node
is called a child node, with the node or nodes having an arrow pointing towards it
called parent node(s), and the user specifies the conditional probabilities of each of
the child node’s states given each state, or combination of states, of its parent node(s).
Hence, the graphical structure defines the probabilistic relationships between the variables by
conditioning the probability distribution of each child node upon its parent(s). In this way,
a BN decomposes the joint probability distribution of a set of random variables X1, . . . ,Xn
into the product of their probabilities conditioned upon their parents:
Pr(X1, ...,Xn) = n∏
i=1Pr(Xi∣parents(Xi)) . (4.1)
1A directed acyclic graph (DAG) connects the nodes using arrows (i.e., directed edges) to form a
structure of connected nodes that never forms a loop when following the paths defined by the arrows.
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This expression, known as the chain rule, is what gives BNs their invaluable capacity of
splitting up a complex inference problem into its different components (e.g., Kjaerulff and
Madsen, 2008). For example, imagine a scenario that can be modeled with six Boolean ran-
dom variables (i.e., variables with the two states “true” and “false” (Section 3.2)) connected
as shown in Fig. 4.1(a). According to Eq. (4.1), the joint probability of them all being true
X
X
X
X
X
X
1
2
3
4
5
6
(a)
Θ
E
(b)
Figure 4.1: Examples of two Bayesian networks (BNs). (a) A BN with six random variables, denoted
by X1,X2, . . . ,X6. (b) A generic structure for representing Eq. (2.4) as a BN, with Θ containing the
propositions of interest in a case (e.g., Θ1: the defendant committed the crime and Θ2: the defendant did
not commit the crime, someone else in the population of potential suspects committed the crime), and E
specifying the observed evidence.
is equal to:
Pr(X1,X2,X3,X4,X5,X6)= Pr(X1)×Pr(X2∣X1)×Pr(X3)×Pr(X4∣X3,X2)×Pr(X5∣X4,X2)×Pr(X6∣X5) .
This means that instead of computing and storing 26 = 64 probabilities, this model only
needs to compute 24 probabilities.
BNs also allow the user to obtain the numerical values of any conditional probabilities
for one or more given states of other variables in the model: for this, the user instantiates2
the variables of the states figuring to the right of the probability’s conditioning bar to these
known states.3 For example, to obtain the value of Pr(X2∣X1) the user instantiates X1 to
the state “true”, and reads the value computed for the state “true” of X2. In this way, the
user can use a Bayesian network to obtain numerical values for the probabilities forming the
likelihood ratio, Bayes factor, or posterior odds seen in Section 2.3 (Eq. (2.4)). Figure 4.1(b)
shows the generic structure for representing Eq. (2.4) as a BN, where Θ represents the
propositions of interest in a case and E specifies the observed evidence (Et11 , figuring in
Eq. (2.4), is one of E’s states).
An object-orientated approach makes it possible to decompose a BN into substructures,
and combine these on several hierarchical levels to form an object oriented Bayesian
network (OOBN). A substructure is referred to as an object or instance of a network
class, which may be a single random variable, or a complex model of its own (such as another
BN) (e.g., Koller and Pfeffer, 1997). Fig. 4.2 illustrates this concept by representing the BN
in Fig. 4.1(a) as an OOBN: Fig. 4.2(a) represents the entire network. By combining different
instances of one or several network classes in a hierarchical structure, an OOBN allows its
2Instantiating a variable means setting the probability of one of its states to certainty (i.e., assigning a
probability of 1).
3This propagation of information in a BN invokes additional concepts and computations that are not
discussed in this thesis. They concern the technical aspects of implementating the probabilistic models
defined by BNs and are independent of the probabilistic model defined by a given BN.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.2: A translation of the BN in Fig. 4.1(a) into an object-oriented Bayesian network (OOBN).
(a) The entire structure, with the instance node EX belonging to the network class called Example. (b)
The network class Example. In figure (b), node X1 has a dashed contour to indicate that it is an input
node in the network class Example (i.e., a node that is not part of the network class, but is a parent of at
least one node in the network class). Node X5 has a shaded contour in both figures to indicate that it is
an output node of the network class Example (i.e., a node that is visible when an instance of the network
class is inserted into another model).
user to construct models for evaluating more complex problems (Koller and Pfeffer, 1997).
That is, the underlying structure of the model is still a BN, and may also be represented
as a BN, but the object-orientation allows the user to reduce the visual complexity of the
interface, differentiate between several hierarchical levels, and combine a set of nodes from
different models. This proves to be very useful for combining a set of identical network frag-
ments that form a repetitive pattern in a regular BN (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007; Kjaerulff
and Madsen, 2008).
4.2 Influence diagrams
An influence diagram (ID), sometimes referred to as a normative expert system, combines
probability and decision theory in a graphical model (e.g., Jensen and Nielsen, 2007; Kjaerulff
and Madsen, 2008). IDs consist of (Shachter, 1986):
 nodes to represent
– random variables in the form of circles (◯),
– the decisions that need to be made in the form of squares (◻), and
– the utilities or losses in the form of diamonds (◇); and
 arrows to denote
– the functional relationships between these nodes in the form of arrows with con-
tinuous lines (Ð→), and
– precedence links between two decision nodes to define the sequence of decisions,
and from a random variable to a decision node to indicate that the state of that
variable is known when making the decision it points to, in the form of arrows
with non-continuous lines (99K).
Again these arrows form a DAG.
An ID is a translation of the spaces in the decision problem into a graphical structure. The
basic structure of an ID combines the three types of nodes as shown in Fig. 4.3(a): the utility
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Figure 4.3: Generic structures of influence diagrams (IDs). Arrows with continuous lines (Ð→) represent
functional relationships between the nodes, and arrows with non-continuous lines (99K) represent precedence
links for decision nodes to indicate that the parent node is instantiated when making the decision in the
child decision node. (a) The general structure of an ID for a one-stage decision problem, combining the
actions (node A), the states of nature (node Θ), and the utilities (node u). (b) The combination of the ID
shown in (a) with the model in Fig. 4.1(b), producing an ID for choosing an action in A given a new piece
of information (node E). (c) Extending the ID in (b) to include the preliminary test decision (node T ) and
the cost of performing this test (node c) produces the generic structure of an ID for a two-stage decision
problem (Korb and Nicholson, 2011). Note that these IDs presented here with a utility function in node u
have identical structures when the decision-maker defines her preferences in terms of losses: in this case, a
diamond-shaped node called l containing this loss function replaces node u.
or loss of a consequence (◇) depends on the action (◻) and on the state of nature (◯). This
is the generic structure for solving a one-stage decision problem. If a piece of information
has updated the decision-maker’s probability distribution over Θ (the state of nature), then
the extended influence diagram shown in Fig. 4.3(b) can take into account this information
(modeled in node E). If obtaining this information is the object of a preliminary decision,
then the addition of a test decision node and a utility node containing the cost of obtaining
this information produces the generic influence diagram structure for a two-stage decision
problem (Fig. 4.3(c)) (Korb and Nicholson, 2011).
The main advantage of an ID is its practical capacity of performing probabilistic and
decision-theoretic calculations in a complex decision problem (Shachter, 1986; Howard and
Matheson, 2005; Jensen and Nielsen, 2007). With this capacity they have successfully met
the needs of several fields faced with important problems of decision making.
4.2.1 Practical implementations
The practical application of IDs ranges from medicine to environmental sciences4 and in-
dustry5. In particular, the domain of medical decision analysis concerned with finding the
optimal treatment by balancing the costs and the benefits of different possible treatments
4For example, decisions concerning the seeding of an approaching hurricane Howard et al. (1972), the
collection of data for assessing nuclear waste (Heger and Hill, 1993), and the treatment of a stream (Heger
and White, 1997).
5For example, finding the optimal maintenance schedule for the components of a production system (Vatn
et al., 1996).
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(e.g., Table 4.1) has accepted a decision-theoretic approach as a valuable tool for rational
decision making:
The strength of decision-theoretic ideas in medicine is that of providing a structure
and an end to the process of gathering, organizing, and integrating the quantitative
information that is relevant to a decision. In this sense, despite the limitations of its
axiomatic foundations, and the cognitive difficulties with representing and communi-
cating values and utilities to the general public, decision-oriented quantification is an
almost indispensable component of good medical decision making. (Parmigiani, 2002,
p. 51)
This domain sees IDs as a useful aid for problems with complex probabilistic relationships
(Owens et al., 1997), and values in particular the IDs’ capacity of compactly representing
complex decisions and highlighting probabilistic relationships (Nease and Owens, 1997). In
addition, the IDs’ capability of combining qualitative, causal knowledge with quantitative,
probabilistic knowledge gives them an advantage over a rule-based classification approach
(Lucas et al., 2000).
Table 4.1 lists only a few examples of medical decision problems which have been modeled
and analyzed through influence diagrams. These are all concerned with applying a particular
treatment or surgical procedure on a patient with a particular set of symptoms and/or
diagnostic test results. They model the decision problem according to the generic structure
in Fig. 4.3(c), by defining:
 action space A: the possible treatments (e.g., perform surgery or not perform surgery);
 state space Θ: the patient’s current health status (e.g., having, or not having, a par-
ticular disease), and/or any other inherent trait of the patient that will influence the
outcome of the treatment (e.g., having a genetic disposition that makes the patient
responsive or non-responsive to the treatment in question);
 test space T : the possible diagnostic tests;
 space of possible test results E : the results of diagnostic tests;
 consequences C: the patient’s possible future health histories (e.g., excellent health,
minor stroke, major stroke, death).
The trickiest aspect in a medical decision problem is defining the utility (or loss) function.
In this decision problem, the decision-maker is the patient or a person, such as a physician,
acting on behalf of the patient’s interests. The probabilities and utilities therefore represent
the patient’s probabilities and utilities. The utility values represent the patient’s benefit,
in terms of her health. This benefit is measured by the patient’s quality-adjusted life
expectancy (QALE) in years. For each of the possible consequences, this value quantifies
the period of time in full health that the patient considers equivalant to a year in the health
state of the consequence (Parmigiani, 2002). The most rational decision is the one that
maximizes the QALE.
The construction of influence diagrams in medicine and other domains reveal the capa-
bility of influence diagrams to deal with complex decision problems.
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Table 4.1: Some examples where IDs model medical decision problems.
Decision problems
Test and treat an infant born to a mother infected with HIV (Owens et al. (1997))
Perform a bacterial culture and treat with antibiotics a patient with a sore throat (Nease and Owens (1997))
Perform diagnostic tests and thoracotomy on a patient with a lung-cancer tumor (Nease and Owens (1997))
Perform a tonsillectomy (surgical procedure) on a patient with a sore throat (Renooij and Gaag (1998))
Perform surgery and treat with chemotherapy and/or radiotherapy a patient with (Lucas et al. (1998))
primary gastric non-Hodgkin lymphoma
Select antibiotic drugs for a patient with signs of pneumonia in the (Lucas et al. (2000))
intensive-care unit
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Chapter 5
Current State of the Art of
Decision-theoretic Models in
Forensic Science
Some papers have addressed forensic decision problems from a normative point of view. This
chapter presents the major publications with regard to the questions of performing or not
performing a test, how many tests to perform, what tests to perform, and what conclusion to
draw. Note that in forensic science, the word “test” should be understood as the application
of forensic examination and/or analytical methods.
5.1 To perform or not to perform a test
5.1.1 Case pre-assessment (Cook et al., 1998a)
In the 1990’s, the UK’s Forensic Science Service (FSS)’s business-like approach to managing
forensic science casework1 led to the desire of improving the cost-effectiveness of forensic
examinations (Blakey, 1995; Cook et al., 1998a). Until then, the forensic scientists at the FSS
exhaustively performed all possible tests on every item that they received. To improve cost-
effectiveness, the FSS proposed to think about the test’s expected results before performing
that test: they called this preliminary stage of reflection case pre-assessment (Cook et al.,
1998a). This stage was part of a model whose aim was to better meet the needs of the
customer (i.e., the policeman or agency asking for the expertise in forensic science) by
implementing an approach that represents the value of scientific evidence by the Bayes
factor (Cook et al., 1998a,b, 1999; Evett et al., 2000b,c).
For each proposition of interest to the customer, case pre-assessment formalizes what re-
sults the scientist expects to obtain from a particular test given the case’s circumstances, and
given that that proposition is true. Expressing these expectations in terms of probabilities,
case pre-assessment produces a probability distribution over the possible likelihood ratio
values for each proposition given that that proposition is true.Case pre-assessment therefore
introduces transparency on the expected contribution of a forensic examination or analytical
method for discriminating between two propositions. Cook et al. (1998a) described these
expectations as
pav[ing] the way for sound decision making during the service delivery phase (p. 153).
1The Home Office’s FSS became an executive agency in 1991. One of the consequences of this transition
was that the FSS began to manage its budget separately, so that its income and expenses became transparent.
As a result, the costs of its services also became transparent to the policemen asking for forensic science
expertise, because they were now charged directly for the work they asked for (Cook et al., 1998a).
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However, how the decisions were to be made based on these expectations was not described
in this model. A probability distribution over the expected results is a key ingredient for
making rational decisions, but as Taroni et al. (2005) pointed out,
it does not offer clear criteria for the decision as to whether or not to perform a test
(p. 895).
The decision does not only depend on the results expected from the test, but also on what
the decision-maker gains (or loses) from these results.
5.1.2 Decision analysis (Taroni et al., 2005)
Taroni et al. (2005) filled this gap by combining the probability distributions over the possible
results with a utility function over these possible results. The combination of these two
produces the expected utility which provides the decision-making criteria of expected utility
maximization (Section 3.5).
Taroni et al. (2005) illustrated this idea by applying it to the decision of performing or
not performing a DNA analysis in contested kinship scenarios (the first row of Table 5.1
summarizes the decision-theoretic framework used). They modeled the posterior probability
of kinship as the decision problem’s state of nature, where ‘posterior’ refers to the probability
of kinship after having made the decision and observed the DNA analysis’s results if the
analysis was performed. According to this definition, the decision’s possible consequences
are the possible posterior probabilities of kinship if the test is performed, and a consequence
of status quo (i.e., my knowledge on the two propositions of interest remains as it is) if the
test is not performed. To create discrete states for the first case, Taroni et al. (2005) used
Hummel’s scale, a scale commonly used for legal kinship decisions, to divide the range of
possible posterior probabilities into six intervals. This produced seven possible consequences:
six for performing the analysis and obtaining a posterior probability in one of the intervals,
and one for not performing the analysis and not obtaining a posterior probability. By
defining a utility function over these seven consequences, the authors evaluated the expected
utilities of performing and not performing a DNA analysis for pairwise combinations of
the propositions of full sibship, half-sibship and unrelated individuals for different prior
probabilities of kinship. They then applied the expected utility maximization criteria to
justify performing or not performing a DNA analysis.
The major contribution of this paper was to recognize that forensic scientists make
decisions, and that a normative approach to these decisions requires the application of
decision theory and the use of the expected utility maximization criteria.
5.2 How many tests?
5.2.1 Using utilities to measure the added value expected from an
additional test (Taroni et al., 2007)
When the scientist decides to perform a DNA analysis, one of the follow-up questions is
“How many markers to type?”. Taroni et al. (2007) proposed to answer this question by
evaluating how much is gained by an additional marker in terms of utility. For this, they
defined the number of markers as the possible actions, and the value of the scientific evidence
(i.e., the likelihood ratio) obtained from typing these markers as the state of nature (the
second row in Table 5.1 summarizes the decision-theoretic framework used). To obtain a set
of discrete states of nature, the authors defined nine likelihood ratio intervals, denoted here
Θj , j = 1,2, . . . ,9. They considered this decision in the context of a criminal case with a
biological trace that needs to be compared with a suspect’s sample, and evaluated likelihood
ratios for the following two pairs of propositions:
Hp - the trace comes from the suspect,
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Hd1 - the trace does not come from the suspect, it comes from an individual unrelated to the
suspect;
and
Hp - the trace comes from the suspect
Hd2 - the trace does not come from the suspect, it comes from a full sibling of the suspect.
In this framework, the probability of obtaining a likelihood ratio in interval Θj is a function
of the number of markers typed, and of whether the trace actually comes from the suspect:
Pr(Θj ∣ai) = Pr(Θj ∣ai,Hp)Pr(Hp) + Pr(Θj ∣ai,Hdk)Pr(Hdk) , k ∈ {1,2} .
The authors then defined utility functions over the likelihood ratio intervals. Because the
utilities vary according to the decision-maker’s objectives, they defined three different utility
functions to represent the objectives of three different actors in the trial: the prosecutor with
a high utility for high likelihood ratios, the defense lawyer with a high utility mostly for state
Θ1 (a likelihood ratio between 0 and 1), and the judge with a high utility for both extremes
of the likelihood ratio scale (since he is interested in obtaining a powerful likelihood ratio,
but does not care in which direction it points). The combination of each of these individual’s
utilities with Pr(Θj ∣ai), for all i = 1,2, . . . ,15 and j = 1,2, . . . ,9, produced that individual’s
expected utilities u¯(ai), for all i = 1,2, . . . ,15. The authors then evaluated the EV OI of an
additional marker as:
u¯(ai∣·) − u¯(ai−1∣·) , for all i = 2,3, . . . ,15 ,
and found that an additional marker’s relative EV OI in percentage reduced to less than
0.05% after the 7th marker for the prosecutor’s and judge’s utility functions, and after the
8th marker for the defense lawyer’s utility function.
The major contribution of this paper is to highlight that typing a maximum number
of markers is not necessarily a rational choice from the point of view of maximizing the
expected utility. From a decision-theoretic perspective, the optimal number of markers to
type depends on the decision-maker’s objectives, which differ among the actors in a criminal
trial, so that there is no single optimal number. Hence, this paper illustrates how the optimal
course of action is subjective (in the sense of personal) because it reflects the decision-maker’s
goals and preferences.
5.2.2 Using the mutual information to measure the added value
expected from an additional test (Mazumder, 2010)
Mazumder (2010) answered the question of “How many markers to type?” by modeling
this decision as a two-stage decision problem (the first row in Table 5.2 summarizes the
decision-theoretic framework used). In this framework, the decision “To type or not to
type a marker?” is a preliminary decision for the terminal decision “What is the probability
distribution to report for the propositions of interest in the case?”. The DNA typing results
are the test results obtained after making the preliminary decision. The state of nature is
the true proposition, and the state space consists of the different propositions formulated in
the case. Thus, in this framework, the action space of the terminal decision is A = [0,1],
where ai ∈ A is the probability of proposition Θj ∈ Θ to report:
ai = Pr(Θj) .
Mazumder (2010) developed a criterion based on the mutual information between the
state of nature Θj and the test result E
th
k to quantify the information gained from the results
produced by a particular test. The rational decision-maker chooses the test that maximizes
the mutual information. The optimal test is therefore defined as the test that provides the
most information on the state of nature.
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From an information-theoretic point of view, the mutual information is defined as the
difference between the unconditional entropy of Θ and the conditional entropy of Θ given
Ethk :
H(Θ) −H(Θ∣Ethk ) ,
where H(·) denotes the entropy.2
From a decision-theoretic point of view, this value is equal to the EV OI(th) of the test
result when the utility function is defined as the logarithmic score (Mazumder, 2010):
u(ai,Θj) = −ln [ai]= −ln [Pr(Θj)] .
In this context, th denotes typing a number h of markers. Hence Mazumder (2010) evaluated
the expected added value of typing an additional marker as the difference between the mutual
information of typing h+ 1 markers and the mutual information of typing h markers. When
this value is equal to 0, or is defined by the decision-maker as being “sufficiently small”, it
is not necessary to type an additional marker, because typing the additional h+1’th marker
would lead to an expected utility that is equal to, or sufficiently close to, the expected utility
obtained after typing h markers, producing an EV OI equal to, or very close to, 0.
With this approach, Mazumder (2010) evaluated the optimal number of markers to type
for disputed paternity, victim identification and kinship determination cases, with a “suf-
ficiently small”-threshold set to 0.05%. Again, these results indicate that it is not always
necessary to type all available markers in order to obtain “sufficient” information for dis-
criminating between the propositions of interest.
The major contributions of this study is to show how to model this decision as a two-
stage decision problem, and how using a logarithmic score as the utility function provides a
means to evaluate the reduction in uncertainty over Θ (i.e., the true proposition) produced
by typing each additional marker.
5.2.3 Sampling scenarios (Taroni et al., 2010; Biedermann et al.,
2012a)
In sampling scenarios, the question of “How many tests to perform?” takes the meaning of
“How many items of a consignment to examine or analyze?”. The objective of sampling
items in a consignment is to make a statement about the proportion of items that have a
particular trait. In a forensic context, the trait of interest is usually something illegal, such as
a drug (Aitken, 1999; Aitken and Taroni, 2004). In this scenario, the forensic scientist must
make a statement on whether the proportion of items in the consignment containing this
illegal substance is greater than a particular threshold (Taroni et al., 2010), for example to
determine whether a case is a high-profile case requiring priority treatment by an examining
magistrate or investigative unit (Biedermann et al., 2012a). However, a laboratory’s limited
resources in terms of money and time, or particular risks related to the testing of the items,
usually do not allow the scientist to test every item, so that the scientist faces the task of
choosing a sample size.
In forensic science, there have been several probabilistic approaches to this question (e.g.,
Frank et al., 1991; Tzidony and Ravreby, 1992; Aitken, 1999; Biedermann et al., 2008b) until
Taroni et al. (2010) proposed a decision-theoretic approach (the fourth row in Table 5.2
2The entropy is an information-theoretic measure of the uncertainty on a random variable. The entropy
of a random variable X, with generic elements Xz , is equal to:
H(X) = − ∑
Xz∈X Pr(Xz) log[Pr(Xz)] ,
where the log can be for a base of 2 (this is the most common and measures the information contents in
bits), a base of e (measuring the information in nats), or a base of 10 (measuring the information in hartleys)
(Lathi, 1998: pp. 682–683).
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summarizes the decision-theoretic framework used). Taroni et al. (2010) and Biedermann
et al. (2012a) modeled this problem as a two-stage decision problem according to the theory
described in Section 3.6.1: the choice of the sample size is a preliminary decision for the
terminal decision of stating whether the proportion of items in the consignment containing
the illegal substance, denoted by θ, is greater than the threshold value, denoted by θ∗.
Defining the possible states of nature as θ ≤ θ∗ and θ > θ∗, the terminal decision’s possible
consequences consist of correct statements and incorrect statements. Taroni et al. (2010)
and Biedermann et al. (2012a) defined a symetric loss function on a monetary scale, with
the loss of a correct statement equal to 0¿ and the loss of an incorrect statement equal to
100,000¿. The monetary scale allows the formulae to take into account the sampling cost
for making the decision on the optimal sample size. To describe the scientist’s uncertainty
on the true proportion, they used a Beta distribution, following Aitken (1999)’s suggestion
for large consignments. Taroni et al. (2010) present equations for solving fixed sample size
and sequential analysis decision problems, and Biedermann et al. (2012a) works through
an example of a fixed sample size decision problem to show how to determine the optimal
sample size.
5.3 What tests?
5.3.1 Which markers to type (Lauritzen and Mazumder, 2008)
(Mazumder, 2010)
The results of Mazumder (2010)’s study do not only indicate how many markers to type
(Section 5.2.2), but also which markers to type. For this, the mutual information between
the state of nature and the test result provides a meaure of the informativeness of an indi-
vidual marker (Lauritzen and Mazumder, 2008). Mazumder (2010) evaluated the relative
informativeness,
H(Θ) −H(Θ∣Ethk )
H(Θ) , (5.1)
of individual genetic markers currently used in forensic genetics. Here, th refers to typing
marker h, and the higher this value, the more information the marker provides on the state
of nature.
Mazumder (2010) evaluated the informativeness of genetic markers for disputed pater-
nity and criminal case scenarios, to produce a rank ordering of the markers from the most
informative to the least informative. Her study on how many markers to type (Section 5.2.2)
minimized the number markers for reaching a sufficiency threshold by taking the markers in
this order, that is, by always taking the most informative of the remaining available markers.
Sensitivity analyses studied the effects of taking into account the possibility of mutations
and of using population data from different ethnic groups. The results indicate that taking
into account mutations slightly decreases the informativeness of the markers (Lauritzen and
Mazumder, 2008; Mazumder, 2010), and the rank ordering of the markers depends on the
population’s relative allele frequencies (Mazumder, 2010).
5.3.2 Which individuals to type (Mazumder, 2010)
A further extension of Mazumder (2010)’s study examined which individuals to type for
disputed paternity, victim identification and kinship determination cases when the DNA
profiles of the individuals of interest are unavailable. This study used the mutual information
criterion (Section 5.2.2), with th representing the individual(s) to type. With the help of
BNs (Section 4.1) for making inferences about the propagation of the genetic information
in the pedigree, Mazumder (2010) determined how much information the DNA profiles of
different subsets of individuals in the pedigree provide on the state of nature. The results of
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this study indicate which subset of individuals contributes the most information, and also
highlight that it is useless to type additional relatives that have the same genetic information
as an already typed individual.
5.3.3 What investigative action to undertake? (Shen et al., 2006)
Shen et al. (2006) present a decision support system for optimizing the investigator’s strategy
for which additional examinations and enquiries to carry out during an investigation. Based
on the initial set of observations and traces collected in the case, this system first uses
Bayesian networks to model plausible scenarios and the traces and observations each scenario
leads to. These possible scenarios form the space Θ of the propositions of interest in the
case. In a second step, the system applies an information-theoretic approach to evaluate the
expected posterior entropy of Θ given the evidence collected by each possible investigative
action th ∈ T :
H(Θ∣Ethk ) = − ∑
Θj∈ΘPr(Θj ∣Ethk ) log2[Pr(Θj ∣Ethk )] .
It uses the Bayesian networks to assign Pr(Θj ∣Ethk ). The goal is to find the investigative
action that provides the most information for discriminating between the scenarios in Θ,
which means that the optimal investigative action is the th that minimizes the expected
posterior entropy H(Θ∣Ethk ).3
5.4 What is the conclusion?
5.4.1 Individualizations and exclusions (Biedermann et al., 2008a)
To evaluate the value of the evidence with regard to a pair of source level propositions
(Cook et al., 1998b), the forensic scientist compares a trace’s characteristics with those
of a reference sample from a potential source. We saw in Section 2.3 that the forensic
scientist should represent the value of these observations in the form of a Bayes factor.
However, in many forensic science laboratories, it is still common practice to individualize
or to exclude a potential source as the trace’s origin. This is problematic in a strictly
probabilistic framework, because probabilities only allow for making inferences on a common
source, but never an individualization defined here as formally excluding all other sources.
More than twenty years ago, Stoney (1991a) described this passage from comparing the
trace’s features to concluding an individualization as:
somewhat analogous to a leap of faith. It is a jump, an extrapolation, based on the
observation of highly variable traits among a few characteristics, and then considering
the case of many characteristics. Duplication is inconceivable to the rational mind and
we conclude that there is absolute identity. (p. 198)
Ten years later, Phillips et al. (2001) recognized that concluding an individualization or
an exclusion in forensic science is a decision. They explained that this decision depends on
the forensic scientist’s probability distribution over the pair of source level propositions, and
on her utilities associated with correct and false conclusions (i.e., a correct individualization,
a correct exclusion, a false individualization and a false exclusion). Later, Whitman and
Koppl (2010) presented similar discussions for offence level propositions.
3Another approach based on the expected posterior entropy uses the empirical cross-entropy (ECE)
and ECE plots to represent the informational gain expected from a forensic analysis and the analysis of
the data it produces (Ramos Castro, 2007; Ramos and Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 2008). The ECE is the prior-
weighted average of the logarithmic scoring rule over different cases. Its plot provides a visual representation
of a method’s expected informational gain in the inferential process that allows the scientist to compare
different methods with each other.
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Biedermann et al. (2008a) formalized these ideas by presenting them in a decision-
theoretic framework. They defined the scientist’s three possible conclusions of individual-
ization, inconclusive and exclusion as the possible actions, and whether or not the potential
source is the trace’s true source as the state of nature (the third row in Table 5.1 summarizes
the decision-theoretic framework used). Combining the possible actions with the possible
states of nature produces a total of six possible consequences: a correct individualization, a
false individualization, an inconclusive conclusion when the trace and the reference sample
share a common origin, an inconclusive conclusion when the trace and reference sample do
not share a common origin, a false exclusion and a correct exclusion. Among these, Bieder-
mann et al. (2008a) considered the accurate conclusions of a correct individualization and a
correct exclusion as the best possible consequences, and assigned a utility value of 1 to each
of these. They considered a false individualization as the worst possible consequence, and
assigned a utility value of 0 to this consequence. They then considered both consequences
of an inconclusive conclusion as equally desirable, with a utility value between the two ex-
tremes, which they denoted α ∈ (0,1). And finally, they considered the consequence of a
false exclusion as less desirable than an inconclusive conclusion, and assigned a utility value
of β ∈ (0,1), β < α to this consequence. Based on these utilities, the conclusions’ expected
utilities are:
u¯(a1) = Pr(Θ1) ,
u¯(a2) = α , and
u¯(a3) = β Pr(Θ1) + Pr(Θ2) .
For a given α and β, the Bayes action depends on the probabilities Pr(Θ1) and Pr(Θ2).
Since Pr(Θ2) = 1−Pr(Θ1), Biedermann et al. (2008a) plotted the three expected utilities in
function of Pr(Θ1). This graph shows the threshold value(s) of Pr(Θ1) that define(s) the
decision strategy as the intersection(s) of the functions that maximize the expected utility.
For a small Pr(Θ1), the Bayes action is to exclude; for a large Pr(Θ1), the Bayes action is
to individualize. For a Pr(Θ1) close to 0.5, the Bayes action could be any of the conclusions,
depending on the values assigned to α and β.
This study emphasizes the distinction between inferences and decisions, and illustrates
how decision making is the logical step following probabilistic inferences.
5.4.2 Case linkage (Taroni et al., 2006b)
When a forensic scientist cannot associate a trace with a potential source, she may compare
this trace with traces from other cases. This comparison may lead to an inference on two
traces having a common source. Or, if both traces are considered to have been left by the
perpetrator, then this inference is on the two cases having been committed by the same
individual.
Taroni et al. (2006b) recognized that stating that two traces have a common source, or
that two cases were committed by the same person is a decision. These statements make up
the action space, and whether or not the two traces come from the same person, or whether or
not the same person committed the two crimes, are the possible states of nature (the fourth
row in Table 5.1 summarizes the decision-theoretic framework used). The consequences of
this decision is either a correct or an incorrect linkage, or either a correct or an incorrect
non-linkage. For these, Taroni et al. (2006b) defined a utility function with values of 10 for
correct statements, and values of 0 for incorrect statements.
The major contribution of this study is its emphasis on the difference between the infer-
ence made on the state of nature and the decision of making a concluding statement about
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it. It explains how making the decision is only possible by taking into account the utilities
or losses associated with the possible consequences, and how making a decision about the
uncertain event does not change the probability distribution over the state of nature.
5.4.3 Data analysis (Taroni et al., 2010)
How many red wool fibres were transferred onto the car seat? What is the proportion of
a toner’s resin group? How many GSR particles are on the hands of an individual who
discharged a firearm 3 hours ago? What is an individual’s alcohol concentration in the
blood? Is it greater than the legal threshold? What is the width of the landmarks on a
bullet recovered on a crime scene? What is the height of an individual figuring on images of
a surveillance camera? What is an allele’s mutation rate? Were the seized banknotes involved
in drug dealing or do they come from the general circulation? Based on the number of CMS
counted in the landmarks of two bullets, were these fired by the same gun or from different
guns?
The answer to each of these questions is a statement: “54 red wool fibres were trans-
ferred onto the car seat”, “the toner contains 2% polystyrene”, etc. Taroni et al. (2010)
model making these statements as one-stage decision problems (the fifth row in Table 5.1
summarizes the decision-theoretic framework used). A forensic scientist observes, counts
and measures, to try to answer each of the above questions, yet making a final statement
does not depend on the collected data alone. As a decision, it combines the inferences made
from the collected data with the prior probability distributions and a loss function (Taroni
et al., 2010). Each of these statements is therefore a conclusion, in the same sense as stat-
ing an individualization or an exclusion (Section 5.4.1). The action space consists of the
possible statements. The state of nature is the true value of the parameter of interest, with
the state space being either discrete or continuous, depending on the parameter. The loss
function describes how undesirable the decision-maker considers the different possible false
conclusions.
The major contribution of this book is to highlight how each conclusion, in every forensic
domain, is a decision. It does not only highlight this point, but presents all of the underlying
Bayesian tools necessary to implement this decision-theoretic framework in practice.
5.5 Graphical models
Aitken and Gammerman (1989) recognized that BNs could be useful in forensic science
applications. Edwards (1991 - 1992), Schum (1994) and Kadane and Schum (1996) described
the potential of probabilistic models for reasoning about evidence in real cases, and Dawid
and Evett (1997) its potential for handling complicated dependence relationships among
different items of evidence. Since then, numerous publications have described the application
of BNs and OOBNs to the interpretation of scientific evidence (Taroni et al., 2004, 2006a;
Biedermann, 2007), in particular for the evaluation of DNA evidence (Evett et al., 2002;
Aitken et al., 2003; Dawid et al., 2002, 2007; Mortera et al., 2003; Cowell et al., 2007b, 2008;
Hepler and Weir, 2008; Vicard et al., 2008; Green and Mortera, 2009; Biedermann et al.,
2012b),4 evidence collected in fire debris (Biedermann et al., 2005a,b), firearm evidence
(Biedermann and Taroni, 2006; Biedermann et al., 2009a), fibre evidence (Garbolino and
Taroni, 2002), black toner analyses (Biedermann et al., 2009b, 2011b) and the combination
of multiple items of evidence (Hepler et al., 2007; Juchli et al., 2012).
The use of IDs in forensic science applications has remained rather scarce. Taroni et al.
(2005) and Biedermann et al. (2008a) used the generic 3-node structure shown in Fig. 4.3(a)
for their one-stage decision problems. Taroni et al. (2010) explained how to extend this ID
to include forensic observations and analytical results in a structure of the type shown in
4See Biedermann and Taroni (2012) for a more complete list of references on the application of BNs and
OOBNs to inference problems related to DNA evidence.
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Fig. 4.3(b). Biedermann et al. (2012a) extended this generic structure to take into account
the variables in a sampling problem. And finally, Taroni et al. (2007)’s decision-theoretic
framework translates into the ID structure shown in Fig. 5.1(a), and Taroni et al. (2006b)
presented the ID in Fig. 5.1(b) for their decision problem.
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Figure 5.1: Two IDs presented in forensic science literature. (a) ID presented by Taroni et al. (2007)
to answer the question of how many markers to type (Section 5.2.1), where A represents the number of
markers to type, Θ the intervals of the obtained likelihood ratio, and u the utility function defined over the
likelihood ratio intervals. (b) ID presented by Taroni et al. (2006b) to answer the question of whether to
link two cases (Section 5.4.2), where A is the decision of linking or not linking two cases, Θ the pair of
propositions on whether or not the two cases are truly linked (i.e., offense level propositions), C whether or
not the decision made in A is correct, u the utilites of a correct and an incorrect decision, E the observed
evidence in the two cases, F a pair of propositions on whether the evidence in the two cases share a common
source (i.e., source level propositions), R1 whether the evidence in the first case is relevant, R2 whether the
evidence in the second case is relevant, and G whether the evidence in neither, one or both cases is relevant.
5.6 Final remarks
This chapter presented the application of decision theory to several isolated decision problems
encountered by forensic scientists. These applications demonstrate that it is possible to apply
decision theory to forensic decision problems, yet these applications each focus on only a
single, very particular problem. Compared with each other, these applications propose to
apply decision theory in many different ways. That is, they structure the decision problem
differently from one case to another: they have modeled the states of nature as being the
posterior probability of the proposition of interest (Taroni et al., 2005), the likelihood ratio
obtained from a particular analysis (Taroni et al., 2007), and the proposition of interest
(Taroni et al., 2006b; Shen et al., 2006; Biedermann et al., 2008a; Mazumder, 2010; Taroni
et al., 2010; Biedermann et al., 2012a). They have modeled the same decision as a one-stage
decision problem (Taroni et al., 2007) and as a two-stage decision problem (Mazumder, 2010).
Hence, they do not provide a uniform approach for handling forensic decision problems. As a
result, there exists no uniform framework that can be applied to the broad range of decision
problems encountered by forensic scientists.
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Thesis
Research studies have shown that there is a need for forensic scientists to make more con-
sistent choices (Section 1.1). The serious consequences that the decisions made by forensic
scientists can have in the administration of justice reinforce this need, and create a de-
mand for forensic scientists to be able to justify their choices. The aim of this thesis is
to respond to this need and demand by presenting a normative framework for
decision problems encountered by scientists in forensic science laboratories.
Decision theory guarantees coherent decision making (Chapter 3). Statisticians and
legal scholars have shown that Bayesian inference and decision theory provides an adequate
normative model for the legal fact-finding process (Sections 2.3 and 2.4). Other domains such
as medicine, where practitioners face similar inference and decision problems as in forensic
science, use models implementing Bayesian inference and decision theory as a valuable tool
for making and justifying their choices (Section 4.2.1). Forensic scientists have recognized
the potential of Bayesian inference for organizing forensic inference problems (Section 2.3),
yet have, for the most part, stopped there. Logically, the next step is for forensic
scientists to extend Bayesian inference models to decision theory for organizing
forensic decision problems.
Sofar, there have already been a few studies which applied a decision-theoretic approach
to a forensic decision problem (Chapter 5). However, these have each focused on very
particular decision problems. They do not provide a uniform framework for the broad range
of decision problems that face forensic scientists, nor a framework that applies to all the
different categories of trace evidence. The objective of this thesis is to present a
uniform normative framework that applies to decision problems encountered
for different categories of trace evidence.
However, a practical application of Bayesian inference and decision theory involves math-
ematical expressions that become increasingly complex and less transparent for
non-statisticians when they take into account an increasing number of non-independent
variables. Many decision problems in forensic science require numerous, non-independent
variables for making the necessary inferences on the state of nature. For forensic inference
problems, Bayesian networks (BNs) provide a tool for organizing the variables in a problem
through a visual representation (Sections 4.1 and 5.5). In medicine, studies have extended
BNs to influence diagrams (IDs) for modeling complex decision problems (Section 4.2.1).
If BNs provide a means for handling complex forensic inference problems, then
this thesis proposes that IDs can provide a tool to help forensic scientists apply
decision theory to forensic decision problems.
To attain this objective, this thesis consists of three propositions on how to handle forensic
inference and decision problems. These advocate the use of decision theory (Proposition 1),
BNs (Proposition 2) and IDs (Proposition 3). Theoretical case studies applying decision
theory, BNs and IDs to forensic inference and decision problems will address each of these
propositions. The rest of this chapter describes each proposition, the objectives of the case
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studies that will try to support each proposition, and the scenarios of the inference and
decision problems chosen for these studies.
6.1 Proposition 1
Decision theory provides a framework for organizing a broad range
of decision problems encountered by scientists in forensic science
laboratories dealing with different categories of trace evidence.
This proposition puts forth that decision theory applies to:
(i) one-stage and two-stage decision problems encountered by scientists in forensic science
laboratories; and to
(ii) decisions made in the context of different categories of trace evidence.
Decision theory organizes a decision problem by defining the action space and the state
space for one-stage decision problems, and the action space, state space, test space and space
of possible test results for two-stage decision problems. This organization of the decision
problem produces a space of consequences over which it is possible to define a utility or
loss function. Once these spaces have been defined, decision theory provides the decision
strategy.
Addressing this proposition requires an application of decision theory to one-stage and
two-stage decision problems in scenarios involving different categories of trace evidence in
forensic science. Three case studies will devote themselves to this task, of which two will
focus on one-stage decision problems, and one on a two-stage decision problem. The one-
stage decision problems consist of the following scenarios:
 What to conclude from a database search producing a single hit?
When a trace has no suspected source, it is common to search for this trace’s intrinsic charac-
teristics (i.e., the characteristics shared by the trace and its source) in a database containing a
subset of the population of the trace’s potential sources. This scenario considers a case where
the results of the database search are binary: there is either a match or no match between the
trace’s profile and that of the reference samples in the database. This scenario also assumes
that no errors are possible, neither in analyzing and observing the trace’s characteristics, nor
in producing the database search results of matches and no matches, and that the individ-
uals registered in the database are all unrelated. The particular case of interest here is one
where a database search among a number ndb of potential sources produces exactly 1 match
and ndb − 1 non-matches with the trace’s intrinsic characteristics. The decision question of
interest is, what can the scientist conclude from these results? In particular, can the scientist
individualize the source of the matching reference sample as the trace’s source?
Theoretically, this scenario applies to any category of trace evidence where database searches
produce binary results. In forensic science and legal literature (e.g., Balding and Donnelly,
1996; Evett and Weir, 1998), though, this scenario is known as the database search problem
and refers to DNA database searches. In this case, the trace’s intrinsic characteristics is
a DNA profile searched for in a database containing the reference profiles of ndb unrelated
individuals in the population of potential sources. The above cited literature debated whether
the strength of the evidence against an individual selected through a database search increased
or decreased with regard to the probable cause case, where the trace’s profile matches the
profile of an individual the investigators associated with the case based on other information.
The logical answer to this question is that the non-matches in the database provide additional
information with regard to a probable cause case, therefore increasing the value of the evidence
against the selected individual with regard to the probable cause case (e.g., Dawid, 2001).
However, recent publications showed that this answer is still not understood by everyone
today (Schneider et al., 2010; Fimmers et al., 2011): these publications not only insisted that
the value of the evidence is smaller in the database search case than in the probable cause
case, but also declared that the probability of a false individualization is greater in a database
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search case. Biedermann et al. (2011a) responded to the first point. This case study will focus
on the second. Following in the footsteps of the literature on the database search problem, it
will therefore also discuss this problem in the context of a DNA database search.
 What genotype to search for in a database of DNA profiles?
This scenario focuses specifically on DNA profiling results and DNA database searches, be-
cause DNA database searches have become a popular investigative tool for searching for
possible sources of biological traces. A DNA database search requires the investigator to
specify the genotype of the DNA profile she wants to search for in the database. For ex-
ample, for single-donor traces where DNA profiling is not subject to stochastic effects, she
will specify a homozygous designation for an alllele when she observes a single allelic peak at
that locus, and a heterozygous designation for a pair of alleles when she observes two allelic
peaks at that locus. However, for single-donor DNA traces producing low-template-DNA
(lt-DNA for short) profiles (Gill and Buckleton, 2010), stochastic effects of allele drop-out
and allele drop-in may cause the resulting electropherogram (EPG) to contain peaks for
a different allelic configuration than that of its donor (e.g., Taberlet et al., 1996; Gill et al.,
2000; Whitaker et al., 2001): if allele drop-out occurs, an allele in the donor’s profile fails to
appear in the trace’s profile, and if allele drop-in occurs, a peak for an allele not present in
the donor’s profile appears in the trace’s profile. As a result, observing a single allelic peak in
an lt-DNA profile may be the result of either a homozygous donor or a heterozygous donor
with one allele drop-out. Similarly, observing a pair of allelic peaks may be the result of
either a heterozygous donor or a homozygous donor with one allele drop-in. The designation
of the donor’s genotype is therefore not straightforward, and this raises the question of what
genotype to search for in the database for the configuration of allelic peaks observed on a
trace’s EPG.
There have been several pragmatic approaches for answering this question. For a locus with
only a single peak, one approach consists of comparing this peak’s height (or area) with a pre-
determined threshold (Buckleton et al., 2005; Gill et al., 2009): if the peak height is greater
than the threshold, the locus’s genotype is designated as a homozygote, and if the peak height
is smaller than the threshold, the genotype is designated as the allele of the observed peak
paired with a wildcard F representing any allele at that locus (Gill et al., 2000). For a locus
with one or several peaks, another approach consists of obtaining several EPGs for the trace
and retaining a consensus profile formed by alleles observed a particular number of times
over all of the replicates (Taberlet et al., 1996). This case study will focus on the decision of
choosing among the possible designations, including the wildcard F , based on the results of
one or more replicates.
The objectives of applying decision theory to these one-stage decision problems are:
 to determine the Bayes action in a particular case;
 to understand which parameters in the model affect the Bayes action, and how these
parameters affect the Bayes action;
 to establish under what circumstances a particular action is the Bayes action; and
 to state the decision strategy.
Given that the scenarios for the one-stage decision problem involve DNA profiling results,
even though the first applies to all domains where a database search produces binary results,
the scenario for the two-stage decision problem is placed in the context of a different category
of trace evidence. This scenario considers the following decision problem in the domain of
fingerprints:
 Process a fingermark?
For each detected fingermark, a fingerprint examiner must decide whether to submit the re-
covered trace to a fingermark examination process, which seeks to associate the mark with its
source (Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWG-
FAST), 2011). This fingermark examination process compares a submitted fingermark with
the fingerprints of potential sources, which may produce data in the form of similarities or
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dissimilarities with reference prints. This data may support a proposition that the mark and a
print come from the same finger, with regard to an alternative proposition that the mark and
the print come from two different fingers, and/or lead to exclusions of possible sources. The
objective of processing the fingermark is therefore to produce data that will narrow down the
pool of possible sources to a smaller population containing the mark’s true source. However,
the fingermark examination process uses the laboratory’s resources, which are limited. This
means that if a submitted fingermark does not produce any such discriminatory data, or leads
to an erroneous conclusion, the laboratory will have spent its resources in vain. In addition, an
erroneous conclusion may lead to an erroneous verdict. Furthermore, a fingermark expected
to lead to a strong association with a print of its true source, does not necessarily represent
useful information in the context of the fingermark’s case (for example, if other traces and
information in the case have already established an association between the crime scene or
evidentiary item and the person who left the mark, or if the mark comes from a victim whose
presence on the crime scene is not disputed). To examine the usefulness of fingermarks not
processed by a forensic science laboratory, Neumann et al. (2011b) conducted a field study
that compared the additional data obtained from these marks with their processing cost. Us-
ing this idea as a starting point, this case study will focus on the decision of processing or not
processing a fingermark given the context of its case and the laboratory’s cost for processing
the mark.
The objectives of applying decision theory to this two-stage decision problem are:
 to establish the expected value of information EV OI(t1) of processing a fingermark;
 to understand which parameters in the model affect the EV OI(t1); and
 to state the decision strategy.
Supporting this first research proposition will provide us with a theoretical framework
for forensic decision problems. However, when these decision problems contain an increased
number of variables and probabilistic relationships (e.g., for making the necessary inferences
on the state of nature), the application of a decision-theoretic framework involves complex
computations that are difficult to implement in practice using an algebraic approach. To
prevent the application of the proposed framework from being limited to simple problems,
Propositions 2 and 3 advocate the use of graphical models for handling complex inference
and decision problems in forensic science. First, Proposition 2 proposes BNs for modeling
complex inference problems, and then Proposition 3 proposes to use their decision-theoretic
extension, IDs, as a tool to help implement a decision-theoretic framework for complex
forensic decision problems.
6.2 Proposition 2
Bayesian networks (BNs) provide a means for handling new complex
inference problems encountered by forensic scientists.
This proposition puts forth the use of BNs as a tool to help forensic scientists reason
for inference problems involving numerous variables and numerous dependence relationships
among these variables. These graphical models should provide an approach that overcomes
the hurdle of complexity that limits the application of a purely algebraic approach to, rather,
simple inference problems. For this, we need to show that:
 BNs provide a mathematically robust and transparent approach for taking into account
numerous variables and their dependence relationships in the computation of the values
of interest;
 the results produced using BNs are in agreement with the equations currently proposed
in forensic science literature;
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 BNs provide a means for going beyond these algebraic equations by allowing the user
to easily incorporate additional variables into the computation of the values of interest
and relax the existing equations’ assumptions; and
 BNs provide a transparent approach for extending less complex models for forensic
inference problems to more complex models.
To address this proposition, a case study of the so-called two-trace problem will focus on
these points. The two-trace problem is a forensic inference problem that has puzzled, and
continues to puzzle, many forensic scientists. It consists of the following scenario:
 The two-trace problem
Introduced by Evett (1987), this problem describes a scenario where investigators recover two
items of the same category of trace evidence (e.g., two bloodstains) on a crime scene, and
a laboratory analysis performed on these traces, reveals that they possess different intrinsic
traits (e.g., the blood group or DNA profile). Later there is a single suspect whose sample
matches one of the two traces. For a particular pair of propositions (where one proposi-
tion is advanced by the prosecution and the other by the defence), the question is: “How
strong is the evidence resulting from these two comparisons in favor of the prosecution’s or
the defence’s proposition?”. The answer to this question depends on the formulation of the
two propositions. Assuming that no analytical errors are possible, Evett (1987) and Meester
and Sjerps (2003) algebraically derived the Bayes factor for source level propositions.1 Evett
(1987) derived a Bayes factor for a pair of propositions that takes into account the observation
of both traces:
proposition 1: at least one of the crime stains comes from the suspect,
proposition 2: neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect.
Meester and Sjerps (2003) showed that the Bayes factor is different when one or both
of the propositions takes into account the observation of only one of the traces, that
is:
proposition 1: crime stain 1 comes from the suspect,
proposition 2: neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
or
proposition 1: crime stain 1 comes from the suspect,
proposition 2: crime stain 1 does not come from the suspect;
and they thought that it is confusing to present the Bayes factor for a two-trace prob-
lem.2 For the activity level propositions:
proposition 1: the suspect is one of the two men who were in contact with the victim during
the offense,
proposition 2: two other men were in contact with the victim during the offense;
Triggs and Buckleton (2003) proposed an algebraic approach to arrive at a mathemat-
ically more complex solution incorporating activity level parameters concerning the
transfer and background presence of trace material (Evett, 1984). With the different
1Evett (1987) actually derived the Bayes factor for the offense level propositions:
proposition 1: the suspect was one of the two men who committed the crime,
proposition 2: the suspect was not one of the two men who committed the crime;
assuming both traces to be relevant. An offense level evaluation with maximal relevance produces the same
Bayes factor as a source level evaluation (e.g., Aitken and Taroni, 2004).
2Actually, obtaining different Bayes factors for different pairs of propositions is a natural consequence of
applying the laws of probability for evaluating the Bayes factor for different pairs of propositions. Rather
than being a confusing inconvenience, this should be seen as an example of the flexibility of the value of the
evidence to adapt to a particular formulation of a pair of propositions (see Chapter 9).
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expressions for a source level Bayes factor, and the more extensive algebraic develop-
ment to arrive at an activity level Bayes factor, the two-trace problem is a perplexing
inference problem.
The objectives of this case study are:
 to construct a BN for the different pairs of source level propositions advanced in forensic
science literature;
 to extend this BN to activity level propositions;
 to deduce the mathematical expressions for the values of interest from the BN, and
compare them with the algebraically-derived equations in forensic science literature;
 to identify and relax the simplifying assumptions made by the algebraically-derived
equations; and
 to extend the BN developed for two traces to a general situation involving more than
two traces.
Supporting this proposition will provide us with a means for handling complex forensic
inference problems by using graphical models. In view of applying decision theory to forensic
decision problems, this result would provide a means for making inferences on the state of
nature when these inferences involve numerous, non-independent variables. Thus, if graph-
ical models in the form of Bayesian networks provide a useful tool for handling complex
inference problems in forensic science, then Proposition 3 proposes that their extension to
IDs can help forensic scientists in handling complex decision problems.
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6.3 Proposition 3
Influence diagrams (IDs) provide forensic scientists with a practical
tool for structuring and providing the elements required for making
coherent choices in forensic decision problems.
This proposition puts forth the use of IDs as a tool to help forensic scientists make
coherent choices in the face of uncertainty. If decision theory provides a framework for
organizing a broad range of decision problems encountered by scientists in forensic science
laboratories dealing with different categories of trace evidence (Proposition 1), and BNs
provide a means for handling complex inference problems encountered by forensic scientists
(Proposition 2), then IDs can provide a practical tool for coherent decision-making in forensic
science by:
(i) incorporating the advantages offered by graphical models (such as BNs) for visually
structuring and performing probabilistic calculations in complex inference problems;
and
(ii) combining the inferences with utility (or loss) functions to compute the expected util-
ities (or losses) for each of the possible actions to reach a decision.
The implementation of decision theory in the software currently available for constructing
IDs varies slightly from one program to another. The IDs in this thesis were constructed
using the software Hugin Researcher, versions 7.0 to 7.6, by Hugin Expert A/S. From a
computational point of view, this program computes the expected utilies (or losses) for
each of the possible actions of a terminal decision, the maximum expected utility, and the
EV OI(th), h = 0,1, . . . , p, and contains algorithms for finding the arg max
h
ENG(th) and
computing the maximum expected utility minus the cost for performing this test. However,
it does not contain any algorithm for evaluating the maxh ENG(th), which is, for example,
available in the software GeNIe 2.0 by the Decision Systems Laboratory of the University of
Pittsburgh, another software currently available for constructing IDs. To distinguish between
an ID’s formal properties and the different levels of computational implementations in ID-
constructing software, this proposition does not pretend that IDs will solve the decision
problem for the scientist, but only that it provides the required elements for solving the
decision problem.
Addressing this proposition requires the construction of IDs for forensic decision prob-
lems. For this, the three case studies presented for Proposition 1 (Section 6.1) will each be
extended to include the construction of an ID. This will produce two IDs for one-stage deci-
sion problems and one ID for a two-stage decision problem. The objectives of constructing
these IDs are:
 to provide a visual representation of each decision model’s underlying assumptions;
and
 to propose a probabilistic and decision-theoretic model that implements decision theory
in each decision problem to provide the elements needed for making a coherent choice.
To clarify how to use IDs for one-stage and two-stage decision problems, Chapter 7 will
provide additional explanations on how the IDs in the case studies provide the elements
required for making coherent choices.
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Results and Discussion
The results take the form of individual research papers presenting theoretical case studies of
the scenarios presented in Chapter 6. These individual research papers are in Part III. The
present chapter summarizes the results of these studies in view of the three propositions
described in the previous chapter, and explains how to confront one-stage and two-stage
decision problems in forensic science. First, Section 7.1 discusses the use of graphical models
(notably BNs) for handling complex forensic inference problems in forensic science. This
section addresses Proposition 2. Then, Sections 7.2 and 7.3 discuss one-stage and two-
stage decision problems, respectively, to show how decision theory organizes these decision
problems, and how to use IDs as a tool for implementing this framework. These sections
address Propositions 1 and 3.
7.1 Graphical models
Chapters 9 and 10 model the two-trace problem using BNs to address Proposition 2—
Bayesian networks provide a means for handling new complex inference problems encoun-
tered by forensic scientists.
Chapter 9 presents a BN that combines all the different pairs of source level propositions
proposed by Meester and Sjerps (2003) as separate nodes in a single model. Through its
graphical representation, it highlights the logical relationships between the different propo-
sitions and the analytical results. Since there are different logical relationships between the
different propositions and the analytical results, different pairs of propositions inevitably lead
to different Bayes factors. The BN’s visual representation of the problem provides trans-
parency and clarity on why this is so. In addition, its logical decomposition of the problem
brings to light the assumptions underlying the proposed Bayes factors, and provides an
expression for the Bayes factor that relaxes these assumptions.
Chapter 10 extends this model to activity level propositions, and to more than two traces
using OOBNs. To overcome the hurdle of complexity that limits the application of an alge-
braic approach to developing the Bayes factor for increasingly complex inference problems,
this study proposes to use BNs for assigning the Bayes factor. For this, it shows how the
Bayes factor resulting from a graphical approach modeling the two-trace problem at the ac-
tivity level is in agreement with the previously published, algebraically-derived expressions.
Again, this graphical approach provides transparency on the assumptions that underlie the
algebraically-derived expression, here notably the activity level Bayes factor published by
Triggs and Buckleton (2003). The extension to more than two traces using OOBNs illustrates
the BNs’ capacity to handle an increased number of variables and probabilistic relationships.
These studies lead to the following conclusions:
 BNs offer transparency to understand what assumptions lie behind algebraic expres-
sions published in forensic science literature and allow the user to go beyond these
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equations by relaxing these assumptions.
 A BN’s properties of rigorously handling probabilistic calculations in a mathematically
robust environment, decomposing complicated events into a set of distinct variables,
and describing and visualizing the assumed dependencies among the variables provide
a structured and logical means for modeling complex inference problems in forensic
science, and for using these models to compute the probabilistic values of interest.
 A BN’s flexible and transparent architecture allows the user to easily incorporate
additional variables into existing models, and to coherently combine and structure
different aspects of a problem as separate objects in distinct hierarchical levels of an
OOBN.
 A BN’s graphical architecture allows a model to be inserted as part of a larger network,
allowing the scientist to address more complex inference problems.
According to these conclusions, a graphical approach using BNs can handle complex infer-
ence problems encountered by forensic scientists. If decision theory provides an adequate
framework for organizing forensic decision problems, then IDs could prove to be practical
tools for handling complex decision problems encountered by forensic scientists.
7.2 One-stage decision problems
A one-stage decision problem describes any decision problem where the decision-maker’s
satisfaction depends directly on the decision’s consequence. That is, the decision-maker is
capable of specifying utilities or losses for the decision’s possible consequences. Modeling a
one-stage decision problem requires the decision-maker to define the action space, the state
space, and a utility or loss function over the actions’ possible consequences (Sections 3.2 and
3.5).
In the context of forensic science, this model applies to any decision where the scientist
formulates a conclusion. The word “conclusion” is used here in a very broad sense, so that
it includes all intermediate conclusions, or statements, that the scientist makes during the
entire process of analyzing, comparing and evaluating her observations. Because, as Savage
(1951) explains:
all problems of statistics, including those of inference, are problems of action, for to
utter or publish any statement is, after all, to take certain action. (p. 55)
Many forensic procedures consist of making a sequence of such statements. For example,
the interpretation of a DNA profile is a process that goes from a set of signals on an elec-
tropherogram (EPG) to the genotype of the contributor, by stating (Butler, 2013):
1. for each signal, whether this signal is a peak or instrument noise;
2. for each peak, whether this peak indicates the presence of an allele or is a stutter;
3. for all loci with single peaks, whether the single peak is a homozygous genotype or a
heterozygous genotype with allele drop-out; and
4. for all loci with two peaks, whether the two peaks are a heterozygous genotype or do
not come from the same source.
The interpretation of a mixture follows similar steps (Gill et al., 2006). From a decision-
theoretic point of view, as explained by Savage (1951), each of these steps consists of making
a decision. Each of these is a one-stage decision problem.
This idea is not new. There are currently a number of empirically-derived thresholds that
tell the forensic scientist how to make these decisions. For example, for the above decisions
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in DNA interpretation, these thresholds take the form of peak heights, peak areas,1 or ratios
of peak heights or areas.2 These existing thresholds are based on empirical approaches (e.g.,
Gill et al., 1997, 2009). They use empirical data to determine what threshold leads to,
for example, 95% of correct choices, or 99% of correct choices. However, there is nothing
that justifies why a laboratory should use the 95%-level threshold rather than the 99%-level
threshold, or vice-versa. This is because these thresholds do not take into account the utility
of a correct choice, or the loss of an incorrect choice.
A decision-theoretic approach produces thresholds that take into account both the proba-
bilistic aspects of the inference problem and the preferential aspects of the decision problem.
Given a probability model and a utility or loss function, this approach produces a decision
strategy for choosing the Bayes action. Sensitivity analyses on the probability model’s pa-
rameters illustrates the parameters’ impact on the Bayes action. Sensitivity analyses on the
utility (or loss) function shows how the threshold(s) vary in function of the decision-maker’s
objectives and preferences.
Chapters 11 and 12 illustrate this idea for the database search problem and the geno-
type designation decision, respectively, to address Proposition 1—Decision theory provides
a framework for organizing a broad range of decision problems encountered by scientists in
forensic science laboratories dealing with different categories of trace evidence.
7.2.1 Organizing the decision problem
Decision theory provides a way of organizing one-stage decision problems by breaking them
down into an action space and a state space. In the context of the forensic decision problems
discussed above, the action space is the exhaustive list of possible conclusions that the
scientist can draw (i.e., statements that the scientist can make), the state of nature is the
true condition of whatever the decision is concluding about and which is unknown, therefore
the state space is all of the possible conditions. For the database search problem (Chapter 11)
and the genotype designation decision (Chapter 12), Table 7.1 presents the action and state
spaces.
In the database search problem (first row in Table 7.1), the state of nature is the crime
stain’s origin. The state space is represented as a population of potential sources of N
unrelated individuals, numbered from 1 to N . However, for the scenario in question, we
are not actually interested in all of the 1 to N individuals: we are interested in only one
of these individuals, the one whose sample matches the trace’s profile to produce the hit
during the database search. It suffices therefore to represent this space with regard to a
single individual. For any individual J , J ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}, this space consists of:
ΘJ : the crime stain comes from individual J ,¬ΘJ = {Θ1, . . . ,ΘJ−1,ΘJ+1, . . . ,ΘN}: the crime stain comes from someone else, unrelated to
individual J .
As for the action space, it contains the actions of individualizing each of the N individuals
in the population of potential sources as the trace’s source, and the action of not individ-
ualizing anybody as the trace’s source. Again, for the scenario in question, it suffices to
represent this space with regard to a single individual. For individual J , J ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N},
this action space consists of:
aJ : individualize individual J as the source of the trace recovered on the crime scene,¬aJ = {a1, . . . , aJ−1, aJ+1, . . . , aN , aN+1}: not individualize individual J as the source of the trace
recovered on the crime scene.
Summarizing the state and the action spaces in this way produces a space of possible con-
sequences of only four elements. These are: a correct individualization, an incorrect indi-
1For example, 50 rfu for the limit of detection threshold, and 150 rfu for the stochastic threshold (Gill
et al., 2009).
2For example the heterozygote balance of 60% (Gill et al., 1997).
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vidualization, a correct non-individualization and an incorrect non-individualization (i.e.,
missing an individualization).
In the genotype designation decision (second row in Table 7.1), the state of nature is
the genotype of the trace’s donor. For a particular locus, the state space consists of all of
the donor’s possible genotypes for that locus. Here, to coherently represent this scenario,
it is not possible to summarize the state space in a smaller number of subsets of Θ. The
action space consists of all of the possible designations for this genotype. This includes
the possibility of using a wildcard F for either one or both alleles: in the former case, the
designation specifies only one of the two alleles, and in the latter case the designation does
not specify any of the alleles, and is entirely uninformative. Combining these two spaces
produces a very large space of possible consequences, yet it is here that it is possible to
divide these consequences into four subsets: correct designations without using F (when
the two designated alleles are the donor’s alleles), correct designations using F (when the
one designated allele is one of the donor’s two alleles), incorrect designations (whenever at
least one of the designated alleles is not one of the donor’s alleles), and the uninformative
designation of type {F,F}.
In both of these decision problems with large state and action spaces, it was therefore
possible to organize the problem so as to have a small size of possible consequences over
which the decision-maker defines a utility or loss function. In these decision problems, the
decisions’ possible consequences describe how correct the conclusion is. It is common to
use loss functions to describe the decision-maker’s preferences among these consequences,
because a decision-maker can usually quantify the penalties associated with false conclusions
more easily than the gain associated with correct conclusions. Hence, on a scale from 0 to
1, correct conclusions have minimum losses of 0, the most serious incorrect conclusion(s)
has (have) a loss of 1, and less serious incorrect conclusions, or non-informative conclusions,
have a loss with a value between 0 an 1, determined by the decison-maker’s preferences
among gambles (Section 3.3). In the two case studies presented here, the greek letters λ
and η denote the intermediate loss values for the database search problem and the genotype
designation decision, respectively. The two loss functions are:
Chapter 11:
What to conclude from a database
search producing a single hit?
loss
correct conclusion 0
missing an individualization λ
(i.e., incorrect non-individualization)
incorrect individualization 1
Chapter 12:
What genotype to search for
in a database of DNA profiles?
loss
correct designation 0
correct designation using F η1
uninformative designation (i.e., {F,F}) η2
incorrect designation 1
The objective of organizing the decision problem in this framework is to obtain a decision
strategy. The decision strategy is the result of combining this organization with the aim of
minimizing the expected loss.
When the expected losses of all the actions in the action space can be represented as a
function of a single probability, the decision strategy reduces to comparing this probability
with a threshold defined by the loss function. This is the case for the database search
problem. For example, for a database search in a database containing individuals 1 to ndb,
ndb ≤ N , and producing a single hit with individual J∗, J∗ ∈ {1,2, . . . , ndb}, the expected
losses for actions aJ∗ and ¬aJ∗ are a function of the probability that the crime stain comes
from individual J∗, denoted by
Pr(ΘJ∗ ∣EtJ∗ ,¬(Et1 , . . . ,EtJ∗−1 ,EtJ∗+1 , . . . ,Etndb ), I),
with I representing the information associating individual J∗ to the crime scene prior to
the database search, and Eth a match between the crime stain’s profile and individual h,
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h = 1,2, . . . , ndb.3 The decision strategy reduces to individualizing individual J∗ if and only
if:
Pr(ΘJ∗ ∣EtJ∗ ,¬(Et1 , . . . ,EtJ∗−1 ,EtJ∗+1 , . . . ,Etndb ), I) > 1
1 + λ .
This result is analogous to the decision strategy produced by the decision-theoretic analysis
for convicting a defendant in the legal factfinding process (Eq. (2.5)), since the λ in this
equation is by definition (Eq. (11.16) in Chapter 11):
λ = loss of missing an individualization
loss of an incorrect individualization
.
This decision strategy highlights the following points:
 Changing λ produces a different threshold to which the decision-maker compares the
probability of ΘJ∗ to make the decision (Figures 11.1 and 11.7 in Chapter 11). The
Bayes action therefore varies for decision-makers with different values for λ. However,
this threshold is independent of the circumstances and probabilities in a case. It
is the same for a probable cause case and for a database search case, providing a
coherent approach to both scenarios. Since the probability of a false individualization
depends on the decision threshold defined by the decision-maker’s loss function, it is
the decision-maker who sets the maximum probability of a false individualization, and
(again) not whether the case is a probable cause or a database search case.
 Whether or not the probability of ΘJ∗ is greater than this threshold depends on the
set of parameters that the probability model uses to determine the probability of ΘJ∗ .
In this probability model, the probability of ΘJ∗ is:
Pr(ΘJ∗ ∣EtJ∗ ,¬(Et1 , . . . ,EtJ∗−1 ,EtJ∗+1 , . . . ,Etndb ), I) = 1
1 + p1 − p1p2 ,
with
p1 = the expected number of matches in the population of potential sources, and
p2 = the proportion of the population of potential sources registered in the database.
Figure 11.6 in Chapter 11 plots Pr(ΘJ∗ ∣EtJ∗ ,¬(Et1 , . . . ,EtJ∗−1 ,EtJ∗+1 , . . . ,Etndb ), I)
in function of these two parameters, for p1 = Nγ (where γ represents the match proba-
bility of the crime stain’s intrinsic characteristics in the population of potential sources)
and p2 = ndbN .
This case study concludes that a decision-theoretic approach is applicable to the decision of
individualizing a trace’s potential source in both the probable cause case and the database
search case.
When the expected losses of all the actions in the action space cannot be represented as
a function of a single probability, then the decision strategy does not reduce to comparing
a single probability with a single threshold. This is the case for the genotype designation
decision problem. In this case, one cannot restrain the action space to two possible actions
as in the database search case. One must consider at least three possible designations (a
homozygote, a designation using F , and an uninformative designation) for every case where
the EPG shows at least one allelic peak for the locus in question. There are therefore three
expected losses to be compared with each other for a given loss function and probability
model. These expected losses are functions of several probabilities that are not mutually
exclusive, so that one cannot represent these comparisons by a single equation describing
the threshold in terms of the comparison of one probability with a value defined by the loss
function. However, one can compute threshold values of a parameter of interest for a given
3Note that Eth , h = 1,2, . . . , ndb, is a Boolean variable here, so that Eth represents a match with individual
h and ¬Eth a non-match with individual h.
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loss function and other model parameters. Hence, Tables 12.1 and 12.2 in Chapter 12 present
threshold values in terms of the average peak height in the EPG. In addition, sensitivity
analyses allow one to study the behavior of the expected losses in function of a parameter
of interest. These analyses show how the threshold depends on the model’s parameters and
its underlying assumptions. Figures 12.2-12.7 in Chapter 12 plot the expected losses in
function of the average peak height in the EPG. They show how the threshold depends on
the observed alleles, the locus and, of course, the average peak height in each EPG. In this
case study, the decision-theoretic approach shows that there is no single, universal threshold
for deciding between any two designations. The Bayes action depends on parameters that
vary from one case to another, from one scientist to another, and from one laboratory to
another. The decision model provides a case-specific approach, that can be adapted to each
laboratory’s and scientist’s needs and objectives.
According to these results, the framework provided by decision theory provides an ad-
equate and useful structure for organizing one-stage forensic decision problems. However,
forensic decisions such as the genotype designation decision contain numerous variables with
complex probabilistic relationships. For these, the next section discusses the application of
influence diagrams to these decision problems.
7.2.2 Influence diagram
To overcome the difficulty of evaluating the expected losses using an algebraic approach
when there are numerous dependent variables, IDs offer a graphical approach for evaluating
the expected losses. Chapters 11 and 12 present IDs for modeling the decision problem. In
this sense, they address Proposition 3—Influence diagrams provide forensic scientists with
a practical tool for structuring and providing the elements required for making coherent
choices in forensic decision problems.
The IDs constructed in these studies illustrate the advantages provided by graphical
models to visually represent a model’s underlying assumptions, as already discussed in Sec-
tion 7.1 for BNs. This section presents how to use an ID as a tool for solving a one-stage
decision problem. For this, we will use the generic model shown in Fig. 4.3(b). The IDs in
Chapters 11 and 12 have the same underlying structure as this model, they are just more
complex because they involve more observed evidence nodes of type E, and more parameters
describing the relationships between these observations and the state of nature.
Figure 7.1 applies this generic model to a fictive decision problem of choosing between
actions a1 and a2 based on the observation E
t1
1 . In this example, the state of nature is one of
Θ2
1Θ
t1E
t1E2t1E2
t1E1
Θ1 Θ2
0.99999
0.00001
0.9999
0.0001
l
Θ A
a1
a2
E
0.9
0.1
0.01
0.899911
0.90
1 0.100089
(a)
t1
1
Θ
Θ
Θ2
A
a1
a2
E
E2 0
1E11
t
0.9991008
0.0008992
0.000899
0.099910
l
(b)
Figure 7.1: Expanded representations of the generic ID shown in Fig. 4.3(b) for a one-stage decision
problem. Node A contains the action space, node Θ the state space, node E the possible test results, and
node l the loss function, which is here: l(C11) = l(C22) = 0, l(C12) = 1 and l(C21) = 0.1. Nodes Θ and
E show probability distributions and node A the expected losses. Node l is not expanded here to focus the
reader’s attention on the values of interest in nodes A, E and Θ. The node with a thicker border represents
an instantiated node, with the certain state in bold. (a) The uninstantiated ID, with the probability table
for node E. (b) Instantiating node E to state Et11 produces the expected losses of a1 and a2 after observing
Et11 .
two possible states, Θ1 or Θ2. Result E
t1
1 is such that it supports state Θ1: Pr(Et11 ∣Θ1, I) =
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0.99999 and Pr(Et11 ∣Θ2, I) = 10−4. A loss function of l(C11) = l(C22) = 0, l(C12) = 1
and l(C21) = 0.1 describes the decision-maker’s preferences. In its expanded form, the ID
indicates the probability distributions over Θ and Et1 , and the expected losses of a1 and a2.
In its uninstantiated form (Fig. 7.1(a)), these expected losses do not take into account the
result Et11 :
l¯(a1∣I) = l(C11)Pr(Θ1∣I) + l(C12)Pr(Θ2∣I)= 0 × 0.1 + 1 × 0.9= 0.9 ,
and
l¯(a2∣I) = l(C21)Pr(Θ1∣I) + l(C22)Pr(Θ2∣I)= 0.1 × 0.1 + 0 × 0.9= 0.01 .
To evaluate the expected losses for each of the possible actions given result Et11 , the user
instantiates node Et1 to state Et11 (Fig. 7.1(b)). The expected losses indicated in the ID
correspond to the following evaluations:
l¯(a1∣Et11 , I) = l(C11) Pr(Et11 ∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I)Pr(Et11 ∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I) + Pr(Et11 ∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I)+ l(C12) Pr(Et11 ∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I)
Pr(Et11 ∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I) + Pr(Et11 ∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I)= 0 × 0.99999 × 0.1
0.99999 × 0.1 + 10−4 × 0.9 + 1 × 10−4 × 0.90.99999 × 0.1 + 10−4 × 0.9= 0.000899 ,
and
l¯(a2∣Et11 , I) = l(C21) Pr(Et11 ∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I)Pr(Et11 ∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I) + Pr(Et11 ∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I)+ l(C22) Pr(Et11 ∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I)
Pr(Et11 ∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I) + Pr(Et11 ∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I)= 0.1 × 0.99999 × 0.1
0.99999 × 0.1 + 10−4 × 0.9 + 0 × 10−4 × 0.90.99999 × 0.1 + 10−4 × 0.9= 0.099910 .
A rational decision-maker then chooses the action with the minimum expected loss, in this
case action a1.
Note that both Hugin Researcher 7.6 and GeNIe 2.0, two software systems currently
available for constructing IDs, contain algorithms for computing the maximum expected
utility.4 To use this tool for degrees of satisfaction defined in terms of losses, it suffices to
apply a linear transformation to represent the loss values on a scale of utilities (for example,
by multiplying the losses by -1).
According to this illustrative example, IDs thus provide a practical tool for forensic
scientists to structure one-stage decision problems and compute the expected losses (or
utilities) required for finding the Bayes action.
4In Hugin Researcher 7.6, the user must select the decision node in the model’s Run Mode and then
open the Value of Information tool in the menu Network and submenu Analysis. In GeNIe 2.0, the decision
node’s value table automatically indicates the maximum expected utilities as bold values when the model is
updated.
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7.3 Two-stage decision problems
A two-stage decision problem describes any decision problem where the decision-maker’s
satisfaction does not depend on this decision’s outcome, but on the consequence of a sub-
sequent decision. Notably, two-stage decision problems are decisions on whether or not to
invest in obtaining information that may increase the utility or reduce the loss incurred by
making a subsequent decision. For the first decision, that is the preliminary decision, the
decision-maker is incapable of specifying utilities or losses for the possible consequences, be-
cause her satisfaction depends on whether the information was useful for attaining another
objective. Measuring this usefulness requires determining the EV OI(th) or ENG(th) of
this preliminary decision’s possible actions with regard to a terminal decision (Section 3.6).
The terminal decision describes this other objective, for which the decision-maker is capable
of specifying utilities or losses for the possible consequences. Modeling a two-stage decision
problem therefore requires the decision-maker to define the preliminary and the terminal de-
cisions. The preliminary decision consists of a test space and the space of the test’s possible
results, and the terminal decision of the action space, state space and utility or loss function
over the actions’ possible consequences.
In the context of forensic science, this model applies to any decision where the scientist
invests money or time in obtaining information in view of making another decision. This
terminal decision can be:
1. another laboratory decision of performing or not performing an analysis,
2. a laboratory “conclusion” decision discussed in Section 7.2, or
3. a subsequent decision made outside of the forensic science laboratory, such as the court
of law’s decision in the legal factfinding process for which the expertise in forensic
science is destined.
An example of the first case would be a preliminary decision of whether to perform a pre-
sumptive test for blood where the terminal decision is to submit or not to submit the
unknown substance for a DNA analysis. An example of the second case is a preliminary
decision of whether to invest in an additional replicate in view of the terminal decision
of designating the donor’s genotype. The third case applies to all forensic analyses. The
decision of processing any category of trace evidence in a forensic science laboratory is a pre-
liminary decision in view of the case’s judicial decision. Chapter 13 illustrates this idea for
the decision of processing or not processing a fingermark. As a two-stage decision problem,
and a decision problem in a category of trace evidence different from DNA, this case study
addresses Proposition 1—Decision theory provides a framework for organizing a broad range
of decision problems encountered by scientists in forensic science laboratories dealing with
different categories of trace evidence.
7.3.1 Organizing the decision problem
Decision theory provides a way of organizing two-stage decision problems by defining an
action space, state space, test space, and a space of possible test results. The test space
consists of actions that provide some form of information that can be represented in the
space of possible test results. The action and state space describe the terminal decision, for
which the decision-maker defines the utility or loss function. Table 7.2 presents the definition
of these spaces for the decision of processing a fingermark.
Chapter 13 models the decision of processing a fingermark as a preliminary decision
for the terminal decision of convicting or acquitting a defendant. This case study presents
the theoretical framework for modeling this decision problem. With an action space of
convicting or acquitting the defendant, and a state space consisting of the defendant’s guilt
or innocence, there are four possible consequences: a correct conviction, a false conviction, a
false acquittal and a correct acquittal. Defining the utility function over these four possible
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consequences on a monetary scale to quantify the gains and losses of these consequences
for the society, allows us to compare the EV OI(th), h = 0,1, with the cost of processing
the fingermark: the decision strategy is to process the fingermark if EV OI(t1) is greater
than or equal to the procesing cost. This case study presents the algebraic expression for
the EV OI(t1). It illustrates how to model this two-stage decision problem in a decision-
theoretic framework. According to these results, the decision-theoretic framework provides
an adequate and useful structure for organizing this two-stage decision problem.
However, the developed expression for the EV OI(t1) contains numerous parameters and
its use is not so transparent. For this reason, the next section explains how to use an ID
modeling a two-stage decision problem to find the action that maximizes the ENG(th).
Note that, as in Section 7.2 for the one-stage decision problem, this explanation will use the
generic model for the two-stage decision problem, and leave the more complex ID for the
decision of processing a fingermark to be described in Chapter 13.
7.3.2 Influence diagram
In a two-stage decision problem, the rational decision-maker chooses the action in the test
space T that maximizes the ENG(th). IDs can serve as tools to help the decision-maker
find this action in a complex decision problem.5 Gittelson et al. (2013c) constructed an
ID for a two-stage decision problem. This case study therefore also addresses Proposition
3—Influence diagrams provide forensic scientists with a practical tool for structuring and
providing the elements required for making coherent choices in forensic decision problems.
This section explains how to find the action that maximizes the ENG(th) using an ID as a
tool. For this, we will demonstrate how to use an ID with only the most basic computational
algorithms implemented in the ID, that is, the propagation of information according to the
laws of probability, and the computation of the expected utilities (losses) for the terminal
decision’s possible actions according to decision theory. In this demonstration, we will use the
generic model presented in Fig. 4.3(c). The aim is to obtain the ENG(th) for h = 1,2, . . . , p,
and choose the action with the maximum ENG(th).
Since the IDs presented in this thesis were constructed using Hugin Researcher, this
section presents Hugin representations of the ID. The Hugin interface for an ID does not
present the ENG(th) values, but presents, instead, the values of its key components. Math-
ematically, the ENG(th) is equal to:
ENG(th) = q∑
k=1maxi [u¯(ai∣Ethk , I) − c]´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
III.
Pr(Ethk ∣I)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
II.
−maxi u¯(ai∣I)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
I.
(7.1)
for utilities, and to:
ENG(th) =mini l¯(ai∣I)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
I.
− q∑
k=1mini [l¯(ai∣Ethk , I) + c]´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
III.
Pr(Ethk ∣I)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
II.
(7.2)
for losses. As the roman numerals in these equations indicate, these expressions are made
up of three types of components:
I. the expected utilities or losses without the additional information;
II. the marginal probabilities of Ethk , k = 1,2, . . . , q; and
III. the expected utilities or losses with an additional piece of information, substracting the cost
of obtaining this information.
5Some software programs currently available for constructing IDs, such as GeNIe 2.0, include an algorithm
for evaluating the maxh ENG(th), but this is not always the case. Hugin Researcher 7.6, for example, will
find the arg max
h
ENG(th), but not indicate the value of the maxh ENG(th).
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With the basic computational algorithms for computing probability distributions and ex-
pected utilities or losses, the ID can evaluate each of these.
Figure 7.2 illustrates this for a fictive example of deciding whether or not to perform a test
t1 to obtain additional information before choosing between actions a1 and a2. The actions
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Figure 7.2: Expanded representations of the generic ID shown in Fig. 4.3(c) for a two-stage decision
problem. This model consists of the preliminary decision (node T ), the terminal decision (node A), the
space of possible test results (node E), the state space (node Θ), a loss function (node l) and the costs of the
tests in T (node c). Here, these expanded representations illustrate how to use this ID to obtain the values
needed for solving a two-stage decision problem for a fictive example. The preliminary decision is whether
or not to perform a test t1 (e.g., a forensic analysis) in view of the terminal decision of choosing between
a1 and a2 (e.g., a factfinder’s decision of convicting or acquitting a defendant). Performing this test costs
10 units and provides information on Θ (e.g., whether the defendant is guilty, Θ1, or innocent, Θ2, of the
alleged offense): Et11 supports Θ1 (Pr(Et11 ∣Θ1, I) = 0.99999 and Pr(Et11 ∣Θ2, I) = 0.0001), and Et12 supports
Θ2 (Pr(Et12 ∣Θ1, I) = 0.00001 and Pr(Et12 ∣Θ2, I) = 0.9999). The loss function over the terminal decision’s
four possible consequences is on the same scale as the cost of performing test t1: l(C11) = l(C22) = 0 (e.g.,
a loss of 0 for convicting a guilty defendant and acquitting an innocent defendant), l(C12) = 10000 (e.g., a
penalty of 10000 for convicting an innocent person) and l(C21) = 1000 (e.g., a penalty of 1000 for acquitting
the offender). Nodes Θ and E show probability distributions and node A the expected losses. The loss values
in nodes l, c and T have been omitted to focus the reader’s attention on the values of interest in nodes A,
E and Θ. The nodes with thicker borders represent instantiated nodes, with the certain state in bold. (a)
Instantiating node T to t0 produces the expected losses of a1 and a2 without any additional information.
(b) Instantiating node T to t1 gives the marginal probabilities of the test results E
t1
1 and E
t1
2 when the test
is performed. (c) Instantiating node T to t1 and node E to E
t1
1 indicates the values for l¯(ai∣Et11 , I) + c,
i = 1,2, in node A. (d) Similarly, instantiating node T to t1 and node E to Et12 indicates the values for
l¯(ai∣Et12 , I) + c, i = 1,2, in node A.
a1 and a2 are, for example, the factfinder’s decision of convicting or acquitting the defendant,
and test t1 is a forensic analysis whose results provide information on whether the defendant
is guilty (this is state Θ1) or innocent (state Θ2) of the alleged offense. In this simplified
example, the forensic analysis t1 can produce either result E
t1
1 or result E
t1
2 . Of the two
possible states of nature, Θ1 (guilty) and Θ2 (innocent), E
t1
1 supports the defendant’s guilt,
Θ1, and E
t1
2 supports the defendant’s innocence, Θ2, according to the following probability
table for the conditional probabilities of Et11 and E
t1
2 :
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Θ1 Θ2
Et11 0.99999 0.0001
Et12 0.00001 0.9999
If no test is performed, then there is no test result (this is state Et01 ). Consider an example
where the factfinder’s prior probability (i.e., the probability without the information from
the forensic analysis) of the defendant’s guilt is 0.1, the cost of performing the forensic
analysis is 10 units, and the loss function (in the same units as the cost of performing the
test) is:
l(C11) = l(C22) = 0,
l(C12) = 10000,
l(C21) = 1000.
This loss function assigns no loss for convicting a guilty defendant and for acquitting an
innocent defendant, and gives a penalty of 10000 units for convicting an innocent person,
and a penalty of 1000 units for acquitting the offender.
The ID in Fig. 7.2 indicates the probability distributions over Θ and E, and the expected
losses of convicting and acquitting the defendant in node A. Instantiating node T to t0
produces the expected losses without the additional information from the forensic analysis
(Fig. 7.2(a)), that is, the components of type I. in Eq. (7.1) and (7.2):
l¯(a1∣I) = l(C11)Pr(Θ1∣I) + l(C12)Pr(Θ2∣I)= 0 × 0.1 + 10000 × 0.9= 9000 , (7.3)
and
l¯(a2∣I) = l(C21)Pr(Θ1∣I) + l(C22)Pr(Θ2∣I)= 1000 × 0.1 + 0 × 0.9= 100 . (7.4)
Without the information from the forensic analysis, the expected loss of convicting the
defendant is 9000 units, and the expected loss of acquitting the defendant is 100 units.
These numerical values reflect the low probability (in this case) that the defendant is guilty,
and the high penalty for convicting an innocent person.
In addition, Fig. 7.2(a) indicates:
Pr(Et01 ∣I) = 1 (7.5)
in node E. By definition, if the test is not performed, there is no result (state Et01 ).
Instantiating node T to t1, posts the marginal probability distribution over E
t1
k in node
E (Fig. 7.2(b)). Instantiating node T to th, h ≠ 0, therefore produces the components of
type II. in Eq. (7.1) and (7.2):
Pr(Et11 ∣I) = Pr(Et11 ∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I) + Pr(Et11 ∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I)= 0.99999 × 0.1 + 0.0001 × 0.9= 0.100089 , (7.6)
and
Pr(Et12 ∣I) = Pr(Et12 ∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I) + Pr(Et12 ∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I)= 0.00001 × 0.1 + 0.9999 × 0.9= 0.899911 . (7.7)
The prior probability distribution over Θ, and the forensic analysis’s high specificity make
test result Et12 the most probable test result when the forensic analysis is performed.
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And finally, instantiating node T to t1, and node E to E
t1
k , k = 1,2, produces the
expected losses that take into account the information provided by Et1k and the cost of
obtaining this information (Figs. 7.2(c) and 7.2(d)). Instantiating node T to th and node E
to Ethk , k = 1,2, . . . , q, produces the components of type III. in Eq. (7.1) and (7.2):
l¯(a1∣Et11 , I) + c = l(C11)Pr(Et11 ∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I)Pr(Et11 ∣I) + l(C12)Pr(E
t1
1 ∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I)
Pr(Et11 ∣I) + c= 0 × 0.99999 × 0.1
0.100089
+ 10000 × 0.0001 × 0.9
0.100089
+ 10= 18.992 , (7.8)
l¯(a2∣Et11 , I) + c = l(C21)Pr(Et11 ∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I)Pr(Et11 ∣I) + l(C22)Pr(E
t1
1 ∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I)
Pr(Et11 ∣I) + c= 1000 × 0.99999 × 0.1
0.100089
+ 0 × 0.0001 × 0.9
0.100089
+ 10= 1009.101 , (7.9)
l¯(a1∣Et12 , I) + c = l(C11)Pr(Et12 ∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I)Pr(Et12 ∣I) + l(C12)Pr(E
t1
2 ∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I)
Pr(Et12 ∣I) + c= 0 × 0.00001 × 0.1
0.899911
+ 10000 × 0.9999 × 0.9
0.899911
+ 10= 10009.989 , (7.10)
l¯(a2∣Et12 , I) + c = l(C21)Pr(Et12 ∣Θ1, I)Pr(Θ1∣I)Pr(Et12 ∣I) + l(C22)Pr(E
t1
2 ∣Θ2, I)Pr(Θ2∣I)
Pr(Et12 ∣I) + c= 1000 × 0.00001 × 0.1
0.899911
+ 0 × 0.9999 × 0.9
0.899911
+ 10= 10.001 , (7.11)
and
l¯(ai∣Et01 , I) + c = l¯(ai∣I) , i = 1,2 . (7.12)
If performing the forensic analysis leads to result Et11 , then the action of convicting the
defendant minimizes the total expected loss (i.e., 18.992 < 1009.101), and if performing the
forensic analysis leads to result Et12 , then the action of acquitting the defendant minimizes
the total expected loss (i.e., 10009.989 > 10.001). Not performing the forensic analysis does
not produce any additional information and has a cost of 0 units, so that the expected losses
are the same as in Eqs. (7.3) and (7.4).
Inserting the numerical values obtained from the ID for components I. (Eq. (7.3)-(7.4)),
II. (Eq. (7.5)-(7.7)) and III. (Eq. (7.8)-(7.12)) into Eq. (7.2) produces:
ENG(t0) = min(9000,100) −min(9000,100) × 1= 100 − 100= 0 ,
and
ENG(t1) = min(9000,100) −[min(18.992,1009.101) × 0.100089 +min(10009.989,10.001) × 0.899911]= 100 − [18.992 × 0.100089 + 10.001 × 0.899911]= 100 − 10.901= 89.099
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A rational decision-maker chooses to perform the test that maximizes the ENG(th). Since
ENG(t1) > ENG(t0), the rational decision-maker chooses to perform the forensic analysis
t1.
Note that both Hugin Researcher 7.6 and GeNIe 2.0 include algorithms for computing
the EV OI(th) (in this example, EV OI(t0) = 0 and EV OI(t1) = 99.099).6 In addition,
Hugin Researcher 7.6 has an algorithm for finding the arg max
h
ENG(th) and computing
the maximum expected utility minus the cost for performing this test (for a translation
of the loss function to a utility function by multiplying the losses by -1 in this example,
this value would be -10.901).7 GeNIe 2.0 has algorithms for both the maximum expected
utilities minus the cost for performing th, h = 0,1, . . . , p, (for a translation of the loss function
to a utility function by multiplying the losses by -1 in this example, these values would be
-100 for t0 and -10.901 for t1),
8 and for computing the maxh ENG(th) (in this example,
maxh ENG(th) = 89.099).9
According to this illustrative example, IDs provide a means for forensic scientists to struc-
ture two-stage decision problems and compute the expected losses (or utilities) and proba-
bilities required to evaluate the ENG(th) which the scientist must maximize for choosing
the most rational course of action.
6In Hugin Researcher 7.6, the user must instantiate node T to th, select node A, open the Value of
Information tool in the menu Network and submenu Analysis, select Custom group and node E under the
tab Information Variables, and press Calculate under the tab Analysis. In GeNIe 2.0, the user must select
the Value of Information tool in the menu Network, select node E, specify that the analysis is for decision
node A and from the point of view of node A, and press Update. In both of these programs, the structure
of the ID must not include the precedence link between nodes E and A for this evaluation to be correct.
7For this, the user selects the δ spu (i.e., Decision: single policy update) function in the tool bar of the
model’s Run Mode. For this evaluation, the structure of the ID must include the precedence link between
nodes E and A.
8The test node automatically indicates these values when the model is updated. This computation
requires the structure of the ID to include the precedence link between nodes E and A.
9For this, the user must select the Value of Information tool in the menu Network, select node E, specify
that the analysis is for decision node A and from the point of view of node T , and press Update. This
evaluation requires the structure of the ID to leave out the precedence link between nodes E and A.
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Conclusions
This thesis studied a normative approach to decision problems encountered by scientists in
forensic science laboratories by performing theoretical case studies to address the following
three propositions:
Proposition 1: Decision theory provides a framework for organizing a broad range of de-
cision problems encountered by scientists in forensic science laboratories dealing with
different categories of trace evidence.
Proposition 2: Bayesian networks (BNs) provide a means for handling new complex infer-
ence problems encountered by forensic scientists.
Proposition 3: Influence diagrams (IDs) provide forensic scientists with a practical tool
for structuring and providing the elements required for making coherent choices in
forensic decision problems.
The results of the case studies have provided elements in support of each of these proposi-
tions.
The uniform framework presented in this thesis for confronting forensic decision problems
distinguishes between one-stage and two-stage decision problems. It shows how to organize
each type of problem by breaking it down into its different elements so as to form the
spaces necessary for applying Bayesian inference and decision theory. The intention of this
framework is not to describe a scientist’s degrees of belief, preferences and choices as they
currently are, but to suggest what they ought to be if the scientist wishes to be a coherent
decision-maker. The application of this framework therefore provides the scientist with a
tool for thinking coherently about a decision problem. In particular, it:
 offers a transparent structure in which the scientists can express their views and com-
municate with each other,
 shows what parts of the decision problem can be analyzed independently of other parts,
and
 helps the scientists better understand their situation, degrees of belief and preferences,
as well as the problem’s key parameters that should have an impact on their choices.
Hence, the proposed framework is an interactive and exploratory tool for better understand-
ing a decision problem so that this understanding may lead to better informed choices.
In view of the serious consequences that the decisions made by forensic scientists can
lead to in the administration of justice, this framework provides a logical foundation for
justifying the scientist’s course of actions. It is the natural extension of the Bayesian inference
models already advocated for the interpretation of scientific evidence to handling decision
problems under uncertainty. Its major advantage over current decision protocols is its case-
specific approach to decision problems: unlike fixed standards prescribing threshold values
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and laboratory protocols applicable to all cases alike, a decision-theoretic approach takes
into account the probability distributions and utility (or loss) functions for the particular
case in question to study the most rational course of action for that particular case. Hence,
future perspectives would be to develop this normative approach into a prescriptive approach
that applies these ideas in forensic practice.
Furthermore, some of the ideas presented in this thesis for scientific evidence describe
a general reasoning process for decision problems concerning evidential testimony. These
are, of course, not restricted to forensic science. They apply just as well to other categories
of evidential testimony, such as eyewitnesses and legal medicine. Hence, another possible
development of these ideas is their application to other types of evidential testimony.
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Chapter 9
Modeling the Forensic
Two-trace Problem with
Bayesian Networks
Abstract
The forensic two-trace problem is a perplexing inference problem introduced by
Evett (1987). Different possible ways of wording the competing pair of propo-
sitions (i.e., one proposition advanced by the prosecution and one proposition
advanced by the defence) led to different quantifications of the value of the ev-
idence (Meester and Sjerps, 2003). Here, we re-examine this scenario with the
aim of clarifying the interrelationships that exist between the different solutions,
and in this way, produce a global vision of the problem. We propose to investi-
gate the different expressions for evaluating the value of the evidence by using a
graphical approach, i.e. Bayesian networks, to model the rationale behind each
of the proposed solutions and the assumptions made on the unknown parameters
in this problem.
9.1 Introduction
The two-trace problem, introduced by Evett (1987), is a perplexing inference problem that
continues to puzzle many forensic scientists. It considers a scenario where forensic investiga-
tors recover two items of a particular category of trace evidence on a crime scene, e.g. two
bloodstains, and compare both of these to the sample taken from a suspect. The question
of interest to the court is, ‘How strong is the evidence resulting from these two comparisons
in favor of the prosecution or the defence?’
The objective of the forensic scientist’s testimony is to answer this question. The answer
to this question takes the form of the value of the evidence (e.g., Aitken and Taroni, 2004):
V = Pr(evidence∣proposition 1, I)
Pr(evidence∣proposition 2, I) , (9.1)
Reprinted from Artificial Intelligence and Law (2013) 21:221-252, Modeling the forensic
two-trace problem with Bayesian networks, S. Gittelson, A. Biedermann, S. Bozza, and F.
Taroni, Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012, with the kind permission
from Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
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where proposition 1 is the proposition advanced by the prosecution, proposition 2 the propo-
sition advanced by the defence, and I the background information consisting of the forensic
scientist’s knowledge on the case circumstances prior to observing the evidence. The ev-
idence is an intrinsic trait (e.g., the blood group or DNA profile) of the two traces and
the suspect’s sample, observed as a result of the test or analysis performed in the forensic
laboratory. Prior to hearing the forensic scientist’s testimony, the prosecution and the de-
fence each take position on the origin of the traces. These views are formalized into the
two propositions, that is, into two statements that are each either true or false. As a pair,
these propositions must be mutually exclusive1, yet there is no requirement for them to be
exhaustive2 (e.g., Robertson and Vignaux, 1995a; Aitken and Taroni, 2004). In this case,
the first proposition (advanced by the prosecution) links the suspect to the crime stains, and
the second (advanced by the defence) rejects such a link. The fact-finder (a judge or jury
member) has a particular degree of belief in the truth of each of these propositions before
hearing the forensic testimony. By presenting the value of the evidence V , the forensic scien-
tist’s testimony conveys by how much more or less the evidence supports the first proposition
with regard to the second proposition: if V > 1, the evidence supports the first proposition;
if V < 1, the evidence supports the second proposition; and if V = 1, the evidence does not
provide support for either of the two propositions, meaning that it is irrelevant for discrim-
inating between them. Hence, the value of the evidence allows the fact-finder to update his
or her belief in the truth of these propositions, and construct an informed opinion about
each party’s account of the events.
9.1.1 Aim and outline of this paper
With two traces making up the recovered evidence, there are several possibilities for formu-
lating a pair of propositions: they can focus on one of the two traces, or on both, and in
the latter case, either specify or not specify which of the two traces originates (or does not
originate) from the suspect. What is disturbing for a fact-finder hearing a forensic scientist’s
testimony in the context of a two-trace problem, is that the value of the evidence, as given
by Eq. (9.1), is different for different pairs of propositions (Meester and Sjerps, 2003).
The aim of this paper is to investigate the value of the evidence in a two-trace problem
with regard to different pairs of propositions, by unifying three different pairs in a single
framework. To accomplish this, we will construct a Bayesian network, i.e., a graphical
probability model. In forensic contexts, Bayesian networks help examine the reasonableness
of the formal derivation of a formula, that is, the assumptions that have been made (Taroni
et al., 2006a). This allows us to compare the derived values of the evidence for different pairs
of propositions. In addition, these models allow the user to perform complex probabilistic
calculations that take into account the probability assignments over all of the unknown
parameters. In this way, we hope to provide a global model which offers a complete and
realistic approach to the valuation of scientific evidence in a two-trace problem. With this
model, we hope to draw the reader’s attention to the importance of the formulation of a
pair of propositions, and increase his/her awareness of the impact that subtle differences in
these formulations can have on the value of the evidence.
Besides a brief description of what Bayesian networks are and how they work (Sec-
tion 9.2), we do not give a detailed explanation on Bayesian networks, and refer the inter-
ested reader to one of the many publications on the subject (e.g., Jensen, 2001; Kjaerulff and
Madsen, 2008). Section 9.3 gives an overview of the two-trace problem as we will treat it in
this paper, and Section 9.4 describes the notation we will use. Section 9.5 explains how we
construct the Bayesian network, and Sections 9.6 and 9.7 illustrate the use of this model and
the influence of the different parameters through a numerical example. Concluding remarks
are in Section 9.8.
1Two propositions are mutually exclusive if they cannot both be true at the same time.
2A set of propositions is exhaustive if it covers all scenarios, so that at least one of its propositions is
always true.
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9.2 Bayesian networks
Bayesian networks are graphical probability models, also known as probabilistic expert sys-
tems. The key advantage of these models is their capacity of splitting up a complex inference
problem into its different parts. They represent random variables as nodes, and dependence
relationships between the random variables as arrows connecting the nodes to form a di-
rected acyclic graph. The random variables can be either discrete or continuous, but for the
sake of simplicity we will use discrete nodes in this paper. Thus, each random variable will
consist of a finite and exhaustive list of mutually exclusive states. The arrows model the
probabilistic relationships between the variables by connecting a ‘parent’ node to a ‘child’
node. They condition the probability distribution of the child node upon each of its parents
with probability tables that allow the user to quantify the probabilistic relationships.
In this way, the Bayesian network decomposes the joint probability distribution of a set
of random variables X1, ...,Xn into the product of each of their probabilities conditioned on
their parents. This is known as the Markov property:
Pr(X1, ...,Xn) = n∏
i=1Pr(Xi∣parents(Xi)) . (9.2)
It is important to stress that there is no true model, because a model is personal and
reflects the constructor’s view of the problem and the information available at the time of the
construction (Lindley, 2000). As our understanding of the issue progresses, the constructed
network may evolve to model a situation more accurately, so that several different Bayesian
network structures may be accepted as a description of the same scenario (Garbolino, 2001).
The relevance of Bayesian networks for applications in forensic science was first recog-
nized - in print - by Aitken and Gammerman (1989). Key publications in legal literature
followed (Edwards, 1991 - 1992; Schum, 1994; Kadane and Schum, 1996), presenting thor-
ough descriptions of the potential of probabilistic models for reasoning about evidence in
real cases. Since then, the application of Bayesian networks has covered different aspects of
evidential assessment (Taroni et al., 2006a), in particular the evaluation of DNA evidence
(Dawid et al., 2002, 2007; Mortera et al., 2003), evidence collected in fire debris (Biedermann
et al., 2005a,b), firearm evidence (Biedermann and Taroni, 2006; Biedermann et al., 2009a),
and fibre evidence (Garbolino and Taroni, 2002), as well as practical considerations on how
to present their results in court (Fenton and Neil, 2011).
In this study, we constructed the Bayesian networks using the software Hugin Researcher
7.3, by Hugin Expert A/S. This program allows the user to construct and use Bayesian
networks that contain numerical probability values. It can only carry out numerical propa-
gations between the nodes. To derive the algebraic expressions corresponding to the calcu-
lations performed by the model, the user applies Eq. (9.2). The probabilistic relationships
defined by the structure and the probability tables tell the user how the probability of a
compound event is broken down into separate conditional probabilities.
9.3 The two-trace problem
We denote the following pair of propositions ‘pair H’:
proposition 1: at least one of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
proposition 2: neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect.
These propositions are called source level propositions according to the hierarchy of propo-
sitions defined by Cook et al. (1998b), because they describe whether a particular object
or person is the source, or origin, of the traces recovered on the crime scene. Source level
propositions are different from activity level propositions (describing the activity that led to
the transfer of the traces from their source to the crime scene) and crime level propositions
(concerned with whether the suspect actually committed the crime under investigation). In
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this paper we treat only source level propositions. For activity or crime level evaluations of
the evidence in a two-trace problem, see Triggs and Buckleton (2003) and Gittelson et al.
(2012a), and Dawid (2004), respectively.
The value of the evidence with regard to the above propositions depends on the evidence
observed. There are three possibilities:
1. if neither of the two crime stains matches the suspect’s sample, then the likelihood of
the first proposition is 0, and consequently Eq. (9.1) becomes
V = 0 ; (9.3)
2. if one of the crime stains matches the suspect’s sample, Evett (1987) showed that this
leads to
V = 1
2γ
, (9.4)
where γ represents the match probability (Weir, 2000) of the matching trait in the rel-
evant population of possible crime stain donors [Note that originally, Evett (1987) did
not deduce this expression for the source level propositions as described, but for their
equivalents at the crime level, assuming the relevance of both traces to be maximal. A
crime level evaluation with maximal relevance produces the same value of the evidence
as the source level evaluation presented here (see, e.g., Aitken and Taroni (2004)).];
3. and if both of the crime stains match the suspect’s sample, most forensic scientists
would assume that the two traces come from a single contributor so that Eq. (9.1)
reduces to
V = 1
γ
. (9.5)
These assessments are based on the assumption that no laboratory errors are possible, an as-
sumption we maintain throughout this paper. Note, however, that relaxing this assumption
may have a considerable effect on the value of the evidence (Thompson et al., 2003).
Among these three ratios, Eqs. (9.3) and (9.5) are the same as for a scenario involving a
single crime stain. This is because the differentiation between the two traces is not necessary
in these cases in order to describe the observed evidence. In these two cases, one can combine
the two crime stains into a single group, which we see as either matching (Eq. (9.5)), or not
matching (Eq. (9.3)) the suspect’s sample. In both of these cases, the reasoning that leads
to Eq. (9.3) and (9.5) is the same as that applied to the evaluation of the value of a single
crime stain.
This is different for the case involving one matching stain and one non-matching stain
(item 2 in the list). This case requires the forensic scientist to distinguish between the
two traces by multiplying the traditional value of 1
γ
by a factor of 0.5 (We will discuss the
meaning of this additional factor in Section 9.7). This is the case which interests us in this
paper.
Evett (1987) was not the only author to treat this problem. After Evett (1987), the
case of one matching stain and one non-matching stain gave rise to the formulation of other
propositions, which led to evidential values that were not equal to Eq. (9.4). According to
Meester and Sjerps (2003), a pair of propositions worded slightly differently (note that the
wording of these propositions has been modified here with regard to their original formulation
in Meester and Sjerps (2003), yet their logical meaning remains unchanged), that is,
proposition 1: crime stain 1 comes from the suspect;
proposition 2: neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
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(we denote this pair ‘pair H ′1’) produced a value of
1
γ
, (9.6)
and the pair
proposition 1: crime stain 1 comes from the suspect;
proposition 2: crime stain 1 does not come from the suspect;
(denoted ‘pair H ′′1 ’) produced a value of3
2 − δ
2γ(1 − δ) , (9.7)
for evidence consisting of a match between crime stain 1 and the suspect’s sample, and a
non-match between crime stain 2 and the suspect’s sample. In Eq. (9.7), the probability
denoted δ represents the prior probability that the suspect was one of two crime stain donors.
This probability had to be introduced to correctly evaluate the probability of the evidence
given proposition 2 and I. See Section 9.7.3 for further explanations.
The pair of propositions H (on page 69) is related to the above two pairs (pairs H ′1 and
H ′′1 ) when the forensic scientist observes a match between the suspect’s sample and stain 1,
and a non-match between the suspect’s sample and stain 2: in this case, all three pairs of
propositions have identical posterior odds of
δ
2(1 − δ)γ , (9.8)
for a prior probability of δ that the suspect was a crime stain donor. (Note that we call the
odds of a pair of propositions ‘prior odds’ before observing the evidence, and ‘posterior odds’
after observing the evidence. We use the terms ‘prior probability’ and ‘posterior probability’
in the same way.)
Here, the observation of a matching trait in the suspect’s sample and stain 1, and a
non-matching trait between the suspect’s sample and stain 2 has made the three pairs of
propositions logically equivalent, since it has become impossible for the suspect to be the
donor of stain 2. Algebraically, this comes down to multiplying the value of the evidence
by the corresponding pair of propositions’ prior odds according to the odds’ form of Bayes’
theorem (Meester and Sjerps, 2003):
δ
1 − δ®
prior odds for pair H
× 1
2γ®
value of the evidence for pair H
, (9.9)
δ/2
1 − δ®
prior odds for pair H′1
× 1
γ®
value of the evidence for pair H′1
, (9.10)
δ/2
1 − δ/2´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
prior odds for pair H′′1
× 2 − δ
2γ(1 − δ)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
value of the evidence for pair H′′1
. (9.11)
Meester and Sjerps (2003) and Meester and Sjerps (2004a) conclude from this that foren-
sic scientists should use posterior odds in the place of the value of the evidence to commu-
nicate the strength of forensic evidence, a recommendation which makes no attempt at
3Note that Eq. (9.7) gives the simplified form of the value of the evidence, so that the numerator and
denominator of this ratio do not represent the probabilities forming the numerator and denominator in
Eq. (9.1).
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clarifying the logical relationships between the three pairs of propositions and their different
values for the same evidence (a point criticized by Dawid (2004)).
The Bayesian network we present in Section 9.5 will illustrate the interrelationships
between these three pairs of propositions by modeling them in separate nodes. Before
explaining the rationale behind this model, the next section presents the notation we will
use in the rest of this paper.
9.4 Notation
We distinguish between the background information (Section 9.4.1), the propositions (Sec-
tion 9.4.2), the unknown parameters δ, λ and τ (Section 9.4.3), and the evidence (Sec-
tion 9.4.4).
9.4.1 Background information
The background information I is all of the knowledge available prior to observing the ev-
idence. This information includes the case circumstances (e.g., the location of the crime
scene), the facts surrounding the recovery of the two traces on the crime scene (e.g., their
exact location on the scene), the fact that one suspect has been found from whom a sample
has been obtained for comparison with the recovered traces, and the non-scientific infor-
mation associating this suspect to the crime scene (e.g., witness statements asserting the
suspect’s presence near the scene). All of the probabilities assessed in a case are conditional
probabilities given I. However, for the sake of brevity in the mathematical expressions that
follow, we shall hereafter omit I from their notation.
9.4.2 Propositions
The propositions reflect the viewpoints of the prosecution and the defence. At the time
they are formulated, the evidence has not yet been observed, so that these formulations
are independent of the evidence, and based solely on the background information. Each
proposition depicts the most plausible situation(s) given the party’s point of view and the
background information (Robertson and Vignaux, 1995a). Since the background information
is case-specific, one pair of propositions may be reasonable in one case, yet unreasonable in
another case.
Section 9.1 introduced four propositions, which we denote with capital letters as follows:
D - at least one of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
D¯ - neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
C1 - crime stain 1 comes from the suspect;
C¯1 - crime stain 1 does not come from the suspect.
The horizontal bar over a capital letter means that the proposition described is the negation
of the proposition denoted by that letter (i.e., its complement). The number figuring as
a subscript to propositions C and C¯ indicates which crime stain the proposition refers to.
Analogous to C1 and C¯1, we also formulate:
C2 - crime stain 2 comes from the suspect;
C¯2 - crime stain 2 does not come from the suspect.
Meester and Sjerps (2003) considered 3 pairs of propositions, denoted here as pairs H,
H ′1, and H ′′1 (the subscript ‘1’ indicates that the pair contains at least one proposition re-
ferring only to crime stain 1). These combine in different ways the four propositions D, D¯,
C1 and C¯1 as follows:
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Table 9.1: Definition of the parameters δ, λ and τ .
δ Probability that the suspect is a crime stain donor
λ Probability that there were two distinct donors
τ Probability that crime stain 1 comes from the suspect,
given that the suspect is one of two donors
pair H: D - at least one of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
D¯ - neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
pair H ′1: C1 - crime stain 1 comes from the suspect;
D¯ - neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
pair H ′′1 : C1 - crime stain 1 comes from the suspect;
C¯1 - crime stain 1 does not come from the suspect.
To model a pair of propositions as a node in a Bayesian network, the node must have
an exhaustive list of states (see Section 9.2). The propositions in pairs H and H ′′1 already
form an exhaustive set of possibilities, and can therefore be modeled as nodes with two
states. Yet pair H ′1 is not exhaustive because it does not consider the possibility that crime
stain 2 comes from the suspect. An exhaustive list would need to include all of the possible
combinations between C1, C¯1, C2 and C¯2, i.e.,
C1 ∩C2 - both crime stains come from the suspect;
C1 ∩ C¯2 - crime stain 1 comes from the suspect,
and crime stain 2 does not come from the suspect;
C¯1 ∩C2 - crime stain 1 does not come from the suspect,
but crime stain 2 comes from the suspect;
C¯1 ∩ C¯2 - neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect.
In this list, proposition D¯ is equivalent to C¯1∩C¯2, and proposition C1 to {C1∩C2}∪{C1∩C¯2}.
Modeling pair H ′1 as a node with exhaustive states in a Bayesian network will therefore
require the additional state C¯1 ∩C2 in this node.
Analogous to pair H ′1, we define pair H ′2 for the combination of C2 and D¯:
pair H ′2: C2 - crime stain 2 comes from the suspect;
D¯ - neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
and analogous to pair H ′′1 , we define pair H ′′2 for the combination of C2 and C¯2:
pair H ′′2 : C2 - crime stain 2 comes from the suspect;
C¯2 - crime stain 2 does not come from the suspect.
Modeling pair H ′2 as a node in a Bayesian network will follow the same reasoning as for pair
H ′1 by requiring the additional state C1 ∩ C¯2 to make the node’s states exhaustive.
9.4.3 Unknown parameters
The two-trace problem involves three unknown parameters (Table 9.1):
 δ: The first parameter, δ, we encountered in Eq. 9.7. This is the prior probability that
the suspect is a crime stain donor, i.e.,
Pr(D) = δ ,
as defined in Meester and Sjerps (2003). δ describes the probability that a trace
recovered on the crime scene comes from the suspect based on the information available
prior to the laboratory analyses of the crime stains. This parameter takes into account
73
CHAPTER 9. MODELING THE FORENSIC TWO-TRACE PROBLEM WITH
BAYESIAN NETWORKS
the background information regarding the suspect’s presence on or near the crime
scene during the lapse of time when the traces were deposited (for example, witness
statements, data from mobile phone providers, and images from surveillance cameras),
as well as background information regarding the suspect’s ability to transfer the type
of trace evidence in question (for example in the case of recovered bloodstains, the fact
that the suspect had a scratch, cut or other injury with blood loss after the time when
the traces were deposited would increase δ). In this model, the value of δ is based on
this background information alone, independent of whether the recovered traces come
from a single source or from two different sources. Note however that in some cases
this assumption of δ being independent of the total number of crime stain donors may
not be reasonable. Notably when the background information described above is very
poor or not available, it may be reasonable to assume that δ is greater in the case
of two donors than in the case of a single donor (Meester and Sjerps, 2004a,b). This
situation is not treated in this paper, but it would require an additional dependence
relationship in the Bayesian network presented in Section 9.5 (Fig. 9.2).
 λ: The second parameter describes the uncertainty on the number of donors (Dawid,
2004). Defined by Dawid (2004), λ represents the probability that there are two distinct
donors. Before observing the evidence, all we know is that there are two traces. A
priori, these may come from the same source with a probability of 1−λ, and from two
different sources with a probability of λ.
 τ : The third parameter, τ , considers the conditional probability that crime stain 1
comes from the suspect given that the suspect is one of two crime stain donors, i.e.,
Pr(C1∣2 donors,D) = τ .
From this definition, it follows that 1 − τ is the probability of crime stain 2 coming
from the suspect given that the suspect is the source of one of the two traces, i.e.,
Pr(C2∣2 donors,D) = 1 − τ .
All of these parameters are assessed on the basis of the background information alone, that is,
before observing the evidence: the value of δ will depend on the prior information regarding
the suspect’s connection to the crime scene; and the values of λ and τ are based on the
circumstancial information of the case, including the location of the traces on the scene,
witness reports, and images from surveillance cameras.
These prior assessments determine the probabilities of the propositions (see column 3 of
Table 9.2). The probabilities of D and D¯ are determined by δ, as described above. The
probabilities of C1, C¯1, C2 and C¯2 are made up of the probabilities of C1 ∩ C2, C1 ∩ C¯2,
C¯1 ∩C2 and C¯1 ∩ C¯2, which are
Pr(C1 ∩C2) = δ(1 − λ)
Pr(C1 ∩ C¯2) = δλτ
Pr(C¯1 ∩C2) = δλ(1 − τ)
Pr(C¯1 ∩ C¯2) = 1 − δ ,
so that the probabilities of C1, C¯1, C2 and C¯2 are
Pr(C1) = Pr(C1 ∩C2) + Pr(C1 ∩ C¯2)= δ(1 − λ) + δλτ ,
Pr(C¯1) = Pr(C¯1 ∩C2) + Pr(C¯1 ∩ C¯2)= δλ(1 − τ) + 1 − δ ,
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Pr(C2) = Pr(C1 ∩C2) + Pr(C¯1 ∩C2)= δ(1 − λ) + δλ(1 − τ) ,
and
Pr(C¯2) = Pr(C1 ∩ C¯2) + Pr(C¯1 ∩ C¯2)= δλτ + 1 − δ .
The examples in Sections 9.6 and 9.7 will illustrate the impact of parameters δ, λ and τ
on the value of the evidence and on the posterior odds of the different pairs of propositions.
9.4.4 Evidence
The evidence is the new piece of information we observe. It is the compound event of
observing the states of the three variables X, Y1 and Y2. X denotes the profile of the
suspect’s sample, Y1 the profile of the first of the recovered traces, which we call ‘crime stain
1’, and Y2 the profile of the second of the recovered traces, which we call ‘crime stain 2’.
We assume that the analysis performed is capable of distinguishing between k different
profiles, which we label Γ1,Γ2, . . . ,Γk. Profile Γi, i = 1,2, . . . , k, has a match probability of
γi in the relevant population of possible crime stain donors. Note that the relevant popula-
tion is defined on the basis of the background information. Before observing the evidence,
X,Y1, and Y2 each have a probability of γi, i = 1,2, . . . , k, ∑γi = 1, to have profile Γi. After
observing the evidence, the states of X,Y1, and Y2 are known with certainty. They are each
equal to one of the k profiles, Γ1,Γ2, . . . ,Γk.
In the next section, we combine the above evidence, propositions, and parameters in a
Bayesian network for the two-trace problem.
9.5 Constructing a Bayesian network
The aim of this section is to construct a Bayesian network containing the propositions,
the parameters, and the evidence, defined in the previous section. This section contains
several technical details of the constructed Bayesian network, and may be skipped by readers
interested more in the application of the model than in its construction. For the propositions
we create nodes H,H ′1, H ′′1 , H ′2 and H ′′2 , and for the evidence, nodes X,Y1 and Y2. Table 9.2
provides the exhaustive list of the states and probabilities associated to each of these nodes.
Taroni et al. (2006a) proposed a model containing some of these nodes for a very specific
scenario of a two-trace problem (Fig. 9.1). In this model, node F contains the inexhaustive
list of states C1∩C¯2, C¯1∩C2 and C¯1∩C¯2. This model sets the profile of Y1 equal to the profile
Y2
X
H
Y1 Y2
Y1
F
Figure 9.1: The Bayesian network presented in Taroni et al. (2006a) for a very specific scenario of the
two-trace problem. Nodes H,X,Y1 and Y2 consist of the states presented in Table 9.2, and node F of the
states C1 ∩ C¯2, C¯1 ∩C2 and C¯1 ∩ C¯2 ≡ D¯.
of X if C1 is true, and the profile of Y2 equal to the profile of X if C2 is true. Concerning the
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Table 9.2: Description of the states of the non-parametric nodes in the Bayesian network in Fig. 9.2. The
parameters δ, λ, and τ are defined in Table 9.1.
Nodes States Probabilities Definitions of the states
H
D δ At least one of the crime stains comes from the suspect
D¯ 1 − δ Neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect
L
1 donor 1 − λ The crime stains come from the same source
2 donors λ The crime stains come from two different sources
H ′′1 C1 δ(1 − λ + λτ) Crime stain 1 comes from the suspectC¯1 δλ(1 − τ) + 1 − δ Crime stain 1 does not come from the suspect
H ′′2 C2 δ[1 − λ + λ(1 − τ)] Crime stain 2 comes from the suspectC¯2 δλτ + 1 − δ Crime stain 2 does not come from the suspect
C1 δ(1 − λ + λτ) Crime stain 1 comes from the suspect
H ′1 C¯1 ∩C2 δλ(1 − τ) Only crime stain 2 comes from the suspect
D¯ 1 − δ Neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect
C2 δ[1 − λ + λ(1 − τ)] Crime stain 2 comes from the suspect
H ′2 C1 ∩ C¯2 δλτ Only crime stain 1 comes from the suspect
D¯ 1 − δ Neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect
Γ1 γ1
X
Γ2 γ2 Profile of the suspect’s sample⋮ ⋮
Γk γk
Γ1 γ1
Y1
Γ2 γ2 Profile of crime stain 1⋮ ⋮
Γk γk
Γ1 γ1
Y2
Γ2 γ2 Profile of crime stain 2⋮ ⋮
Γk γk
Γ1Γ1 γ1γ1
Γ1Γ2 γ1γ2
Y1Y2 Γ2Γ1 γ2γ1 Profiles of crime stains 1 and 2 (as ordered pairs)⋮ ⋮
ΓkΓk γkγk
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Table 9.3: Probability table for node H′1 in Fig. 9.2. The states of H′1 are defined by the combinations of
the states in nodes H′′1 and H′′2 .
H ′′1 : C1 C¯1
H ′′2 : C2 C¯2 C2 C¯2
H ′1: C1 1 1 0 0
C¯1 ∩C2 0 0 1 0
D¯ 0 0 0 1
Table 9.4: Probability table for node H′2 in Fig. 9.2. The states of H′2 are defined by the combinations of
the states in nodes H′′1 and H′′2 .
H ′′1 : C1 C¯1
H ′′2 : C2 C¯2 C2 C¯2
H ′2: C2 1 0 1 0
C1 ∩ C¯2 0 1 0 0
D¯ 0 0 0 1
propositions, it specifies that C1 and C2 can only be true if D (in node H) is true. However,
this model makes the assumption that C1 and C2 are equally likely under D, and it does
not consider the possibility of C1 and C2 being true at the same time (i.e., node F contains
an inexhaustive list of states). Node Y1Y2 combines the states of Y1 and Y2 as ordered pairs,
so that the model computes the compound probability of the two crime stain profiles. This
node is necessary for evaluating the value of the evidence (see Section 9.7).
We use this model as a starting point to extend and improve it to a more general Bayesian
network for evaluating the value of the evidence in a two-trace problem. For this, we exam-
ine the following points: the relationship between the propositional nodes (Section 9.5.1),
the uncertainty on the number of donors (Section 9.5.2), and the relationship between the
propositional and the evidential nodes (Section 9.5.3).
9.5.1 Relationships between the propositional nodes H, H ′1, H ′′1 , H ′2
and H ′′2
The postdata equivalence presented in Section 9.3 indicates a relationship between the nodes
containing the pairs of propositions H, H ′1 and H ′′1 . To expose the links that exist between
these nodes, we analyse the logical relationships between the propositions that form the
nodes’ states.
The difference between proposition D and propositions C1 and C2 is that the former does
not specify which trace, or traces, come(s) from the suspect, whereas the latter do. Logically,
this means that propositions C1 and C2 are two subsets of proposition D, i.e., C1 ⊂ D and
C2 ⊂ D. In a Bayesian network, this relationship may be modeled by conditioning the
probabilities of C1 and C2 on D (Taroni et al., 2006a). In other words, we model node H
(containing proposition D) as a parent of nodes H ′′1 (containing proposition C1) and H ′′2
(containing proposition C2).
As for nodes H ′1 and H ′2, their states C¯1∩C2, C1∩C¯2 and D¯ (≡ C¯1∩C¯2) are combinations
of C1, C¯1, C2, and C¯2. Each of these combinations is a subset of its single components:{C1 ∩ C¯2} ⊂ C1, {C1 ∩ C¯2} ⊂ C¯2, {C¯1 ∩C2} ⊂ C¯1, {C¯1 ∩C2} ⊂ C2, D¯ ⊂ C¯1 and D¯ ⊂ C¯2. Again,
we find it convenient to model a subset as a child of its superset. Therefore, we model nodes
H ′1 and H ′2 as children of nodes H ′′1 and H ′′2 , with the conditional probability distributions
given in Tables 9.3 and 9.4.
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Table 9.5: Probability table for node H′′1 in Fig. 9.2. This probability table contains the parameter τ =
Pr(C1∣2 donors,D).
H: D D¯
L: 1 donor 2 donors 1 donor 2 donors
H ′′1 : C1 1 τ 0 0
C¯1 0 1 − τ 1 1
Table 9.6: Probability table for node H′′2 in Fig. 9.2. Note that the second, fifth and seventh columns
describe impossible combination of states (i.e., in the second column, the suspect is a crime stain donor,
and there is only a single donor for both crime stains, yet the suspect is not the donor of crime stain 1; and
in the fifth and seventh columns the suspect is not a crime stain donor, yet crime stain 1 comes from the
suspect), so that the probability distribution over states C2 and C¯2 is not defined for these events (‘n/a’ =
not applicable). For an alternative way of modeling this conditional probability distribution over the states
of node H′′2 that avoids having these impossible combinations in the conditional probability table, we refer
the reader to the work by Fenton et al. (2011).
H: D D¯
L: 1 donor 2 donors 1 donor 2 donors
H ′′1 : C1 C¯1 C1 C¯1 C1 C¯1 C1 C¯1
H ′′2 : C2 1 n/a 0 1 n/a 0 n/a 0
C¯2 0 n/a 1 0 n/a 1 n/a 1
The resulting hierarchical ordering, from the parent node to the child node, is therefore:
H → {H ′′1 ,H ′′2 }→ {H ′1,H ′2} .
Our Bayesian network will reflect this hierarchy.
9.5.2 Uncertainty on the number of donors
To take into account the possibility that there was only one donor, we add an additional
node L made up of the states ‘1 donor’ and ‘2 donors’. We use the parameter λ, denoting
the prior probability of ‘2 donors’, to introduce the uncertainty on the number of donors
into this node.
The states of node L add a constraint on the probability distribution over C1, C¯1,C2,
and C¯2, and on the observed profile of crime stain 2 (Y2) given the profile of crime stain 1
(Y1). That is, if there is only 1 donor, then Y2 must be equal to Y1, and both C1 and C2
must be true or false, together, according to whether D is true or false. If there are 2 donors,
then either C1 or C2 will be true when D is true, but never both C1 and C2. In the case
of two donors, the parameter τ (denoting Pr(C1∣2 donors,D)) determines the probability
distribution over C1 and C2 under proposition D. Tables 9.5 and 9.6 describe the logical
relationships between the propositions C1, C¯1,C2, and C¯2 and the propositions D and D¯
given the number of donors specified in node L.
9.5.3 Relationship between the propositional and evidential nodes
As proposed by Taroni et al. (2006a), the profile of each crime stain depends on whether
that particular crime stain comes from the suspect, i.e., on propositions C1 and C2. This
means that node Y1 should be connected with a node containing state C1, and node Y2
connected with a node containing state C2. The most straightforward way of achieving this
in the model is for Y1 to be a child of H
′′
1 , and Y2 a child of H
′′
2 . Thus, Y1 copies the state
of X when C1 is true, and is independent of X when C¯1 is true (see Table 9.7). The same
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Table 9.7: Probability table for node Y1 in Fig. 9.2. If C1 is true, the state of Y1 is equal to the state of
X. If C¯1 is true, the probability of observing each profile is equal to that profile’s match probability in the
relevant population of possible crime stain donors.
H ′′1 : C1 C¯1
X: Γ1 Γ2 Γother Γ1 Γ2 Γother
Y1: Γ1 1 0 0 γ1 γ1 γ1
Γ2 0 1 0 γ2 γ2 γ2
Γother 0 0 1 1 − γ1 − γ2 1 − γ1 − γ2 1 − γ1 − γ2
principle holds for Y2 (Table 9.8), with the additional constraint that Y2 copies the state of
Y1 in every case where both traces come from the same source (defined by node L). Finally,
node Y1Y2 combines the states of Y1 and Y2 as ordered pairs, as proposed by Taroni et al.
(2006a) (see Table 9.9). Putting all of these considerations together produces the Bayesian
network shown in Fig. 9.2.
There are two ways to use the Bayesian network, which we will illustrate in the next two
sections: the user can either update the prior probability distributions over the propositions
to posterior probability distributions given the evidence (see Section 9.6), or the user can
use the Bayesian network to evaluate the probabilities forming the ratio of the value of the
evidence (Eq. 9.1) for a given pair of propositions (see Section 9.7). Both of these are useful
means for a forensic scientist to convey the value of the evidence to a fact-finder.
H’’2
Y1 Y2
X
LH
1H’ H’2
Y1Y2
δ
τ
λ
1H’’
Figure 9.2: The extended Bayesian network for the two-trace problem. This model is more flexible and
realistic than the Bayesian network shown in Fig. 9.1, because it models the uncertainty on the number of
crime stain donors, and the uncertainty on which trace comes from the suspect if the suspect is one of two
donors. It also includes a node for each of the unknown parameters, allowing the user to define a probability
distribution for each. Table 9.1 gives the definitions of the parameters, and Table 9.2 lists the definitions
and probabilities of the states in each of the non-parametric nodes.
9.6 Using the Bayesian network to update the prior
probability distribution to a posterior probability
distribution
Fact-finders and lawyers are interested in the probability distribution over the propositions
given the forensic scientist’s evidence. The Bayesian network presented in Fig. 9.2 can
compute this posterior probability distribution for a given prior probability distribution
over the propositions. There are two applications where a forensic scientist testifying in
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Table 9.9: Probability table for node Y1Y2. This node combines the states of Y1 and Y2 as ordered pairs.
Y1: Γ1 Γ2 Γother
Y2: Γ1 Γ2 Γother Γ1 Γ2 Γother Γ1 Γ2 Γother
Y1Y2: Γ1Γ2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
other 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
court would use the model in this way: (i) when a fact-finder or lawyer interested in the
probabilities of the propositions communicates the information required to define the prior
distribution to the forensic scientist, (ii) when the forensic scientist wants to illustrate the
evidence’s effect on several prior probability distributions of different orders of magnitude
to show what the posterior probability distribution would be for each.
To specify the prior probability of each proposition, the user must assess the values of δ,
λ and τ (see the definitions given in Table 9.1 and in Section 9.4.3). Practically speaking,
the user of the model must enter these values into the Bayesian network, an action called
‘instantiating’ the corresponding nodes. The Bayesian network then propagates these values
to the rest of the network.
To find the posterior probability distribution given the evidence, the user instantiates
the observed traits for the suspect’s sample and the two traces in nodes X, Y1 and Y2,
respectively. After entering this evidence, the Bayesian network updates the probability
distributions in the remaining nodes according to the laws of probability and the prob-
abilistic relationships specified by the model. The probability distributions indicated in
the propositional nodes now correspond to the posterior distributions given the evidence.
Mathematically, this updating corresponds to the application of the laws of probability, in
particular Bayes’ theorem. The following numerical example illustrates this concept.
Example: Consider a case where crime scene investigators recover two contact
stains on a wall, at a given height above the floor: say, crime stain 1 at 1.5
meters, and crime stain 2 at 1.8 meters from the floor. There are no witness
statements asserting whether these two traces come from a single source or from
two different sources. We assume that it is, a priori, equally probable for the two
traces to come from a single source as it is for them to come from two different
sources, and thus set λ = 0.5. A suspect, with a prior probability assessed at
δ = 0.1 of being the source of at least one of the two traces recovered on the crime
scene, comes to the attention of the police. This suspect is particular in that
he is very short, measuring only 1.6 meters. This information makes a contact
between the suspect and the location of crime stain 1 more probable than a contact
between the suspect and the location of crime stain 2. In other words, if only one
of the two traces comes from this suspect, it is more probable for this stain to be
crime stain 1 than crime stain 2. For this reason, we set τ = 0.75.
The following analysis compares the probability distributions for the three different types
of pairs of propositions by considering pairs H, H ′1 and H ′′1 . (Note that the Bayesian network
presented in Fig. 9.2 allows for the same analysis with regard to pairs H, H ′2 and H ′′2 , focusing
on crime stain 2 instead of on crime stain 1. Here, however, we will focus on crime stain 1.)
For this, node H ′2 is superfluous in the Bayesian network (Fig. 9.2). In this section, Fig. 9.3
has omitted this node to avoid cluttering the Bayesian network’s expanded representations.
Fig. 9.3(a) gives the prior probability distribution over the nodes of the Bayesian network
for the above described example. The ratio of the probabilities of the propositions of each
81
CHAPTER 9. MODELING THE FORENSIC TWO-TRACE PROBLEM WITH
BAYESIAN NETWORKS
(a)                                                                          (b)
2
Γ2
Γother
Γ1
Γ2
Γother
Γ1
X
0.01000
0.02000
0.97000Γother
Γ2
Γ1
1C
Y1Y2 Y1Y2
Γ2
Γother
Y
         1
         0
         0
1
Γ1
1    2
Γ2
Γother Y
         0
         0
         1
X
Γ1
Γother
other          0
         1Γ Γ
         0
         1
         0
Γ
Γ
2
1
2
         1
         1
         1
C          0
         1
0.89286
0.10714
D 0.89286
0.10714
H
2
2
2
H’’
0.89286
          0
0.10714
1C
1C
2
H’
2 donors
01 donor
L
1
         1
         1
         1
L
2
2
C
2 donors
1 donor 0.5
0.5
other
0.00010
0.99990
Y1
0.01000
0.02000
0.97000
2
0.02000
0.01000
0.97000 Y
1C 2
H’
Γ Γ1    2
0.90000
0.08750
0.91250
0.06250
0.93750
0.08750
0.01250
0.90000
H
D 0.10000
C
H’’1
C
D
1
0
1
τ
0.75
0
0
1
0
1
δ
0.1
0
0
0.5
λ
0
0
CC
C
H’’
1
1
D
1
C
D
1
0
1
τ
0.75
0
0
1
0
1
δ
0.1
0
0
0.5
λ
0
0
0
1
H’’
C1
C
D
0
Figure 9.3: Expanded representation of the Bayesian network presented in Fig. 9.2, without node H′2,
which has been omitted to avoid cluttering the figure, and to focus the reader’s attention on the probability
distributions in nodes H, H′1 and H′′1 . This Bayesian network updates (a) the prior probability distribution
over the propositions, to (b) the posterior probability distribution obtained after observing the traits of X,
Y1 and Y2. Here, the model is applied to the example described on pages 81 and 83, with δ = 0.1, λ = 0.5,
τ = 0.75, γ1 = 0.01 and γ2 = 0.02. The observed evidence consists of X = Γ1, Y1 = Γ1 and Y2 = Γ2.
This information is communicated to the Bayesian network by instantiating the evidential nodes to these
observed states. Here, the instantiated nodes are indicated by a thicker border, and the instantiated state
with a probability of 1 in bold. Instantiating the evidential nodes produces identical posterior odds for the
pairs of propositions H, H′1 and H′′1 . Note that in (b), we could also have instantiated node Y1Y2 instead
of nodes Y1 and Y2 and obtained the same outcome.
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pair forms the following prior odds for the three pairs of propositions defined in Section 9.4.2:4
δ
1 − δ = 0.10000.9000 (9.12)
= 0.1111 for pair H,
δ(1 − λ + λτ)
1 − δ = 0.08750.9000 (9.13)
= 0.0972 for pair H ′1, and
δ(1 − λ + λτ)
δλ(1 − τ) + 1 − δ = 0.08750.9125 (9.14)
= 0.0959 for pair H ′′1 .
With these numerical calculations, we do not imply that it is possible to attain this level of
precision in practice. The precision of the numerical calculations in Eq. (9.12)-(9.14), and in
the equations of the rest of this and the next section, is only for the purpose of showing the
level of agreement between the Bayesian network’s computations and the algebraic equations.
The comparison of the above results with the prior odds given in Meester and Sjerps
(2003) (see Eqs. (9.9) - (9.11)) shows that the latter describe a case where λ = 1 and τ = 0.5.
The above expressions relax these assumptions by allowing the user to specify parameters λ
and τ so that they reflect the circumstances of the case as accurately as possible.
Comparing the prior odds for each of the pairs of propositions with each other reveals
that the most general pair of propositions (pair H) has the greatest odds, and the most
specific pair of propositions (pair H ′′1 ) has the smallest odds. This is logical since the prior
odds for a specific crime stain cannot be greater than the general prior odds for the suspect
being a donor of any one of the crime stains.
Example (continued). We now analyze the evidence, and observe Y1 = Γ1, Y2 = Γ2
and X = Γ1, i.e., the suspect’s sample matches crime stain 1. In the population
of potential sources of the two traces, we assume γ1 = 0.01 and γ2 = 0.02.
Instantiating the evidential nodes X, Y1 and Y2 to their observed traits (Fig. 9.3(b)),
produces identical posterior odds of
0.89286
0.10714
≈ 8.3333
for all three pairs of propositions. Algebraically, these posterior odds are given by
δτ(1 − δ)γ1 . (9.15)
The comparison of this ratio with the posterior odds presented in Meester and Sjerps (2003)
(see Eq. (9.8)) shows that Eq. (9.15) relaxes the assumption of τ = 0.5, assumed in Eq. (9.8).
Eq. (9.15) therefore gives the generalized expression for the posterior odds for any value of τ .
This approach of instantiating the evidential nodes in the Bayesian network is useful
whenever one wants to find a posterior probability distribution for a given prior probability
distribution. This application is limited to situations where the forensic scientist receives
information about the prior probability distribution from an actor in the legal system, or
4Note that, by definition, pair H′1 consists of two nonexhaustive propositions. This is not problematic in
this situation, because the evidence introduced later on will render the remaining proposition impossible.
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Table 9.10: The mathematical expressions used by the Bayesian network in Fig. 9.2 to compute the prior
odds, value of the evidence (Bayes factor) and posterior odds for each of the three pairs of propositions, H,
H′1, and H′′1 . For the definitions of δ, λ and τ , see Table 9.1.
for pair H: δ
1−δ®
prior odds
× τ
γ1®
V
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posterior odds
for pair H ′1: δ(1−λ+λτ)1−δ´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
prior odds
× τ1−λ+λτ
γ1´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
V
= δτ(1−δ)γ1´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
posterior odds
for pair H ′′1 : δ(1−λ+λτ)δλ(1−τ)+1−δ´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
prior odds
× τ1−λ+λτ
γ1
1−δ(1−τ)λδ+1−δ´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
V
= δτ(1−δ)γ1´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
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situations where the forensic scientist assigns hypothetical prior distributions to illustrate the
evidence’s effect on the probabilities of the propositions. However, the forensic scientist’s
role is not to determine the probability distribution over the propositions. The role of
the forensic scientist is to evaluate the value of the evidence (e.g., Lindley, 1977a; Aitken
and Taroni, 2004). This means that he/she wants to find out to what extent the observed
evidence will affect the probability distribution over the propositions, without knowing what
this probability distribution is.
In addition to computing the posterior probabilities seen in this section, the Bayesian
network allows its user to evaluate the probabilities forming the value of the evidence for
any of the three pairs of propositions. We discuss this use of the Bayesian network in the
next section.
9.7 Using the Bayesian network to evaluate the value of
the evidence
The objective of the forensic scientist’s testimony is to present the value of the evidence.
That is, he/she should present how much more or less probable the evidence is if the first
proposition is true than if the second proposition is true. This value depends on the for-
mulation of the two propositions. The value of the evidence for each pair of propositions
corresponds to the Bayes factor obtained by dividing the posterior odds by the prior odds
(Table 9.10).
Mathematically, this value is given by Eq. (9.1). Applying the third law of probability
for dependent events according to a suspect-anchored perspective (e.g., Aitken and Taroni,
2004) makes this equation equal to
84
CHAPTER 9. MODELING THE FORENSIC TWO-TRACE PROBLEM WITH
BAYESIAN NETWORKS
V = Pr(X,Y1, Y2∣proposition 1)
Pr(X,Y1, Y2∣proposition 2)= Pr(Y1, Y2∣X,proposition 1)
Pr(Y1, Y2∣X,proposition 2) × Pr(X ∣proposition 1)Pr(X ∣proposition 2) ,
which reduces to
= Pr(Y1, Y2∣X,proposition 1)
Pr(Y1, Y2∣X,proposition 2) , (9.16)
(9.17)
given that the profile of the suspect’s sample does not change under the competing propo-
sitions, i.e., Pr(X ∣proposition 1) = Pr(X ∣proposition 2).
So, to find the value of the evidence, the Bayesian network calculates the probabilities
forming the numerator and the denominator of Eq. (9.16). The Bayesian network computes
the compound probability of Y1 and Y2 in node Y1Y2. This node indicates the numerator
of V for the observed traits of Y1 and Y2 when X and ‘proposition 1’ are instantiated,
and the denominator of V when X and ‘proposition 2’ are instantiated.5 Fig. 9.4, 9.5 and
9.7 illustrate the results obtained in this way for each of the three pairs of propositions,
H, H ′1 and H ′′1 , for the numerical example presented in Section 9.6. Again, the expanded
representations of the Bayesian network omit node H ′2 to avoid cluttering these figures, and
to focus the reader’s attention on the propositional nodes H, H ′1 and H ′′1 . In the following
sections, we discuss each value in turn, and examine how each is affected by the parameters
τ , λ and δ.
9.7.1 The value of the evidence for pair H
According to Fig. 9.4, the value of the evidence for pair H is equal to
V = 0.0075
0.0001
= 75 .
Algebraically, this value is given by
V = λτγ2
λγ1γ2= τ
γ1
. (9.18)
The numerator describes the probability of observing the evidence given that at least one
of the crime stains comes from the suspect (proposition D). In this case, the observation of
the evidence is only possible when the two traces come from two different donors (for which
the probability is λ), of which the suspect is the donor of the first trace (probability τ),
and someone with trait Γ2 the donor of the second trace (probability γ2). The denominator
describes the probability of observing the evidence given that neither of the crime stains
comes from the suspect (proposition D¯). In this case, the observation of the evidence
corresponds to the event that the two traces come from two different donors (probability λ),
5Note that the Bayesian network presented here models the probability of Y1 and Y2 as independent of
the suspect’s sample given ‘proposition 2’. This makes the probability of Y1 and Y2 when ‘proposition 2’
and X are instantiated identical to the probability of Y1 and Y2 when only ‘proposition 2’ is instantiated,
so that the instantiation of X is not absolutely necessary in this case.
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Figure 9.4: The Bayesian network computes ((a) the numerator, and (b) the denominator of the value of
the evidence (Eq. (9.16)) for pair of propositions H, for evidence consisting of X = Γ1, Y1 = Γ1 and Y2 = Γ2.
The instantiated nodes are indicated by a thicker border, and the instantiated state with a probability of 1
in bold. The numerator is the probability of Γ1Γ2 in node Y1Y2 when Γ1 is instantiated in node X and D is
instantiated in node H. The denominator is the probability of Γ1Γ2 in node Y1Y2 when Γ1 is instantiated
in node X and D¯ is instantiated in node H. The calculations are for the example described in Section 9.6
(δ = 0.1, λ = 0.5 and τ = 0.75).
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Figure 9.5: The Bayesian network computes (a) the numerator, and (b) the denominator of the value of
the evidence (Eq. (9.16)) for pair of propositions H′1, for evidence consisting of X = Γ1, Y1 = Γ1 and Y2 = Γ2.
The nodes with the thicker borders are the instantiated nodes, with the instantiated state indicated with a
probability of 1 in bold. The numerator is the probability of Γ1Γ2 in node Y1Y2 when Γ1 is instantiated in
node X and C1 is instantiated in node H
′
1, and the denominator is the probability of Γ1Γ2 in node Y1Y2
when Γ1 is instantiated in node X and D¯ is instantiated in node H
′
1. These calculations are for the scenario
described in Section 9.6 (δ = 0.1, λ = 0.5 and τ = 0.75).
of which one donor has trait Γ1 (probability γ1) and the other donor trait Γ2 (probability
γ2).
For this pair of propositions, V reduces to a linear function of τ , ranging from a minimum
of 0 when τ = 0 (i.e., when it is a priori impossible for the suspect to be the source of trace
1 in a case where the suspect is the source of one of the two traces), to a maximum of 1
γ1
for τ = 1 (i.e., when it is a priori certain that the suspect is the source of trace 1 in the
case that the suspect is the source of one of the two traces). In the latter case, the value of
the evidence is the same as in a one-trace problem, because, just as in a one-trace problem,
it becomes certain to observe a match between crime stain 1 and the suspect’s sample if
proposition D is true.
When τ = 0.5, this means that it is equally likely for either of the two traces to come
from the suspect in a case where the suspect is one of two crime stain donors. This is the
additional factor multiplied by 1
γ1
to produce Eq. (9.4) derived by Evett (1987) for the value
of one matching stain and one non-matching stain. Underlying Eq. (9.4) is therefore the
assumption that each of the two traces is equally likely to come from the suspect if the
suspect is the source of one of the two traces. Yet, as seen in the example on page 81, the
two crime stains may not have the same prior probability of coming from the suspect if
they were recovered at different locations on the crime scene. In this case, it is necessary
to replace Eq. (9.4) with Eq. (9.18), and assign a more adequate value for τ based on the
circumstances of the case.
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Figure 9.6: The value of the evidence V for pair H′1 as a function of (a) λ and (b) τ . Here, γ1 = 0.01. V
is an increasing function of λ and τ , attaining a maximal value of 1
γ1
when λ = 1 or τ = 1, for λ ≠ 0, τ ≠ 0.
9.7.2 The value of the evidence for pair H ′1
For pair H ′1, Fig. 9.5 shows that the value of the evidence is equal to
V = 0.00857
0.0001
= 85.7 ,
which, algebraically, corresponds to
V = λτ1−λ+λτ γ2
λγ1γ2
(9.19)
= τ1−λ+λτ
γ1
. (9.20)
Here, the probability in the numerator is the probability of observing the evidence given that
crime stain 1 comes from the suspect (proposition C1). A priori, there are two possibilities if
proposition C1 is true: either both traces come from the suspect (for which the probability
is 1−λ), or only crime stain 1 comes from the suspect (for which the probability is λτ). The
observation of one matching and one non-matching trace is impossible if both traces come
from the suspect. The probability of observing the evidence is therefore the normalized
probability for the latter case times the probability that the donor of the second trace has
trait Γ2 (probability γ2), as shown in the numerator of Eq. (9.19). The denominator remains
the same as for pair H.
For this pair of propositions, V is an increasing function of both τ and λ for all τ < 1 and
λ < 1 (Fig. 9.6). V attains the maximum value of 1
γ1
when at least one of these parameters
is equal to 1:
 When λ = 1, it is certain that the two traces come from two different sources. In this
case, it is, a priori, certain that crime stain 2 does not come from the suspect given
proposition C1, and the only possibility left under this proposition is that the suspect
is the source of only crime stain 1. The normalized probability in the numerator of
Eq. (9.19) therefore reduces to 1, so that the probability of observing the evidence given
C1 and X = Γ1 is equal to 1 × γ2. With the denominator, this reduces the numerator
of V to 1.
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 When τ = 1, it is a priori certain that trace 1 comes from the suspect if exactly one
of the traces comes from the suspect. The normalized probability in the numerator of
Eq. (9.19) thus reduces to λ. The probability of observing the evidence is therefore
equal to the probability that the two traces come from two different sources times the
probability that the other donor has trait Γ2, i.e., λ × γ2. With the denominator, this
reduces the numerator of V to 1.
According to the reasoning in Meester and Sjerps (2003), Eq. (9.6) was obtained for
λ = 1 and τ = 0.5. In this case, V is maximum for this pair of propositions because of λ = 1.
However, the assumption of λ = 1 can only be made in very specific cases. By definition,
this assumption must be made before observing the evidence, so it can only be based on
other information in the case. For example, one could imagine a case with a crime scene
in a location under high surveillance and cleaned on a regular and scheduled basis: here,
a surveillance camera showing two unidentifiable individuals on the scene on the day the
traces were deposited, where individual 1 was only present in the location of the recovery of
crime stain 1, and individual 2 only in the location of the recovery of crime stain 2, might
justify an assumption of λ = 1. Other than these very particular circumstances, it is difficult
to imagine a scenario where such an unmitigated assumption could be made.
To justify an assumption of τ = 1, the circumstances must be just as particular. In this
case, they must be such that they make it impossible for the suspect to be the source of
only crime stain 2. This could be the case when it is physically impossible for the suspect
to have been in contact with the surface of crime stain 2. However, even in these cases it
is difficult to justify τ = 1 for DNA traces in situations where secondary transfer is possible
(e.g., Goray et al., 2010).
In most cases, V will therefore be less than 1
γ1
. For τ = 0.5, the exact value will lie
somewhere on the dashed curve of Fig. 9.6(a) below the maximum point at λ = 1.
According to Fig. 9.6(a), the range of values obtained for V for different values of λ
is smaller for high values of τ . This is because a large value of τ leads to a high prior
probability that trace 1 comes from the suspect, regardless of whether there was one donor
or two donors. That is, if the suspect was the only donor, then it is certain that trace 1
comes from the suspect, and if the suspect was one of two donors, then the prior probability
that trace 1 comes from the suspect (= τ) is also high. Therefore a large value for τ leads to
a high probability in the numerator of V (Eq. (9.20)), regardless of the value of λ.
This is no longer the case for small values of τ . If τ is small, the prior probability that
trace 1 comes from the suspect will be determined mostly by the probability that both traces
come from the suspect, i.e., 1−λ. The numerator of V (Eq. (9.20)) will therefore vary greatly
according to the value of λ. The greater λ, the smaller the prior probability of a single donor.
Since the evidence is such that it rejects the hypothesis of a single donor, the probability of
observing the evidence given proposition C1 (i.e., the numerator of V ) is greater when the
prior probability of a single donor is small. That is, a small prior probability for a single
donor increases the normalized probability of the event that only crime stain 1 comes from
the suspect, figuring in the numerator of V . Thus, the overall value of the evidence is an
increasing function of λ.
Fig. 9.6(b) shows that the range of values obtained for V for different values of τ remains
0 to 1
γ1
, regardless of the value of λ. This is because the evidence (a match with crime
stain 1 and a non-match with crime stain 2) is such that its value will always be 0 in a case
where it is impossible for crime stain 1 to come from the suspect, given that there were two
different donors (i.e., when τ = 0), and equal to 1
γ1
whenever it is certain that crime stain 1
comes from the suspect, given that there were two different donors (i.e., when τ = 1). Thus,
the value of the evidence is an increasing function of τ .
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Figure 9.7: The Bayesian network computes (a) the numerator and (b) the denominator of the value of the
evidence (Eq. (9.16)) for pair of propositions H′′1 , for evidence consisting of X = Γ1, Y1 = Γ1 and Y2 = Γ2.
The nodes with the thicker borders are the instantiated nodes, with the instantiated state indicated with a
probability of 1 in bold. The numerator is the probability of Γ1Γ2 in node Y1Y2 when Γ1 is instantiated
in node X and C1 is instantiated in node H
′′
1 , and the denominator is the probability of Γ1Γ2 in node
Y1Y2 when Γ1 is instantiated in node X and C¯1 is instantiated in node H
′′
1 . These calculations are for the
scenario described in Section 9.6 (δ = 0.1, λ = 0.5 and τ = 0.75).
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9.7.3 The value of the evidence for pair H ′′1
According to Fig. 9.7, the value of the evidence for pair H ′′1 is equal to
V = 0.00857
9.86 × 10−5
= 86.9 ,
which is computed by
V = λτ1−λ+λτ γ2
λγ1
1−δ(1−τ)λδ+1−δγ2 (9.21)
= τ1−λ+λτ
γ1
1−δ(1−τ)λδ+1−δ (9.22)
Here, the probability in the numerator is the same as for pair H ′1. The probability in the
denominator is the probability of observing the evidence given that crime stain 1 does not
come from the suspect (proposition C¯1). A priori, there are two possibilities if proposition
C¯1 is true: either the suspect is only the source of crime stain 2 [for which the probability
is (1 − τ)λδ], or neither of the two traces comes from the suspect (for which the probability
is 1 − δ). The observation of the evidence is only possible in the latter case. Therefore, the
probability of the evidence is the probability that the two traces come from two different
donors, of which one has trait Γ1 and the other trait Γ2, i.e., λγ1γ2, times the normalized
probability that neither of the traces comes from the suspect (Eq. (9.21)).
For this pair of propositions, V is a function of τ , λ and δ (Fig. 9.8). Just like for pair H ′1,
V is equal to 1
γ1
whenever τ = 1. In this case, the numerator of V reduces to λγ2 as explained
above for pair H ′1, and the denominator of V becomes equal to λγ1γ2, because the possibility
of the suspect being the source of crime stain 2 when there are two different crimes stain
donors becomes impossible. With the numerator, the denominator of V therefore reduces
to γ1.
Yet, unlike for pair H ′1, λ = 1 no longer produces V = 1γ1 (e.g., Fig. 9.8(a), 9.8(c) and
9.8(e)). This is because λ = 1 (i.e., there were two different donors) does not, a priori, exclude
the possibility that the suspect is the source of the second trace given that crime stain 1 does
not come from the suspect (proposition C¯1). For λ = 1, V is actually a decreasing function
of τ , attaining a minimum of 1
γ1
when τ = 1 (Fig. 9.8(b), 9.8(d) and 9.8(f)). This is because
the possibility of the suspect being only the source of crime stain 2 becomes less probable as
τ increases, thus increasing the normalized probability of the event that neither of the traces
comes from the suspect. This increases the denominator of V , and decreases the whole value
of the evidence. However, when τ → 0, τ ≠ 0, the probability of the suspect being only the
source of crime stain 2 increases, which decreases the normalized probability of neither trace
coming from the suspect. This decreases the denominator of V , and increases the whole
value of the evidence. Thus the maximum of V for this pair of propositions is greater than
1
γ1
(which is the maximum value for the other two pairs of propositions):
when τ → 0 and λ = 1, V → 1
γ1(1 − δ) . (9.23)
In other words, for τ < 1, the possibility that the suspect is the source of crime stain 2 is
not excluded. Yet, if the suspect is not the source of crime stain 1 (proposition C¯1), the
evidence is only possible when neither stain comes from the suspect (probability of 1 − δ),
so that the factor 1− δ has an increasing influence in the denominator of V for τ → 0, τ ≠ 0.
This effect becomes more pronounced as δ increases (Fig. 9.8(b), 9.8(d) and 9.8(f)). A
larger value of δ produces a smaller probability in the denominator of V , and therefore a
greater value of V .
91
CHAPTER 9. MODELING THE FORENSIC TWO-TRACE PROBLEM WITH
BAYESIAN NETWORKS
Figure 9.8: The value of the evidence V for pair H′′1 in function of: (a) λ for δ = 0.1, (b) τ for δ = 0.1,
(c) λ for δ = 0.5, (d) τ for δ = 0.5, (e) λ for δ = 0.9, and (f) τ for δ = 0.9. Here, γ1 = 0.01. V is an
increasing function of λ and δ, and equal to 1
γ1
for τ = 1. It tends towards a maximum of 1
γ1(1−δ) for λ = 1
and τ → 0, τ ≠ 0.
92
CHAPTER 9. MODELING THE FORENSIC TWO-TRACE PROBLEM WITH
BAYESIAN NETWORKS
The value of the evidence proposed by Meester and Sjerps (2003) for this pair of propo-
sitions (Eq. (9.7)) is equal to
1
γ1
1−δ
1
2 δ+1−δ
.
Again, this value assumes λ = 1 and τ = 0.5. Its application is therefore just as limited by
the assumption λ = 1 as the value of the evidence they propose for pair H ′1 (see page 89).
This value is the point at τ = 0.5 on the solid lines in Fig. 9.8(b), 9.8(d) and 9.8(f). With
λ < 1, V would be smaller, lying on one of the other lines in these graphs.
9.7.4 Comparison of the values of the evidence
As Meester and Sjerps (2003) concluded, pairs of differently formulated propositions for the
two-trace problem lead to different values of the evidence. For the example presented, the
value of the evidence is greatest for pair H ′′1 , and smallest for pair H. This is because the
probability of observing a match with stain 1 and a non-match with stain 2 is greatest given
proposition C1 and smallest given proposition C¯1.
The derived formulae for calculating the value of the evidence show that this value is a
function of τ for all three pairs of propositions, a function of λ for two of the three pairs
(pairs H ′1 and H ′′1 ), and a function of δ for one pair (pair H ′′1 ). In the two-trace problem,
the value of the evidence is therefore not based solely on the analytical results provided by
the laboratory analyses of the collected evidence, that is, on the match probabilities of these
results in the relevant population of possible sources. In addition, the value depends on
parameters assessed on the basis of the case circumstances prior to observing the evidence.
The more specific the competing pair of propositions are, the more parameters will determine
the value of the evidence for these propositions. That is, propositions focusing only on one
of the two traces require additional information regarding the total number of donors on
the crime scene and/or the prior assumption on the suspect’s implication as a donor of any
of the traces on the scene. To accurately evaluate the value of the evidence in a two-trace
problem, an evaluator’s knowledge must therefore extend beyond the observations made on
the evidence, to the facts regarding the case circumstances.
9.8 Discussion and conclusions
The role of the forensic scientist is to evaluate the value of the evidence (e.g., Evett, 1998).
In the forensic two-trace problem, this has been somewhat perplexing since three different
formulations of the competing pair of propositions lead to three different quantifications of
this value (Meester and Sjerps, 2003).
In this paper, we have provided a more general vision of the entire two-trace problem
by constructing a Bayesian network that includes each of the three pairs of propositions as
a separate node in the model. Through an illustrative example, we demonstrate how to
use the network to evaluate the value of the evidence for each pair of propositions. The
different structural relationships between each of the pairs and the evidence inevitably leads
to different values of the evidence, each addressing the two-trace problem from a different
angle.
The flexibility of the value of the evidence to adapt to each pair of propositions is an ad-
vantage, not an inconvenience. A forensic scientist’s task is to evaluate the relative support
provided by the evidence for one proposition with respect to an alternative proposition (i.e.,
the value of the evidence) (e.g., Evett, 1998). And this, he/she must do with regard to the
very particular framework of circumstances that reflects the case, and for the precise propo-
sitions of interest to the court. Therefore, it is important that the propositions be chosen
and formulated with care, and that these be based on the particular circumstances related
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to the case. The different values of the evidence then complement each other, providing the
scientist with a range of formulae from which he/she can select the most appropriate in view
of the pair of propositions of interest to the court.
The crucial issue is to understand what assumptions lie behind each formula, in order
to correctly use it in the context of the case. In this respect, the Bayesian network offers
transparency through its graphical representation of the dependence relationships among
the variables. In particular, it models the dependency of each of the random variables on
three unknown parameters:
 δ, the probability that at least one trace comes from the suspect,
 λ, the probability that the two traces come from two different donors (Dawid, 2004),
and
 τ , the probability that trace 1 comes from the suspect in a case where the suspect is
one of two different donors.
The value of the evidence is a function of τ for all three pairs of propositions, a function
of λ for the two pairs where the prosecutor’s proposition relates only to one trace, and (as
presented in Meester and Sjerps (2003)) a function of δ for the pair where the defence’s
proposition relates only to one trace. To accurately evaluate the value of the evidence, an
evaluator is therefore obliged to have information on the case circumstances. If it is difficult
to obtain precise assessments for the unknown parameters, the Bayesian network environ-
ment allows the user to specify subjective probability distributions over each parameter
space.
Note that the model presented in this paper is still based on several assumptions, notably
on the independence between the three unknown parameters. The validity of this assumption
will depend on the circumstantial information available in a case, and on the evaluator’s
personal assessments of the parameters. The results of this work justify a careful examination
and further study on the dependence relationships between these parameters in cases where
the assumption of independence no longer holds.
Notwithstanding, the major advantage of using the Bayesian network is when the evi-
dence of the two traces must be combined with other types of evidence. The fundamental
structure of this Bayesian network allows for an extension to more than two traces, as well
as an extension to address activity level propositions (Gittelson et al., 2012a). Thanks to its
graphical architecture, this model can be inserted as a component part in a larger network
for a more complex inference problem. Given that most forensic cases involve numerous
traces of different types of evidence, this possibility is an indispensable property for all prac-
tical applications. The generic Bayesian network presented in this paper therefore offers a
transparent and practical tool for tackling two-trace problems in forensic casework.
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Bayesian Networks and the
Value of the Evidence for the
Forensic Two-trace Transfer
Problem
Abstract
This paper presents a graphical approach for developing a likelihood ratio for
complex forensic inference problems: an approach based on the construction of
Bayesian networks (BNs). Here, we used this approach to frame the two-trace
transfer problem for activity level propositions. In this problem, a suspect’s
sample matches one of two traces recovered on a crime scene, and the forensic
scientist evaluates the value of this evidence with respect to the propositions of
whether or not the suspect was engaged in a struggle with the victim. The evalu-
ation of this scenario with BNs provides a transparent approach to the problem,
and suggests a means for coherently addressing more complex challenges, such
as generalizing this scenario to n traces.
A dead body is found in a public park. The medical examination of the body reveals
signs of a physical struggle. On the crime scene, forensic investigators recover two items of a
certain category of trace evidence, say, for example, bloodstains. Trace 1 was found in what
we will call location 1, and trace 2 in location 2. These are both inside the perimeter of the
crime scene.
The investigation is able to acquire images from two surveillance cameras which filmed
different parts of the crime scene during the time lapse the crime was committed. One
camera filmed location 1, and the other location 2. Each camera has an image showing the
victim struggling with an assailant: the image from the first camera shows the victim and an
assailant in location 1, the image from the second camera shows the victim and the assailant
in location 2. Unfortunately, the images are of poor quality, and a comparison does not
allow one to conclude with certainty whether it is the same assailant in both locations, or
whether there were two assailants, one in location 1 and the other in location 2.
Reprinted from the Journal of Forensic Sciences, 57, S. Gittelson, A. Biedermann, S. Bozza,
and F. Taroni, Bayesian networks and the value of the evidence for the forensic two-trace
transfer problem, pages 1199-1216, Copyright 2012 American Academy of Forensic Sciences,
with permission from John Wiley and Sons.
95
CHAPTER 10. BAYESIAN NETWORKS AND THE VALUE OF THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE FORENSIC TWO-TRACE TRANSFER PROBLEM
A forensic laboratory analyzes an intrinsic characteristic of the two traces (e.g., the blood
group or DNA profile). A comparison of these analytical results with the result obtained
from the victim’s sample allows the forensic scientists to exclude the victim as the source of
both of these traces. The results show that the traces are of different types, say, for example,
that trace 1 is of type Γ1 and trace 2 of type Γ2.
Later in the investigation, a suspect’s sample matches one of these two traces. The
evidence against this suspect thus consists of a combination of a matching item and a non-
matching item. The question is, “How strong is this evidence against the suspect?”
In forensic science, this scenario is known as the two-trace transfer problem. The answer
to the above question takes the form of a likelihood ratio (LR). This LR opposes two
mutually exclusive propositions (where the word proposition designates a formal statement
about an event that the forensic scientist formulates based on the circumstantial information
of the case, as described by Evett et al. (2000b)):
LR = Pr(evidence∣proposition 1, I)
Pr(evidence∣proposition 2, I) .
The LR is the ratio of the probabilities of observing the evidence given each of the competing
propositions and I. The evidence consists of the characteristics of the two traces and the
suspect’s sample, and the letter I denotes the background information. The background
information consists of all the knowledge and circumstances that influence the numerical
evaluations of the probabilities forming the numerator and the denominator. Note that all
probabilities in this study are conditional on the background information I, yet, for the sake
of brevity, we shall hereafter omit I from their notation.
For this scenario, the forensic scientists can formulate the following pair of source level
propositions (we use the superscript s to indicate that these are source level propositions):
Hs—one of the traces on the crime scene comes from the suspect;
H¯s—neither of the traces on the crime scene comes from the suspect;
or the following pair of activity level propositions (we use the superscript a to indicate that
these are activity level propositions):
Ha—the suspect was engaged in a struggle with the victim;
H¯a—the suspect was not engaged in a struggle with the victim.
The first pair of propositions is at the source level in the hierarchy of propositions (Cook
et al., 1998b), because it is only concerned with the origin of the traces, that is, the item
or person from which the traces come from. This pair ignores how and when the traces
were transferred from their origin to the crime scene. A match between the profile of the
suspect’s sample and one of the traces, say for example trace 1, produces an LR supporting
proposition Hs, regardless of the extrinsic characteristics of the traces (e.g., the quantity of
material on the crime scene, or how fresh the trace was on the crime scene). If the trace
is an old bloodstain, that was already present on the crime scene before the victim was
assaulted, then this evidence will support Hs with an LR equal to 1
2γ1
(Evett, 1987), just
as in the case where the bloodstain was transferred to the crime scene during the assault.
This LR only takes into account γ1, which denotes the probability of obtaining a match
with trace 1’s analytical characteristic Γ1 (the matching characteristic, in this case) in the
relevant population (Weir, 2000). For this reason, the LR for this pair of propositions only
provides us with a very limited amount of information, which does not tell us whether the
suspect was an assailant who struggled with the victim. To address the question of whether
the suspect was an assailant, we must use the second pair of propositions.
The second pair of propositions is formulated at the activity level in the hierarchy of
propositions (Cook et al., 1998b), because it describes the activity or action of interest to
the case, that is, the activity or action that may have caused the transfer of the traces from
the assailant to the crime scene. In addition to taking into account the origin of the traces,
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these propositions also consider how and when the traces came onto the crime scene. An
activity level LR thus consists of transfer, background and match probabilities (Evett, 1984).
To differentiate the probabilities referring to trace 1 from those referring to trace 2, we use
the subscript i ∈ {1,2} for all of the probabilities referring to trace i and location i:
 Transfer probabilities ti, i = 1,2, describe how probable it is for trace i to have been
transferred during the alleged action, have persisted on the crime scene, and then to
have been recovered by the investigators. The complement of ti is t¯i = 1 − ti.
 Background probabilities bi, i = 1,2, represent the probability for a trace to be present
on the crime scene at location i as a consequence of another transfer event, unrelated
to the alleged action. The probability of the absence of such a trace is b¯i = 1 − bi.
 Match probabilities γi, i = 1,2, are the probabilities for obtaining a match with charac-
teristic Γi (in our scenario, we call trace 1’s characteristic Γ1 and trace 2’s characteristic
Γ2, such that the subscript i here corresponds with the notation for trace i, i ∈ {1,2})
in the relevant population. For a trace transferred during the struggle, the relevant
population is that of the possible assailants. For a background trace, however, the
relevant population is the population of background traces. To distinguish these two
from each other, the match probability of a characteristic in the population of possi-
ble assailants is γi, and the match probability of a characteristic in the population of
background traces is denoted γ′i.
Thus, we have, for example, b¯1 denoting the probability that there was no background
trace present at location 1, and t2 denoting the probability that a trace was transferred to
location 2 during the struggle between the assailant and the victim at that location, persisted
there, and was recovered during the investigation. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume
in the rest of the paper that the traces transferred during the alleged action all persisted on
the crime scene and were all recovered by the investigators. Therefore, we will simply refer
to these traces as traces that were transferred during the struggle.
Using an algebraic approach, previous authors (Triggs and Buckleton, 2003) came up
with the following formula for evaluating this activity level LR:
LR = 12 b¯1b¯2t1t2(1 − 2q)γ2 + 12 b¯1b2t1t¯2(1 + γ1)γ′2 + 12b1b¯2t¯1t2γ′1γ2 + b1b2t¯1t¯2γ′1γ′2
b¯1b¯2t1t2(1 − 2q)γ1γ2 + b¯1b2t1t¯2γ1γ′2 + b1b¯2t¯1t2γ′1γ2 + b1b2t¯1t¯2γ′1γ′2 . (10.1)
This equation combines the above described transfer, background and match probabil-
ities. In addition, it contains the expression 1 − 2q to describe the probability that the
transferred traces come from two different assailants (Triggs and Buckleton, 2003). That is,
these authors assumed that there were two assailants and defined the probability that two
transferred traces both come from assailant 1 as q, and the probability that two transferred
traces both come from assailant 2 as q. This led to a probability of 2q that two transferred
traces come from the same assailant, and to a probability of 1 − 2q that two transferred
traces come from different assailants.
As for the background probabilities, note that in this previous study (Triggs and Buck-
leton, 2003), a single variable p was used to describe the background probabilities of both
traces together, such that b¯1 × b¯2 = p0, b¯1 × b2 = p21, b1 × b¯2 = p11, and b1 × b2 = p1,22 . Here a
b is used instead of p to be able to compare the formula with other activity level formulae
figuring in later sections.
The authors of (Triggs and Buckleton, 2003) developed Eq. (10.1) using an algebraic
approach. That is, they considered four mutually exclusive transfer events to explain the
evidence: the product of an appropriate combination of the transfer, background, and match
probabilities depicts each of these transfer events, and the sum of these four products (one
for each possible event) forms the numerator and the denominator of this LR.
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10.1 Aim and outline of this study
Despite the valuable formal rigor of such an approach, it reaches its limits when applied to
increasingly complex inference problems: either it will make simplifying assumptions that
ignore probabilistic dependencies between the variables, or the mathematical development
of the formula becomes so intricate that it is no longer transparent to non-statisticians (such
as lawyers, prosecutors and judges). With regard to this issue, the aim of this study is
to investigate a new approach for developing an LR formula for complex forensic inference
problems: a graphical approach based on the construction of Bayesian networks (BNs). BNs
have already proven to be practical tools for portraying inference problems in forensic science
(e.g., (Aitken and Gammerman, 1989; Dawid et al., 2002; Mortera et al., 2003; Biedermann
et al., 2005a,b; Taroni et al., 2006a; Biedermann and Taroni, 2006; Biedermann, 2007; Dawid
et al., 2007; Hepler et al., 2007; Biedermann et al., 2008b) to name a few). Yet, up to now,
forensic statisticians have used BNs to reproduce existing LR formulae, formulae developed
through algebraic calculations. Instead of coming up with an algebraic formula, and then
translating it into a BN, our approach inverses this process: first, we will construct a new
BN that captures the problem by combining existing BNs in a logical way, and then, in a
second step, verify the logic behind this BN by analyzing the mathematical expression for
computing the LR produced by this network.
We will demonstrate the potential of this approach by applying it to the two-trace transfer
problem described above. Up to now, only (Triggs and Buckleton, 2003) have proposed a
formula for evaluating the corresponding LR (Eq. (10.1)) at the activity level. Note that
our approach will not follow the reasoning that led to the development of Eq. (10.1). In
this study, we relax the prior assumption of there being two assailants, as well as the prior
assumption of it being equally probable for the suspect to have been the assailant of the
victim in each of the two locations in the case of two different assailants.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we explain what BNs are and describe the
BN for evaluating an activity level LR for a scenario involving the recovery of only a single
trace. Second, we extend this reasoning process to the recovery of two traces in the two-
trace transfer problem by constructing a new BN. Following this result, we deduce from the
constructed network the algebraic expression corresponding to the model’s computed LR, a
formula, which we then compare with Eq. (10.1) and discuss in different situations, including
an extension to n traces.
10.2 Bayesian networks
A BN (also known as a probabilistic expert system) is a directed acyclic graph composed
of nodes and arrows (Jensen, 2001; Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008). Nodes stand for random
variables that can be either discrete or continuous—for the sake of simplicity, the examples
in this study will all use discrete nodes. Hence, each variable will consist of a finite number
of exhaustive and mutually exclusive states. The arrows represent probabilistic relationships
between the variables. Each arrow connects a parent node to a child node and conditions the
probability distribution of the child node upon its parent. Probability tables allow the user
to quantify these probabilistic relationships. For an explanation of the different categories
of relationships between variables that may be modeled by a BN, see for example Neil et al.
(2000).
The key advantage offered by BNs is their capacity of splitting up a complex inference
problem into its different variables. In this way, a BN decomposes the joint probability
distribution of a set of random variables X1, . . . ,Xn into the product of their probabilities
conditioned on their parents, which is nothing else than the Markov property:
Pr(X1, ...,Xn) = n∏
i=1Pr(Xi∣parents(Xi)).
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Note that several different BN structures may be accepted as a description of the same
scenario. There is no true model; a model is personal and reflects the constructor’s view of
the problem and the information available at the time of its construction (Lindley, 2000).
Thus, as our understanding of the issue progresses, a constructed network may evolve to
model a situation more accurately.
For constructing the BNs in this study, we used the software Hugin Researcher 6.7, by
Hugin Expert A/S (DK-9000 Aalborg, Denmark).
10.2.1 Example of a source level Bayesian network for a single trace
To illustrate the use of BNs, Fig. 10.1 shows a BN for evaluating the source level LR for a
single trace. This network consists of three variables:
X
Y
F
Figure 10.1: BN for evaluating a source level LR for a single trace. Node F contains the pair of propo-
sitions F s and F¯ s, and nodes X and Y contain an exhaustive list of the possible analytical results of the
analyses of the suspect’s sample (node X) and of the trace recovered on the crime scene (node Y ). Table 10.1
gives the conditional probability table for node Y .
 F for the pair of propositions:
F s—the trace on the crime scene comes from the suspect;
F¯ s—the trace on the crime scene does not come from the suspect;
(we use the capital letter F to distinguish the propositions in a one-trace problem from
the propositions in a multiple trace problem denoted with the capital letter H),
 X for the characteristic of the suspect’s sample, and
 Y for the characteristic of the trace recovered on the crime scene.
The states of nodes X and Y are an exhaustive list of the possible analytical results of
the laboratory analysis (e.g., the possible blood groups or genotypes of a DNA marker). For
the sake of illustration, consider that these possible results are limited to three: Γ1, Γ2, and
Γother, where Γother groups together all the possible analytical results that are neither Γ1,
nor Γ2.
The relationship between the three variables is the following: if F s is true, then the
characteristic of the trace must be the same as the characteristic of the suspect’s sample; and
if F¯ s is true, the characteristic of the trace is assumed to be independent of the characteristic
of the suspect’s sample. Note that the BNs in this paper do not include the possibility
of laboratory errors (to introduce this possibility into a BN see e.g., Taroni et al. (2004,
2006a)). The characteristic of the trace, therefore, depends on which proposition is true and
on the characteristic of the suspect’s sample. This makes node Y a child of nodes F and X
(Fig. 10.1). Table 10.1 presents the conditional probability table associated with node Y .
A match between the recovered trace and the suspect’s sample—say, for example, Y = Γ1
and X = Γ1—produces the following LR for propositions F s and F¯ s:
LR = Pr(Y = Γ1,X = Γ1∣F s)
Pr(Y = Γ1,X = Γ1∣F¯ s) .
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Table 10.1: Probability table for node Y in Fig. 10.1. For simplicity, we use only three categories to describe
the analytical results: Γ1, Γ2, and Γother (where Γother groups together all of the possible analytical results
that are neither Γ1, nor Γ2).
F : F s F¯ s
X: Γ1 Γ2 Γother Γ1 Γ2 Γother
Y : Γ1 1 0 0 γ1 γ1 γ1
Γ2 0 1 0 γ2 γ2 γ2
Γother 0 0 1 1 − γ1 − γ2 1 − γ1 − γ2 1 − γ1 − γ2
Applying the third law of probability for dependent events (Evett and Weir, 1998; Aitken
and Taroni, 2004) produces:
LR = Pr(Y = Γ1∣X = Γ1, F s)
Pr(Y = Γ1∣X = Γ1, F¯ s) × Pr(X = Γ1∣F s)Pr(X = Γ1∣F¯ s) .
The characteristic of the suspect’s sample (X = Γ1) is independent of the propositions,
such that Pr(X = Γ1∣F s) = Pr(X = Γ1∣F¯ s). This reduces the second ratio to 1, and leaves
us with:
LR = Pr(Y = Γ1∣X = Γ1, F s)
Pr(Y = Γ1, ∣X = Γ1, F¯ s) . (10.2)
The BN calculates these probabilities by instantiating the states figuring to the right of
the vertical bar (i.e., setting their probabilities to 1). The BN then updates the probabilities
of the states in non-instantiated nodes of the model according to the laws of probability.
The numerator of the LR is, therefore, given by the probability of Y = Γ1 after instantiating
states X = Γ1 and F s (Fig. 10.2(a)). This probability is equal to 1 (as defined in Table 10.1,
(a)                                                (b)
Γ1
Γ2
Γ1
Γ2
Γ1
Γ2
Γ1
Γ2
1
0
Y
X
1
0
1
0
0
1
Y
0.01
0.99
X
1
0
sF
F s
sF
F s
F F
Figure 10.2: The BN in Fig. 10.1 computes the probabilities forming the LR (Eq. (10.2)). The bold
contour indicates that the node is instantiated. Here γ1 = 0.01 and γ2 = 0.02. (a) The numerator of the LR
is the probability of Y = Γ1 when states X = Γ1 and F s are instantiated; (b) the denominator the probability
of Y = Γ1 when states X = Γ1 and F¯ s are instantiated.
row 1, column 1). The denominator of the LR is given by the probability of Y = Γ1 after
instantiating states X = Γ1 and F¯ s (Fig. 10.2(b)). This probability is equal to γ1 (as defined
in Table 10.1, row 1, column 4). Thus the LR is
LR = 1
γ1
,
which is the LR presented in forensic literature for a source level evaluation of a single trace
(Evett and Weir, 1998).
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10.3 Activity level Bayesian network for a single trace
Before addressing the two-trace transfer problem, this section presents the evaluation of an
LR for activity level propositions in the case of a single trace. This explanation will be help-
ful in understanding the development of the LR for two traces. So, consider here the same
scenario as described at the beginning of this study, but instead of recovering two traces
on the crime scene, the investigators recover only a single trace. In this case, we consider
the following pair of propositions (labeled F , because we are in a one-trace problem, with a
superscript a, because they are activity level propositions):
F a—the suspect was engaged in a struggle with the victim at the location where the trace
was recovered;
F¯ a—the suspect was not engaged in a struggle with the victim at the location where the
trace was recovered.
To evaluate the LR for this pair of propositions, one must extend the BN in Fig. 10.1 to
include transfer and background probabilities (Taroni et al., 2006a). For this, we must add
a node B containing states:
B—presence of a background trace in the location where the trace was recovered; B¯—
absence of a background trace in the location where the trace was recovered;
and a node T containing the states:
T—there was a transfer from the assailant during the struggle at the location where the
trace was recovered;
T¯—there was no transfer from the assailant during the struggle at the location where the
trace was recovered.
Both of these will determine the characteristic of the trace we observe on the crime scene.
If the trace is a background trace, the probability distribution over the states of Y will be
equal to the match probabilities of the characteristic in the population of background traces.
If the trace is a transferred trace, Y will have the characteristic of the assailant. Nodes B
and T are therefore parents of node Y (Fig. 10.3(a)).
B
Y
T
TS
X
F TSB
X
Y
T
F
TSB
X
Y
T
F
(a)                               (b)                                          (c)                                                     (d)
Figure 10.3: The construction of a BN for evaluating an activity level LR for a single trace (Taroni et al.,
2006a). (a) The characteristic of the trace (node Y ) depends on whether the trace is a background trace
(node B) or a transferred trace (node T ). (b) A transferred trace’s true source (node TS) will only be
equal to the suspect’s characteristic (node X) if the suspect was the assailant (node F ). (c) If the trace
was a transferred trace, its characteristic will be equal to the characteristic in node TS. (d) The transfer
probabilities (in node T ) may differ according to the proposition in node F and the characteristic of the
transferred trace’s true source in node TS. This is the complete model for evaluating the activity level LR
for a single trace (Taroni et al., 2006a). The nodes figuring in this BN are defined in Table 10.2.
The characteristic of the assailant depends on whether the suspect is this assailant (node
F ). If F a is true, the characteristic of the assailant is equal to the characteristic of the
suspect’s sample (node X), and if F¯ a is true, the probability distribution over the possible
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Table 10.2: Description of the states and prior marginal probabilities of the nodes in Fig. 10.3. t and
b denote the transfer and background probabilities, respectively. We differentiate between t, the transfer
probability under Fa, and t′, the transfer probability under F¯a. For node Y (the trace’s characteristic), we
differentiate between γ1 and γ2, denoting the match probabilities in the population of potential assailants,
used in the case the trace was transferred during the alleged activity, and γ′1 and γ′2, denoting the match
probabilities in the population of background traces, used in the case that the trace is a background trace.
For simplicity, we use only three categories to describe the analytical results: Γ1, Γ2, and Γother (where
Γother groups together all of the possible analytical results that are neither Γ1, nor Γ2).
Nodes States Prior Marginal Probabilities Definitions of the States
F F a Pr(F a) The suspect was engaged in a struggle with the
victim at the location where the trace was
recovered
F¯ a 1 − Pr(F a) The suspect was not engaged in a struggle with
the victim at the location where the trace was
recovered
B B b Presence of a background trace
B¯ b¯ Absence of a background trace
T T t or t′ There was a transfer from the assailant
T¯ t¯ or t¯′ There was no transfer from the assailant
X Γ1 γ1 Characteristic of the suspect’s sample
Γ2 γ2
Γother 1 − γ1 − γ2
TS Γ1 γ1 Characteristic of the trace’s true source if it
Γ2 γ2 was transferred during the struggle with the
Γother 1 − γ1 − γ2 victim
Y Γ1 γ1 or γ
′
1 Characteristic of the trace
Γ2 γ2 or γ
′
2
Γother 1 − γ1 − γ2 or 1 − γ′1 − γ′2
characteristics is given by the match probabilities in the population of possible assailants.
To represent the characteristic of the assailant, we must create a new node containing the
list of possible characteristics as its states, a node called TS for “true source” (Taroni et al.,
2006a). This node is a child of F and X (Fig. 10.3(b)). Table 10.3 gives the conditional
probability distribution over its states.
Table 10.3: Probability table for node TS (true source) in Fig. 10.3. This node describes the characteristic
of the transferred trace’s true source. For simplicity, we use only three categories to describe the analytical
results: Γ1, Γ2, and Γother (where Γother groups together all of the possible analytical results that are
neither Γ1, nor Γ2).
F : F a F¯ a
X: Γ1 Γ2 Γother Γ1 Γ2 Γother
TS: Γ1 1 0 0 γ1 γ1 γ1
Γ2 0 1 0 γ2 γ2 γ2
Γother 0 0 1 1 − γ1 − γ2 1 − γ1 − γ2 1 − γ1 − γ2
If the trace on the crime scene is a transferred trace, then its characteristic will be equal
to the characteristic of the assailant given in node TS. Node TS is, therefore, a parent
of node Y (Fig. 10.3(c)). Table 10.4 gives the conditional probability distribution over the
states of Y given the states of its parents T , B, and TS.
The transfer probabilities defined in node T depend on the activity specified in node F .
Sometimes, the activity described by proposition F a will not be the same as the activity
described by proposition F¯ a. For example, the alternative proposition could describe a
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legitimate activity between the suspect and the victim (such as the suspect was trying to
rescue the victim). In this case, the transfer probabilities will be different under each of the
two propositions, making node T a child of node F . We therefore use t′ (and its complement
t¯′) to denote the transfer probability given proposition F¯ a to distinguish this probability
from t (and its complement t¯) denoting the transfer probability given proposition F a.
The occurrence of a transfer may also depend on the attributes of the transferred ma-
terial. The extent of such an influence depends on the type of trace evidence considered.
For example, for fiber evidence, a wool fiber may be transferred more easily than a silk
fiber. If the analytical results in the BN are the types of fiber, then node TS must also
be a parent of node T to specify different transfer probabilities for different types of fibers.
Fig. 10.3(d) shows the complete BN for the transfer of a single trace, modeling all of the
possible dependence relationships (Taroni et al., 2006a).
If X = Γ1 and Y = Γ1, the LR computed by this BN is equal to
LR = Pr(Y = Γ1∣X = Γ1, F a)
Pr(Y = Γ1∣X = Γ1, F¯ a) (10.3)= b¯t + bγ′1t¯
b¯t′γ1 + bγ′1t¯′ . (10.4)
This LR corresponds to the LR developed in the literature (Evett, 1984).
This BN computes the two probabilities of Y that form the LR in the same way as at
the source level: the numerator is the probability of Y = Γ1 when the states X = Γ1 and F a
are instantiated, and the denominator the probability of Y = Γ1 when the states X = Γ1 and
F¯ a are instantiated (Fig. 10.4). However, unlike the source level evaluation, the resulting
(a)                                                                    (b)
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0
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0.99
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1
0
Y
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0.12375
0.50000not 1 trace not 1 trace
1
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X
1
0
TS
1
0
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0.49500
0.50000
sF
F s
sF
F s
F F
Figure 10.4: The BN in Fig. 10.3(d) computes the probabilities forming the LR (Eq. (10.4)). Here, b = 0.5,
t = t′ = 0.75, γ1 = γ′1 = 0.01, and γ2 = γ′2 = 0.02. The bold contour indicates that the node is instantiated. (a)
The numerator of the LR is the probability of Y = Γ1 when states X = Γ1 and Fa are instantiated, in this
case 0.37625; (b) the denominator is the probability of Y = Γ1 when states X = Γ1 and F¯a are instantiated,
in this case 0.005.
probabilities for Y = Γ1 no longer figure in the probability table for Y . This is because in
this BN, there are additional nodes separating node Y from nodes X and F . The calculation
of the LR takes these intermediate nodes into account by extending the conversation (e.g.,
Lindley, 1985; Dawid and Evett, 1997) of the probability of Y to the parent variables of this
node, that is, to B, T and TS, according to the relationships described in the probability
table of node Y (Table 10.4). The first row of this table, corresponding to Y = Γ1, tells us
that the trace can only have characteristic Γ1 when the trace was transferred from a source
having characteristic Γ1 in the absence of a background trace (column 4), or when the trace
is a background trace and there was no transfer from the assailant (columns 7, 8, and 9).
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In all other cases, Table 10.4 defines a probability of 0 for observing Y = Γ1, making this
analytical result impossible for the combination of the states in that column. The table
defines a probability of 1 for Y = Γ1 if the trace was transferred, and a probability of γ′1 if
the trace is a background trace, such that the LR (Eq. (10.3)) is equal to
LR = 1 ×
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Pr(B¯ ∩ T ∩ TS = Γ1∣X = Γ1, F a)+γ′1 ×
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Pr(B ∩ T¯ ∣X = Γ1, F a)
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, (10.5)
where the mathematical symbol ∩ means the intersection where both the state on its left and
the state on its right are true. The probabilities labelled (a), (b), (c), and (d) are discussed
below:
(a) Pr(B¯ ∩ T ∩ TS = Γ1∣X = Γ1, F a) is the probability that the trace was transferred dur-
ing the struggle from an assailant having characteristic Γ1, given that the suspect has
characteristic Γ1 and that the suspect was this assailant who struggled with the victim.
This probability is equal to
b¯ × t × Pr(TS = Γ1∣X = Γ1, F a) .
According to Table 10.3, Pr(TS = Γ1∣X = Γ1, F a) = 1 (row 1, column 1), so that the
above expression reduces to
b¯ × t .
(b) Pr(B ∩ T¯ ∣X = Γ1, F a) is the probability that the trace is a background trace and that
there was no transfer from the assailant, given that the suspect, having characteristic
Γ1, was the assailant in the struggle with the victim. As the trace was not transferred
from the assailant, this probability is independent of the assailant’s characteristic and
is equal to
b × t¯ .
(c) Pr(B¯ ∩T ∩TS = Γ1∣X = Γ1, F¯ a) is the probability that the trace was transferred during
the struggle from an assailant having characteristic Γ1, given that the suspect has char-
acteristic Γ1, but that the suspect was not the assailant who struggled with the victim
on the crime scene. This probability is equal to
b¯ × t′ × Pr(TS = Γ1∣X = Γ1, F¯ a) .
According to Table 10.3, Pr(TS = Γ1∣X = Γ1, F¯ a) = γ1 (row 1, column 4), so that the
above expression is equal to
b¯ × t′ × γ1 .
(d) Pr(B ∩ T¯ ∣X = Γ1, F¯ a) is the probability that the trace is a background trace and that
there was no transfer from the assailant, given that the suspect, with characteristic Γ1,
was not the assailant in the struggle with the victim. As in (b), this probability is
independent of the assailant’s characteristic and is equal to
b × t¯′ .
Introducing the expressions for (a), (b), (c) and (d) into Eq. (10.5) produces
LR = 1 × b¯ × t + γ′1 × b × t¯
1 × b¯ × t′ × γ1 + γ′1 × b × t¯′ ,
which is Eq. (10.4). This calculation validates the structure of the BN in Fig. 10.3(d) for
evaluating an activity level LR for a single trace. In the next section, we extend this BN to
two traces.
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10.4 Constructing a Bayesian network for two traces
This section describes the steps for extending a BN for a single trace to two traces. We first
illustrate this concept for the BN in Fig. 10.1, at the source level, and then apply the same
reasoning to the BN in Fig. 10.3(d), at the activity level, to address the two-trace transfer
problem described at the beginning of the paper.
10.4.1 Constructing a source level Bayesian network for two traces
In a two-trace problem, the evidence consists of the characteristic of the suspect’s sample
and the characteristics of two traces recovered on the crime scene. We will call the first trace
recovered on the crime scene “trace 1,” and the second trace recovered on the scene “trace
2.”
To represent the characteristics of each of the traces, we duplicate node Y in Fig. 10.1,
creating a node for trace 1 called Y1, and a node for trace 2 called Y2. As in Fig. 10.1, the
characteristic of each of these traces will be identical to the characteristic of the suspect’s
sample if that trace comes from the suspect. Therefore, Y1 and Y2 are each a child of nodes
X and F . To distinguish between the two traces, we duplicate node F to create node F1 for
trace 1, and node F2 for trace 2 (Fig. 10.5(a)), so that F1 contains the propositions:
Y1 Y2
H
X
Y1 Y2
F1 2F2F
Y1 Y2
H
X
2F
Y1 Y2
X
1F1F
(a)                                  (b)                              (c)
Figure 10.5: The construction of a BN for evaluating a source level LR for two traces. (a) Nodes F
and Y in Fig. 10.1 are duplicated such that nodes F1 and Y1 refer to trace 1, and nodes F2 and Y2 to
trace 2. (b) The pair of propositions Hs and H¯s in node H are added as a parent to nodes F1 and F2
(see Tables 10.5 and 10.6 for the conditional probability tables of F1 and F2). (c) The BN is completed by
adding a node Y1 ∩Y2 to compute the numerator and denominator of the LR. This is a modified version of
the BN presented in (Taroni et al., 2006a).
F s1 —trace 1 comes from the suspect;
F¯ s1 —trace 1 does not come from the suspect;
and F2 the propositions:
F s2 —trace 2 comes from the suspect;
F¯ s2 —trace 2 does not come from the suspect;
The probability tables of nodes Y1 and Y2 are identical to Table 10.1 for node Y in a
one-trace scenario.
Now, the propositions of interest for evaluating an LR for multiple traces are no longer
F s and F¯ s, but Hs and H¯s:
Hs—one of the traces on the crime scene comes from the suspect;
H¯s—neither of the traces on the crime scene comes from the suspect.
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Assuming that it is not possible for both of the traces on the crime scene to come from
the suspect, and that it is equally probable for either of the traces to come from the suspect
when Hs is true (for a source level BN where we relax these assumptions, see Gittelson et al.
(2013a)), then either F s1 or F
s
2 must be true when proposition H
s is true, but F s1 and F
s
2
will never both be true at the same time. We therefore add node H, containing states Hs
and H¯s, as a parent of nodes F1 and F2. In addition, we must add a link between nodes F1
and F2 to assure that F
s
2 is true (i.e., trace 2 comes from the suspect) when H
s (i.e., one
of the traces comes from the suspect) and F¯ s1 (i.e., trace 1 does not come from the suspect)
are both true (Fig. 10.5(b)). If proposition H¯s is true, then it follows that both F¯ s1 and F¯
s
2
are true. Tables 10.5 and 10.6 define the probability distributions over F s1 , F¯
s
1 , F
s
2 and F¯
s
2 .
Table 10.5: Probability table for node F1 in Fig. 10.5. This node indicates whether or not trace 1 comes
from the suspect. Given that one of the traces on the crime scene comes from the suspect, this probability
table considers it equally probable for this trace to be trace 1 or trace 2.
H: Hs H¯s
F1: F
s
1 0.5 0
F¯ s1 0.5 1
Table 10.6: Probability table for node F2 in Fig. 10.5. This node indicates whether or not trace 2 comes
from the suspect. This probability table considers it impossible for both of the traces to come from the
suspect, and considers that either trace 1 or trace 2 must come from the suspect if Hs is true.
H: Hs H¯s
F1: F
s
1 F¯
s
1 F
s
1 F¯
s
1
F2: F
s
2 0 1 0 0
F¯ s2 1 0 1 1
For this BN to compute the numerator and denominator of the LR, we add a node that
combines the characteristics of both traces, node Y1∩Y2, as a child of Y1 and Y2 (Fig. 10.5(c)).
The resulting BN is a slightly modified version of the BN presented in Taroni et al. (2006a).
(In Taroni et al. (2006a), propositions F s1 , F¯
s
1 , F
s
2 , and F¯
s
2 are all combined in a single node
F .) The two versions are logically equivalent and compute an LR of
LR = Pr(Y1 = Γ1, Y2 = Γ2∣X = Γ1,Hs)
Pr(Y1 = Γ1, Y2 = Γ2∣X = Γ1, H¯s)= 1
2γ1
for Y1 = Γ1, Y2 = Γ2, and X = Γ1. This model is, therefore, in perfect agreement with
scientific literature (Evett, 1987). For further explanations or examples of a BN treating a
two-trace problem at the source level, see Taroni et al. (2006a) and Gittelson et al. (2013a).
10.4.2 Constructing an activity level Bayesian network for two traces
To address the two-trace transfer problem at the activity level, we proceed in the same way
as at the source level to extend a BN of a single trace to two traces. We begin by using
node X as the center of the new model, and duplicate the rest of the nodes on either side of
X, such that we have a set of nodes referring to trace 1 (labeled with a subscript 1) on the
left of X, and a set of nodes referring to trace 2 (labeled with a subscript 2) on the right
of X (Fig. 10.6(a)). The probability tables for nodes TS1, TS2, Y1, and Y2 are identical to
Tables 10.3 and 10.4, for nodes TS and Y , respectively.
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F1
B1 T1 TS1
Y1
X
T2
2F
Y2
2B2TS
T1
F1
1Y Y2
B2B1
T
2F
2TS
X
H
TS1
T1
F1
1Y Y2
1Y 2Y
B2B1
T
2F
2TS
X
H L
TS1
2
2
(c)                                                                                                     
(a)                                                                            (b)
Figure 10.6: The construction of a BN for evaluating an activity level LR for two traces. We begin with
the BN in Fig. 10.3(d). (a) We duplicate all of the nodes in this model except for X, and use subscripts
1 and 2 to differentiate the nodes referring to trace 1 from the nodes referring to trace 2. (b) We add a
node H and an arrow from F1 to F2 just as in Fig. 10.5(b). (c) We add an additional node L to model the
uncertainty on whether the assailant in location 1 was the same person as the assailant in location 2, and
a node Y1 ∩ Y2 to compute the numerator and denominator of the LR.
Again, we introduce a node H as a parent of nodes F1 and F2. H contains the proposi-
tions of interest for the two-trace transfer problem:
Ha—the suspect was engaged in a struggle with the victim;
H¯a—the suspect was not engaged in a struggle with the victim;
F1 the propositions:
F a1 —the suspect was engaged in a struggle with the victim in location 1;
F¯ a1 —the suspect was not engaged in a struggle with the victim in location 1;
and F2 the propositions:
F a2 —the suspect was engaged in a struggle with the victim in location 2;
F¯ a2 —the suspect was not engaged in a struggle with the victim in location 2.
If H¯a is true, then it follows that both F¯ a1 and F¯
a
2 are true. If H
a is true, we assume that
either F a1 , F
a
2 , or both F
a
1 and F
a
2 must be true. Unlike the BN we presented above for a
source level evaluation, we will take into account here the possibility that it may have been
the same assailant in both locations. For this, we must link F1 to F2, as before (Fig. 10.6(b)),
and define a new node L containing the states
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L—the assailant in location 1 is the same person as the assailant in location 2;
L¯—the assailant in location 1 is not the same person as the assailant in location 2;
as a parent to F1 and F2 (Gittelson et al., 2013a). We use the probability λ to denote the
prior probability that there were two different assailants on the crime scene (Dawid, 2004),
that is, Pr(L¯) = λ. To relax the assumption that it is equally probable for the suspect to
have struggled with the victim in either of the two locations in a case where the suspect was
one of two assailants, we introduce another probability, which we call τ . This probability
represents the prior probability that the suspect was engaged in the struggle in location 1
in the case that the suspect is an assailant and that there were two different assailants in
locations 1 and 2 on the crime scene, i.e., Pr(F a1 ∣L¯,Ha) = τ . Tables 10.7 and 10.8 give the
probability tables for F1 and F2.
Table 10.7: Probability table for node F1 in Fig. 10.6. This node indicates whether or not the suspect was
engaged in a struggle with the victim in location 1. We use τ to denote the probability that the suspect was
engaged in the struggle in location 1 given that he is one of two assailants (i.e., Pr(Fa1 ∣L¯,Ha)).
H: Ha H¯a
L ∶ L L¯ L L¯
F1: F
a
1 1 τ 0 0
F¯ a1 0 1 − τ 1 1
Table 10.8: Probability table for node F2 in Fig. 10.6. This node indicates whether or not the suspect
was engaged in a struggle with the victim in location 2. This is only possible when either the suspect was
the assailant in both locations (column 1), or when the suspect was one of two assailants and he was not
engaged in a struggle with the victim in location 1 (column 4).
H: Ha H¯a
L: L L¯ L L¯
F1: F
a
1 F¯
a
1 F
a
1 F¯
a
1 F
a
1 F¯
a
1 F
a
1 F¯
a
1
F2: F
a
2 1 n/a 0 1 0 0 0 0
F¯ a2 0 n/a 1 0 1 1 1 1
To compute the LR,
LR = Pr(Y1 = Γ1, Y2 = Γ2∣X = Γ1,Ha)
Pr(Y1 = Γ1, Y2 = Γ2∣X = Γ1, H¯a) , (10.6)
we add a node Y1 ∩ Y2 as a child of nodes Y1 and Y2 (Fig. 10.6(c)). This completes the BN,
with all of the nodes and states of the final model given in Table 10.9.
Note that if the same background noise is present in both locations, nodes B1 and B2
may be merged into a single node B, parent to both Y1 and Y2. This creates an additional
probabilistic link between Y1 and Y2, which influences the evaluation of the LR. However,
this special case is not treated in this paper.
In the next section, we present the algebraic expression that corresponds to the computed
LR. We derive this expression to compare the LR provided by this model with the existing
formulae in forensic literature.
10.5 Algebraic expression for the LR computed by the
Bayesian network in Fig. 10.6(c)
The robust mathematical framework of BNs allows their user to deduce the algebraic formu-
lae of interest. In the forensic context of the two-trace transfer problem, we are interested in
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CHAPTER 10. BAYESIAN NETWORKS AND THE VALUE OF THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE FORENSIC TWO-TRACE TRANSFER PROBLEM
the LR for propositions Ha and H¯a (Eq. (10.6)). In this section, we introduce the transfer,
background and match probabilities into this expression, based on the probabilistic relation-
ships modeled in the BN in Fig. 10.6(c). For this development, we assume that trace 1 has
characteristic Γ1 (Y1 = Γ1) and trace 2 characteristic Γ2 (Y2 = Γ2). As for the characteristic
of the suspect’s sample, we will label it X for the time being and specify its characteristic
later on.
We begin by applying the third law of probability for dependent events to Eq. (10.6):
LR = Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣X,Ha)
Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣X, H¯a)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
(i)
× Pr(Y2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X,Ha)
Pr(Y2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X, H¯a)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
(ii)
(10.7)
This separates the LR into the product of two ratios:
(i) the LR for observing the characteristic of trace 1 for the two competing propositions
given the characteristic of the suspect’s sample;
(ii) the LR for observing the characteristic of trace 2 for the same propositions, given the
characteristic of the suspect’s sample and given that the characteristic of trace 1 has
already been observed.
As the probability tables for nodes Y1 and Y2 are identical to the probability table for
node Y in the one-trace evaluation, the developments of these two ratios over nodes B1, T1
and TS1, and B2, T2 and TS2, respectively, are identical to Eq. (10.5):
LR =1 ×
(a)ucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright
Pr(B¯1 ∩ T1 ∩ TS1 = Γ1∣X,Ha)+γ′1 ×
(b)ucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright
Pr(B1 ∩ T¯1∣X,Ha)
1 × Pr(B¯1 ∩ T1 ∩ TS1 = Γ1∣X, H¯a)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
(c)
+γ′1 × Pr(B1 ∩ T¯1∣X, H¯a)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
(d)
× 1 ×
(e)ucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright
Pr(B¯2 ∩ T2 ∩ TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X,Ha)+γ′2 ×
(f)ucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright
Pr(B2 ∩ T¯2∣Y1 = Γ1,X,Ha)
1 × Pr(B¯2 ∩ T2 ∩ TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X, H¯a)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
(g)
+γ′2 × Pr(B2 ∩ T¯2∣Y1 = Γ1,X, H¯a)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
(h)
.
(10.8)
Let us first examine the denominators of these two ratios.
10.5.1 Denominators of the ratios in Eq. (10.8)
Under H¯a, neither of the traces was transferred by the suspect, so we assume the suspect’s
characteristic has no influence on the probabilities of Y1 = Γ1 and Y2 = Γ2, and remove the
conditioning on X from these probabilities.
Probability (c) (i.e., Pr(B¯1 ∩ T1 ∩ TS1 = Γ1∣H¯a)) is the probability that trace 1 was
transferred during the struggle from an assailant having characteristic Γ1, given that the
suspect was not an assailant who struggled with the victim on the crime scene. As in the
one-trace transfer problem, this probability is equal to
b¯1 × t′1 × Pr(TS1 = Γ1∣H¯a) .
The probability table for node TS1 is identical to the probability table for node TS shown
in Table 10.3, such that Pr(TS1 = Γ1∣H¯a) = γ1, and the above expression is equal to
b¯1 × t′1 × γ1 .
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Probability (d) (i.e., Pr(B1 ∩ T¯1∣H¯a)) is the probability that trace 1 is a background
trace and that there was no transfer from the assailant in location 1, given that the suspect
was not an assailant in the struggle with the victim. As in the one-trace transfer problem,
this probability is independent of the assailant’s characteristic and is equal to
b1 × t¯′1 .
Probability (g) (i.e., Pr(B¯2 ∩ T2 ∩ TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1, H¯a)) is the probability that trace
2 was transferred during the struggle from an assailant having characteristic Γ2, given that
trace 1 has characteristic Γ1 and that the suspect was not an assailant who struggled with
the victim on the crime scene. This probability is equal to
b¯2 × t′2 × Pr(TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1, H¯a) .
The probability table for node TS2 is identical to the probability table for node TS shown
in Table 10.3, such that Pr(TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1, H¯a) = γ2, and the above expression is equal
to
b¯2 × t′2 × γ2 .
Probability (h) (i.e., Pr(B2 ∩ T¯2∣Y1 = Γ1, H¯a)) is the probability that trace 2 is a back-
ground trace and that there was no transfer from the assailant in location 2, given that
trace 1 has characteristic Γ1 and that the suspect was not an assailant in the struggle with
the victim. As in the development of probability (d), this probability is independent of the
assailant’s characteristic and is equal to
b2 × t¯′2 .
The denominator of ratio (i) is therefore
b¯1t
′
1γ1 + γ′1b1t¯′1 ,
and the denominator for ratio (ii),
b¯2t
′
2γ2 + γ′2b2t¯′2 .
Each of these expressions is identical to the denominator of the LR published for the
one-trace transfer problem (Eq. (10.4)). This is reasonable, because the observation of two
different traces makes it impossible for the two traces to have come from the same person,
such that the observations of the two traces can be considered independent of each other.
Each observation is, therefore, comparable with the observation of a single trace.
Next, let us examine the numerators of the two ratios in Eq. (10.8).
10.5.2 Numerators of the ratios in Eq. (10.8)
Probabilities (a) and (e) (i.e., Pr(B¯1 ∩T1 ∩TS1 = Γ1∣X,Ha) and Pr(B¯2 ∩T2 ∩TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 =
Γ1,X,H
a)) are the probabilities that each of the traces was transferred during the struggle,
and probabilities (b) and (f) (i.e., Pr(B1 ∩ T¯1∣X,Ha) and Pr(B2 ∩ T¯2∣Y1 = Γ1,X,Ha)) the
probabilities that each of the traces is a background trace and that there was no transfer
from the struggle in each of the locations. The developments of the latter are independent
of an assailant’s characteristic. As in the one-trace transfer problem, probability (b) is equal
to
b1 × t¯1 ,
and probability (f) to
b2 × t¯2 .
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Concerning the probabilities that each of the traces was transferred during the struggle
under Ha, it is possible that a trace may have been transferred by the suspect. We must,
therefore, take into account the probability that the true source of a transferred trace may
effectively be the suspect. As a result, we must consider the characteristic of the suspect’s
sample to develop probabilities (a) and (e).
Theoretically, there are two possibilities for the evidence in a two-trace problem:
(1) the suspect’s sample has characteristic Γ1 (i.e., X = Γ1) and matches trace 1; or
(2) the suspect’s sample has characteristic Γ2 (i.e., X = Γ2) and matches trace 2.
In the first case, the suspect matches the first trace observed on the scene; in the second
case, the suspect matches the second trace observed on the scene. Of course, the order of the
observations will not affect the numerical value obtained for the LR. However, the algebraic
derivation of the formulae includes conditional probabilities which will differ in these two
scenarios. Therefore, we will develop probabilities (a) and (e) twice: first, we will assume
that the suspect’s sample matches the first trace, and second, that the suspect’s sample
matches the second trace.
In the case that the suspect’s sample matches trace 1 (i.e., X = Γ1)
Probability (a), that is, Pr(B¯1 ∩ T1 ∩ TS1 = Γ1∣X = Γ1,Ha), is the probability of the event
that trace 1 was transferred during the struggle from an assailant having characteristic Γ1,
given that the suspect has characteristic Γ1 and that the suspect was an assailant who
struggled with the victim on the crime scene. As in the one-trace transfer problem, this
probability is equal to
b¯1 × t1 × Pr(TS1 = Γ1∣X = Γ1,Ha) . (10.9)
To find Pr(TS1 = Γ1∣X = Γ1,Ha), we must continue to work our way up in the structure
of the BN (Fig. 10.6(c)). Between nodes TS1 and H is node F1. We must, therefore, extend
the conversation to propositions F a1 and F¯
a
1 :
Pr(TS1 = Γ1∣X = Γ1,Ha) = 1 × Pr(F a1 ∣Ha)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
1−λ+λτ
+γ1 × Pr(F¯ a1 ∣Ha)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
λ(1−τ)= 1 − λ + λτ + γ1λ(1 − τ) .
This development results from two possible explanations for the event TS1 = Γ1 (i.e., the
event that a transferred trace’s true source in location 1 is Γ1):
 either trace 1 was transferred from the suspect, in which case the probability of TS1 =
Γ1 is equal to 1;
 or trace 1 was transferred by the other assailant, who has characteristic Γ1 with a
probability of γ1.
The weighted sum of these values with the probabilities of each of them occurring given
proposition Ha produces the above expression. The first case is possible either when the
suspect was the only assailant (probability of 1 − λ), or when the suspect was one of two
assailants (probability of λ) and of these two, was the one in location 1 (probability of τ).
The second case is only possible when the suspect was one of two assailants (probability of
λ), and this time was the one in location 2 (probability of 1 − τ).
Inserting these results into Eq. (10.9) gives us the following expression for Pr(B¯1 ∩ T1 ∩
TS1 = Γ1∣X = Γ1,Ha):
b¯1 × t1 × [1 − λ + λτ + γ1λ(1 − τ)] .
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Introducing the expressions for (a), (b), (c) and (d) into Eq. (10.8) produces
Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣X = Γ1,Ha)
Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣X = Γ1, H¯a) = b¯1t1 [1 − λ + λτ + γ1λ(1 − τ)] + γ′1b1t¯1b¯1t′1γ1 + γ′1b1t¯′1 (10.10)
for ratio (i) in Eq. (10.7).
The expression for (e) is more complex. Pr(B¯2 ∩ T2 ∩ TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ1,Ha)
is the probability of the event that trace 2 was transferred during the struggle from an
assailant having characteristic Γ2, given that trace 1 and the suspect have characteristic Γ1
and that the suspect was an assailant who struggled with the victim on the crime scene.
This probability is equal to
b¯2 × t2 × Pr(TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ1,Ha) , (10.11)
and the extension of the conversation to propositions F a2 and F¯
a
2 to find Pr(TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 =
Γ1,X = Γ1,Ha) produces
Pr(TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ1,Ha) = γ2 × Pr(F¯ a2 ∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ1,Ha) . (10.12)
Given that the suspect has characteristic Γ1, the true source of a transferred trace in loca-
tion 2 can only have characteristic Γ2 if the assailant in this location was not the suspect
(proposition F¯ a2 ). In this case, the probability that the true source has characteristic Γ2 is
γ2. To compute Pr(F¯ a2 ∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ1,Ha), the BN applies Bayes’ theorem:
Pr(F¯ a2 ∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ1,Ha) = Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣F¯ a2 ,X = Γ1,Ha) × Pr(F¯ a2 ∣Ha)Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣X = Γ1,Ha) . (10.13)
This ratio is made up of the following three probabilities:
 The development of probability Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣F¯ a2 ,X = Γ1,Ha) is identical to that of the
numerator of the traditional one-trace transfer scenario (Eq. (10.5)):
Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣F¯ a2 ,X = Γ1,Ha)= 1 × Pr(B¯1 ∩ T1 ∩ TS1 = Γ1∣F¯ a2 ,X = Γ1,Ha) + γ′1 × Pr(B1 ∩ T¯1∣Ha)= b¯1t1 + γ′1b1t¯1 .
 By definition,
Pr(F¯ a2 ∣Ha) = λτ ,
that is, the probability that the assailant in location 2 was not the suspect given that
the suspect was an assailant is equal to the probability that there were two different
assailants in each of the locations (probability λ) and that the suspect was the assailant
in location 1 (probability τ).
 And Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣X = Γ1,Ha) is the numerator of the first ratio in our LR (Eq. (10.10)):
Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣X = Γ1,Ha) = b¯1t1 [1 − λ + λτ + γ1λ(1 − τ)] + γ′1b1t¯1 .
Therefore, Eq. (10.13) is equal to
Pr(F¯ a2 ∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ1,Ha) = (b¯1t1 + γ′1b1t¯1)λτb¯1t1 [1 − λ + λτ + γ1λ (1 − τ)] + γ′1b1t¯1 .
Inserting this result into Eq. (10.12), and Eq. (10.12) into Eq. (10.11), makes probability (e)
in Eq. (10.8) equal to
Pr(B¯2∩T2∩TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ1,Ha) = b¯2t2γ2 ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
(b¯1t1 + γ′1b1t¯1)λτ
b¯1t1 [1 − λ + λτ + γ1λ (1 − τ)] + γ′1b1t¯1
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ .
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Introducing the expressions for (e), (f), (g) and (h) into Eq. (10.8) produces
Pr(Y2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ1,Ha)
Pr(Y2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ1, H¯a) =
b¯2t2γ2 { (b¯1t1+γ′1b1 t¯1)λτb¯1t1[1−λ+λτ+γ1λ(1−τ)]+γ′1b1 t¯1 } + γ′2b2t¯2
b¯2t′2γ2 + γ′2b2t¯′2
for ratio (ii) in Eq. (10.7).
Inserting all of the obtained results into Eq. (10.8) leads to the following activity level
LR for a case in which the suspect’s sample matches the first of two traces recovered on a
crime scene:
LR = b¯1t1 [1 − λ + λτ + γ1λ (1 − τ)] + γ′1b1t¯1
b¯1t′1γ1 + γ′1b1t¯′1´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
(i)
× b¯2t2γ2 { (b¯1t1+γ
′
1b1 t¯1)λτ
b¯1t1[1−λ+λτ+γ1λ(1−τ)]+γ′1b1 t¯1 } + γ′2b2t¯2
b¯2t′2γ2 + γ′2b2t¯′2´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
(ii)
.
In the case that the suspect’s sample matches trace 2 (i.e., X = Γ2)
In this case, probability (a), that is, Pr(B¯1 ∩ T1 ∩ TS1 = Γ1∣X = Γ2,Ha), is the probability
of the event that trace 1 was transferred during the struggle from an assailant having char-
acteristic Γ1, given that the suspect was an assailant who struggled with the victim on the
crime scene, but that the suspect has characteristic Γ2. This probability is equal to
b¯1 × t1 × Pr(TS1 = Γ1∣X = Γ2,Ha) .
In this case, the true source can only have characteristic Γ1 if the suspect was not the assailant
in location 1 (proposition F¯ a1 ), and if the assailant in location 1 possesses characteristic Γ1
(probability of γ1):
Pr(TS1 = Γ1∣X = Γ1,Ha) = γ1 × Pr(F¯ a1 ∣Ha)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
λ(1−τ)= γ1λ(1 − τ) .
The expression for Pr(B¯1 ∩ T1 ∩ TS1 = Γ1∣X = Γ2,Ha) is therefore b¯1 × t1 × γ1λ(1 − τ).
Introducing the expressions for (a), (b), (c) and (d) into Eq. (10.8) produces
Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣X = Γ2,Ha)
Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣X = Γ2, H¯a) = b¯1t1γ1λ (1 − τ) + γ′1b1t¯1b¯1t′1γ1 + γ′1b1t¯′1 (10.14)
for ratio (i) in Eq. (10.7).
Again, it is the expression for (e) which is more complex. Pr(B¯2 ∩ T2 ∩ TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 =
Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha) is the probability of the event that trace 2 was transferred during the
struggle from an assailant having characteristic Γ2, given that trace 1 has characteristic Γ1,
the suspect has characteristic Γ2 and the suspect was an assailant who struggled with the
victim on the crime scene. This probability is equal to
b¯2 × t2 × Pr(TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha) , (10.15)
and the extension of the conversation to propositions F a2 and F¯
a
2 to find Pr(TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 =
Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha) produces
Pr(TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha)= 1 × Pr(F a2 ∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha) + γ2 × Pr(F¯ a2 ∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha) . (10.16)
This development results from two possible explanations for the event TS2 = Γ2 (i.e., the
event of the true source of a transferred trace in location 2 having characteristic Γ2):
115
CHAPTER 10. BAYESIAN NETWORKS AND THE VALUE OF THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE FORENSIC TWO-TRACE TRANSFER PROBLEM
 either trace 2 was transferred from the suspect, in which case the suspect was the
assailant who struggled with the victim in the location of trace 2 (proposition F a2 );
 or trace 2 was transferred by another assailant (proposition F¯ a2 ), who has characteristic
Γ2 with a probability of γ2.
The BN computes the probabilities Pr(F a2 ∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha) and
Pr(F¯ a2 ∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha) by applying Bayes’ theorem:
Pr(F a2 ∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha) = Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣F a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha) × Pr(F a2 ∣Ha)Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣X = Γ2,Ha) , (10.17)
Pr(F¯ a2 ∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha) = Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣F¯ a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha) × Pr(F¯ a2 ∣Ha)Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣X = Γ2,Ha) . (10.18)
These two ratios are made up of the following five probabilities:
 We develop Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣F a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha) by extending the conversation over nodes B1,
T1, and TS1:
Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣F a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha)= 1 × Pr(B¯1 ∩ T1 ∩ TS1 = Γ1∣F a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha) + γ′1 × Pr(B1 ∩ T¯1∣Ha)= b¯1t1 × Pr(TS1 = Γ1∣F a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha) + γ′1b1t¯1 .
(10.19)
To find Pr(TS1 = Γ1∣F a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha), we extend the conversation over propositions
F a1 and F¯
a
1 :
Pr(TS1 = Γ1∣F a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha) = γ1 × Pr(F¯ a1 ∣F a2 ,Ha) ,
and to find Pr(F¯ a1 ∣F a2 ,Ha), we apply Bayes’ theorem:
Pr(F¯ a1 ∣F a2 ,Ha) =
1ucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright
Pr(F a2 ∣F¯ a1 ,Ha)×
λ(1−τ)ucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright
Pr(F¯ a1 ∣Ha)
Pr(F a2 ∣Ha)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
1−λ+λ(1−τ)
= λ (1 − τ)
1 − λ + λ (1 − τ) .
Inserting these results into Eq. (10.19) produces
Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣F a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha) = b¯1t1γ1 [ λ (1 − τ)1 − λ + λ (1 − τ)] + γ′1b1t¯1 .
 By definition,
Pr(F a2 ∣Ha) = 1 − λ + λ(1 − τ) ,
that is, given that the suspect was an assailant, the suspect was the assailant in location
2 either when there was only one assailant in both locations (probability 1−λ), or when
there were two different assailants (probability λ), and the suspect struggled with the
victim in location 2 (probability 1 − τ).
 Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣X = Γ2,Ha) is the numerator of the first ratio in our LR (Eq. (10.14)):
Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣X = Γ2,Ha) = b¯1t1γ1λ(1 − τ) + γ′1b1t¯1 .
116
CHAPTER 10. BAYESIAN NETWORKS AND THE VALUE OF THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE FORENSIC TWO-TRACE TRANSFER PROBLEM
 We develop Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣F¯ a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha) by extending the conversation over nodes B1,
T1, and TS1:
Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣F¯ a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha)= 1 × Pr(B¯1 ∩ T1 ∩ TS1 = Γ1∣F¯ a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha) + γ′1 × Pr(B1 ∩ T¯1∣Ha)= b¯1t1 × Pr(TS1 = Γ1∣F¯ a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha) + γ′1b1t¯1 .
(10.20)
To find Pr(TS1 = Γ1∣F¯ a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha), we extend the conversation over propositions
F a1 and F¯
a
1 :
Pr(TS1 = Γ1∣F¯ a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha) = γ1 × Pr(F¯ a1 ∣F¯ a2 ,Ha)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
0= 0 .
Given that the suspect has characteristic Γ2, the true source of a transferred trace in
location 1 can only have characteristic Γ1 if the assailant in location 1 was not the
suspect (proposition F¯ a1 ). This unknown assailant possesses characteristic Γ1 with a
probability of γ1. However, if the suspect was an assailant on the crime scene, then
he must have been the assailant at either location 1 or location 2. According to our
definitions of the propositions, it is therefore impossible that the suspect was not the
assailant in location 1, given that he did not struggle with the victim in location 2,
but was an assailant on the crime scene.
Inserting this result into Eq. (10.20) produces
Pr(Y1 = Γ1∣F¯ a2 ,X = Γ2,Ha) = γ′1b1t¯1 .
If the suspect was an assailant, yet did not struggle with the victim in location 2, he
must have been the assailant in location 1. However, because the trace in location 1
does not match the suspect’s sample, trace 1 can only have characteristic Γ1 if it is a
background trace.
 And, by definition,
Pr(F¯ a2 ∣Ha) = λτ ,
as in Eq. (10.13).
Therefore, Eq. (10.17) is equal to
Pr(F a2 ∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha) = {b¯1t1γ1 [ λ(1−τ)1−λ+λ(1−τ)] + γ′1b1t¯1} × [1 − λ + λ (1 − τ)]b¯1t1γ1λ(1 − τ) + γ′1b1t¯1= b¯1t1γ1λ (1 − τ) + γ′1b1t¯1 [1 − λ + λ (1 − τ)]
b¯1t1γ1λ(1 − τ) + γ′1b1t¯1 ,
and Eq. (10.18) to
Pr(F¯ a2 ∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha) = γ′1b1t¯1λτb¯1t1γ1λ(1 − τ) + γ′1b1t¯1 .
Inserting these results in Eq. (10.16), and Eq. (10.16) into Eq. (10.15), gives us the probability
of (e):
Pr(B¯2 ∩ T2 ∩ TS2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha)
= b¯2t2 { b¯1t1γ1λ (1 − τ) + γ′1b1t¯1 [1 − λ + λ (1 − τ)]
b¯1t1γ1λ (1 − τ) + γ′1b1t¯1 + γ2 [ γ
′
1b1t¯1λτ
b¯1t1γ1λ (1 − τ) + γ′1b1t¯1 ]}
= b¯2t2 {b¯1t1γ1λ (1 − τ) + γ′1b1t¯1 [1 − λ + λ (1 − τ)] + γ2 (γ′1b1t¯1λτ )}
b¯1t1γ1λ (1 − τ) + γ′1b1t¯1 .
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Introducing the expressions for (e), (f), (g) and (h) into Eq. (10.8) produces
Pr(Y2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ2,Ha)
Pr(Y2 = Γ2∣Y1 = Γ1,X = Γ2, H¯a) =
b¯2t2{b¯1t1γ1λ(1−τ)+γ′1b1 t¯1[1−λ+λ(1−τ)]+γ2(γ′1b1 t¯1λτ)}
b¯1t1γ1λ(1−τ)+γ′1b1 t¯1 + γ′2b2t¯2
b¯2t′2γ2 + γ′2b2t¯′2
for ratio (ii) in Eq. (10.7). Combining this result with Eq. (10.14), produces the following
activity level LR for a case where the suspect’s sample matches the second trace recovered
on the crime scene:
LR = b¯1t1γ1λ (1 − τ) + γ′1b1t¯1
b¯1t′1γ1 + γ′1b1t¯′1´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
(i)
× b¯2t2{b¯1t1γ1λ(1−τ)+γ′1b1 t¯1[1−λ+λ(1−τ)]+γ2(γ′1b1 t¯1λτ)}b¯1t1γ1λ(1−τ)+γ′1b1 t¯1 + γ′2b2t¯2
b¯2t′2γ2 + γ′2b2t¯′2´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
(ii)
.
Summary
The LR computed by the BN in Fig. 10.6c is the product of two ratios: one pertaining to
the observation of the matching trace, and the other to the observation of the non-matching
trace. Whatever the order of these observations, the second observation is always conditional
on the analytical result of the first trace observed.
If trace 1 matches the suspect’s sample, the LR is:
LR = b¯1t1 [1 − λ + λτ + γ1λ (1 − τ)] + γ′1b1t¯1
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matching trace
× b¯2t2γ2 { (b¯1t1+γ
′
1b1 t¯1)λτ
b¯1t1[1−λ+λτ+γ1λ(1−τ)]+γ′1b1 t¯1 } + γ′2b2t¯2
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non-matching trace given matching trace
,
(10.21)
and if trace 2 matches the suspect’s sample, the LR is:
LR = b¯1t1γ1λ (1 − τ) + γ′1b1t¯1
b¯1t′1γ1 + γ′1b1t¯′1´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
non-matching trace
× b¯2t2{b¯1t1γ1λ(1−τ)+γ′1b1 t¯1[1−λ+λ(1−τ)]+γ2(γ′1b1 t¯1λτ)}b¯1t1γ1λ(1−τ)+γ′1b1 t¯1 + γ′2b2t¯2
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matching trace given non-matching trace
.
(10.22)
Note that each ratio in these equations is an extension of the LR published for the one-trace
transfer problem (Eq. (10.4)). In fact, the denominator and the second term in the numerator
remain unchanged. The extension affects only the first term in the numerator, that is, the
product b¯t. This product is the probability that the recovered trace was transferred by an
assailant during the alleged activity. It must be multiplied by a factor corresponding to the
probability of the transferred trace’s source having the observed characteristic. This factor
will vary according to whether we consider one trace (in Eq. (10.4) for the one-trace transfer
problem, this factor is equal to 1) or two traces, or more accurately, whether we consider a
case where there is the possibility of more than one assailant (Triggs and Buckleton, 2003).
In the latter case, it will further depend on whether we consider the matching trace or
the non-matching trace, and the first or the second of the two recovered traces. Note that
Eqs. (10.21) and (10.22) contain parameters which are actually prior probabilities. For this
reason, the LR that is obtained is not to be intended in its usual sense because it appears
that it no longer depends only upon the sample data.
To compare these expressions with each other and with Eq. (10.1), we multiply the two
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ratios, and rewrite them in the form of Eq. (10.1). Thus Eq. (10.21) becomes:
LR = b¯2t2γ2 [(b¯1t1 + b1γ′1t¯1)λτ] + γ′2b2t¯2 {b¯1t1 [1 − λ + λτ + γ1λ (1 − τ)] + γ′1b1t¯1}(b¯1t′1γ1 + γ′1b1t¯′1) × (b¯2t′2γ2 + γ′2b2t¯′2)
= b¯1b¯2t1t2λτγ2 + b¯1b2t1t¯2 [1 − λ + λτ + λ (1 − τ)γ1]γ′2 + b1b¯2t¯1t2λτγ′1γ2 + b1b2t¯1t¯2γ′1γ′2
b¯1b¯2t′1t′2γ1γ2 + b¯1b2t′1t¯′2γ1γ′2 + b1b¯2t¯′1t′2γ′1γ2 + b1b2t¯′1t¯′2γ′1γ′2 ,
(10.23)
and Eq. (10.22):
LR = b¯2t2 {b¯1t1γ1λ (1 − τ) + γ′1b1 t¯1 [1 − λ + λ (1 − τ)] + γ2 (γ′1b1 t¯1λτ)} + γ′2b2 t¯2 [b¯1t1γ1λ (1 − τ) + γ′1b1 t¯1](b¯1t′1γ1 + γ′1b1 t¯′1) × (b¯2t′2γ2 + γ′2b2 t¯′2)
= b¯1b¯2t1t2λ (1 − τ)γ1 + b¯1b2t1 t¯2λ (1 − τ)γ1γ′2 + b1b¯2 t¯1t2 [1 − λ + λ (1 − τ) + λτγ2]γ′1 + b1b2 t¯1 t¯2γ′1γ′2
b¯1b¯2t′1t′2γ1γ2 + b¯1b2t′1 t¯′2γ1γ′2 + b1b¯2 t¯′1t′2γ′1γ2 + b1b2 t¯′1 t¯′2γ′1γ′2 .
(10.24)
These two equations are identical for τ = 0.5. In this case, we do not need to differentiate
between trace 1 and trace 2, and only need to distinguish between the matching trace i ∈{1,2} with characteristic Γi, and the non-matching trace j ∈ {1,2}, j ≠ i, with characteristic
Γj :
LR = 12 b¯ib¯jtitjλγj + b¯ibjtit¯j [1 − λ + 12λ + 12λγi]γ′j + 12bib¯j t¯itjλγ′iγj + bibj t¯it¯jγ′iγ′j
b¯ib¯jt′it′jγiγj + b¯ibjt′it¯′jγiγ′j + bib¯j t¯′it′jγ′iγj + bibj t¯′it¯′jγ′iγ′j . (10.25)
The numerator and denominator of this equation each consist of the four possible combi-
nations of background and transferred traces for the matching and the non-matching trace
(i.e., both traces were transferred, only the matching trace was transferred, only the non-
matching trace was transferred, and both traces are background traces). In the denominator
and in the fourth term of the numerator, the probabilities of the observations consist of the
product of the corresponding background, transfer and match probabilities. These describe
events that are independent of the suspect’s characteristic and of the suspect’s possible in-
volvement in the struggle with the victim. The first three terms of the numerator, however,
are not independent of the suspect’s involvement. These contain the additional probabilities
of λ and τ (which, in Eq. (10.25) is equal to 1
2
), in addition to the background, transfer, and
match probabilities. More specifically:
 The first term in the numerator considers the event that both traces were transferred
during the struggle. Apart from the appropriate background and transfer probabilities,
the probability of observing one matching and one non-matching trace, given that the
suspect was an assailant, is equal to the match probability of the non-matching trace’s
characteristic (i.e., γj) times the probability that there were two different assailants
(i.e., λ) times the probability that the suspect was the assailant in location 1 (in this
case, 1
2
).
 The second term in the numerator describes the event that only the matching trace
was transferred during the struggle. In this case, there are three possibilities: the
suspect could have been the assailant in both locations (probability of 1 − λ), the
suspect could have been the assailant only in the location of the matching trace (here,
probability of 1
2
λ), or the suspect could have been the assailant only in the location of
the non-matching trace (here, probability of 1
2
λ). In the last case, the assailant in the
other location also had the matching characteristic with a probability of γi. The sum
of the probabilities of each of these possible events makes up the additional factor in
the square brackets in Eq. (10.25).
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 The third term in the numerator describes the event that only the non-matching trace
was transferred. As the suspect could not have transferred the non-matching trace,
this is only possible if the suspect was the assailant at the location of the matching
trace (here, probability of 1
2
λ).
The LR computed by the BN thus combines the probabilities defined in this paper in a
logical way.
10.6 Discussion
In this section, we analyze Eqs. (10.23) - (10.25). First, we compare these expressions to
Eq. (10.1); then, we show how Eq. (10.25) may reduce to both the source level LR for two
traces and the activity level LR for a single trace under the appropriate assumptions; and
finally, we discuss the extension of the model to n traces.
10.6.1 Comparison with Eq. (10.1)
Rewriting Eq. (10.1) with the subscript i for the probabilities referring to the matching
trace, and the subscript j for the probabilities referring to the non-matching trace, produces
(Triggs and Buckleton, 2003):
LR = 12 b¯ib¯jtitj (1 − 2q)γj + 12 b¯ibjtit¯j (1 + γi)γ′j + 12bib¯j t¯itjγ′iγj + bibj t¯it¯jγ′iγ′j
b¯ib¯jtitj (1 − 2q)γiγj + b¯ibjtit¯jγiγ′j + bib¯j t¯itjγ′iγj + bibj t¯it¯jγ′iγ′j . (10.26)
A comparison of this equation with Eq. (10.25) shows that this equation assumes τ = 0.5,
and uses the variable q whereas we have used the variable λ. The differences are due to the
different definitions underlying q and λ. This can be seen by setting q = 0 and λ = 1: in this
case, these variables disappear from the equations and the two LRs become identical.
The difference between q and λ is that the definition of q is limited to the event of two
transferred traces, whereas λ is defined at the level of the propositions, independently of
whether the traces were transferred during the struggle. More specifically, expression 1− 2q
(in Eq. (10.26)) denotes the probability that two transferred traces come from different
assailants (Triggs and Buckleton, 2003). It therefore only applies to the first term in the
numerator and the first term in the denominator, where the probabilities describe the event
of two transferred traces. Probability λ (in Eq. (10.25)), on the other hand, describes the
prior probability that the assailant in location 1 was not the same assailant as the assailant in
location 2. This definition is not limited to only the transferred traces, and therefore appears
in the first, second and third terms of the LR’s numerator (Eq. (10.25)). Note that λ does
not figure in the LR’s denominator, because the denominator considers the observations of
the two traces independently of each other.
Owing to these different definitions:
 the additional factor of 1−2q in the first term of the denominator of Eq. (10.26) makes
this denominator smaller than the denominator of Eq. (10.25);
 the additional factor of 1−λ in the second term of the numerator in Eq. (10.25) makes
this term greater in Eq. (10.25) than in Eq. (10.26); and
 probability λ in the third term of the numerator in Eq. (10.25) makes this term smaller
in Eq. (10.25) than in Eq. (10.26).
Numerically, the impact of these differences depends on the values assigned to the back-
ground and transfer probabilities. (That is, in most cases Eq. (10.26) will produce a slightly
greater LR, yet if large values are assigned to bi and tj , and small values to bj and ti, Eq.
(10.25) may produce the greater LR owing to the greater impact of the numerator’s third
term.)
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10.6.2 Verification of the model
To verify the results produced by our model, we show that Eq. (10.25) reduces to the source
level LR for two traces and to the activity level LR for a single trace when assumptions are
made to simulate these two situations.
First, we observe that letting the background (bi and bj) and transfer probabilities (ti,
t′i, tj , and t′j) tend toward 1 or 0 leads to the expected, logical results: the computed LR is
an increasing function of ti and a decreasing function of tj . If ti = t′i = tj = t′j = 0, it reduces
to 1, and when ti = t′i = tj = t′j = 1 and b¯i = b¯j = 1, it tends toward the source level LR, which
is 1
2γi
for λ = 1 and τ = 1
2
(Evett, 1987):
LR = 12γj
γiγj= 1
2γi
.
Second, the computations of the BN can also be reduced to the activity level LR for
a single trace (Eq. (10.4)). To do this, we consider a scenario in which another assailant,
matching trace j, has already been found, and one assumes that if trace j was transferred by
one of the assailants, then it was transferred by this other assailant. We extended Fig. 10.6(c)
to illustrate this new situation by adding a node Z for the second suspect, and a node HZ for
a second pair of general propositions, pertaining to this second suspect (Fig. 10.7). The LR
T2T1
2TSB1 B21TS
F2
Y1 Y2
Y2Y1
1
X
Z
ZHXH
F
Figure 10.7: BN extended to include a second suspect, denoted Z, in a case where there were two different
assailants. A node HZ was added containing the same propositions as in H (now renamed HX), but for
this second suspect.
deduced from this model with respect to the first suspect (see Appendix for the derivation)
is now:
LR = b¯iti + γ′ibit¯i
b¯it′iγi + γ′ibit¯i ,
which corresponds to the activity level LR (Eq. (10.4)) for a single trace (Evett, 1984).
10.6.3 Extension to n traces
In an n − trace transfer problem, we consider n different traces recovered on the crime
scene to come from n distinct sources. The organized structure of the BN in Fig. 10.6(c)
easily lends it to an extension to any number of traces by transforming it into an object
oriented BN (OOBN). An OOBN allows the user to evaluate more complex problems by
combining different objects in a hierarchical structure (Hepler et al., 2007). An object may
be a simple random variable (like the nodes in a regular BN), or a separate, complex model,
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such as another BN (Koller and Pfeffer, 1997). Thus, the main advantage of an OOBN is
its capacity to differentiate between several hierarchical levels and to combine a set of nodes
from different models. This is particularly useful for combining a set of identical network
fragments that form a repetitive pattern in a regular BN (Dawid et al., 2007; Kjaerulff and
Madsen, 2008).
In the case of the two-trace problem, one can represent each group of variables specific
to one trace as a separate object. In this extension of the model, we assume that λ = 1 (i.e.,
there are n different perpetrators for a case with n traces), and omit node L in the BN.
Thus, the two-trace problem in Fig. 10.6(c) becomes an OOBN with only four objects: two
random variables and two subnetworks (Fig. 10.8(a)). The two network fragments hidden
N H X
trace 1 trace 2 trace Ntrace 1 trace 2
H X
N−1
(a)                                                                         (b)
Figure 10.8: Object-oriented BNs for (a) two traces, and (b) n traces. In (b), the additional node N
allows the user to specify the number of different traces the BN should consider in the evaluation. Here,
the dotted line represents traces 3 to N − 1. Each additional trace has an incoming arrow from nodes N ,
H, and X, and from each of the previously observed traces.
in the interface nodes of trace 1 and trace 2 in Fig. 10.8(a) are shown in Fig. 10.9(a),(b),
respectively. This OOBN has the same structure as the BN in Fig. 10.6(c) (without node
N−1
N H
F1
X
FN
NT
NY
BN
TSN
F
F2
H X H
F1
X
F1
1T
1Y 2Y
F2
2TB
TS1
1
TS
B2
2
(a)                                                       (b)                                                     (c)
Figure 10.9: The network fragments hidden in the interface nodes of (a) trace 1, (b) trace 2, and (c)
trace N in Fig. 10.8. The nodes with a dashed contour are nodes figuring either in the master network in
Fig. 10.8, or in a different network fragment. The dotted line in (c) represents nodes F3 to FN−2. These
are all a parent to node FN .
L), only decomposed into three separate elements.
The OOBN structure for two traces suggests a logical way to extend the model to ad-
ditional traces. New traces are added in the same way trace 2 was added to trace 1: the
observation of each new trace’s characteristic depends on the general variables H and X, and
on the specific hypotheses (contained in nodes of type F ) of each of the previously observed
traces (Fig. 10.8(b) and 10.9(c)). By this means, one can construct a general model for m
different traces (m ≥ n), and then designate, through an additional node N , the number of
different traces n for which one would like the BN to compute an LR.
The program Hugin Researcher is only limited by the amount of memory it can use.
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This limit lies at 4GB, which is great enough to allow for hundreds of traces to be modelled
with this OOBN (the exact number of traces will depend on the number of analytical traits
defined as the states of nodes X, Y and TS).
The additional variable N also allows the user to introduce an uncertainty on the number
of sources if this is not clearly defined by the circumstantial information of the case. This
OOBN clearly describes the dependencies assumed among the variables, and rigorously
applies the laws of probability to compute the LR of interest.
10.7 Conclusions
Forensic scientists are faced with the need of addressing increasingly complex inference
problems for assessing the value of scientific evidence. Two-trace problems are a typical
example for this. They are a realistic problem which, up to now, forensic statisticians
have addressed with an algebraic approach for calculating LRs. These applications have
led to efficient results for simple evidential assessments, yet quickly lead to mathematically
sophisticated expressions when applied to more complex problems. For an increasing number
of variables and an increasing number of conditional probabilistic relationships between these
variables, purely theoretical developments make it difficult to maintain a transparent and
error-free approach. The algebraic approach thus reaches its limits when it is applied to
increasingly complex inference problems.
The aim of this study was to investigate a new way for computing LRs, a graphical
approach based on the construction of BNs. These graphical models overcome the hurdle of
complexity by:
 decomposing complicated events into a set of distinct variables;
 describing and visualizing the assumed dependencies among the variables;
 rigorously handling probabilistic calculations in a mathematically robust environment;
 easily incorporating additional variables into existing models; and
 coherently combining and structuring different aspects of a problem as separate objects
in distinct hierarchical levels of an OOBN.
Thus, the construction of BNs provides a transparent approach to inference problems
that is not limited by an increasing number of variables and probabilistic relationships,
and not prone to careless mathematical errors that may occur when using or developing an
algebraic formula.
In the context of the two-trace transfer problem, the development of a BN demonstrated
the potential of such graphical probability models by producing a new activity level LR that
relaxes assumptions made in previous algebraic developments. In addition, the graphical
structure readily presents itself to extensions to more complex problems such as the n-trace
problem at the activity level. Thus, the development of BNs allows forensic scientists to
progress in the field of evidential interpretation by providing a tool to tackle more complex
inference problems in a structured and logical way.
10.8 Appendix: Derivation for the activity level LR for
Fig. 10.7
The aim of this derivation is to show that the introduction of a second suspect (denoted Z)
matching trace j allows one to reduce the activity level LR for two traces to the activity
level LR for a single trace. For this evaluation, we assume that λ = 1, that is, that there
were two different assailants. Further, we assume that the second suspect was engaged in a
struggle with the victim in the location of trace j (i.e., proposition F aj,Z). To differentiate the
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propositions referring to suspect 1 from those referring to suspect 2, the former now contain
an additional subscript X, and the latter a subscript Z (see Table 10.10 for the definitions
of these different propositions). We want to obtain the LR for suspect X. With respect
Table 10.10: Definitions of the additional propositions that figure in the BN shown in Fig. 10.7.
Nodes States Definitions of the States
HX HaX Suspect 1 was engaged in a struggle with the victim
H¯aX Suspect 1 was not engaged in a struggle with the victim
HZ HaZ Suspect 2 was engaged in a struggle with the victim
H¯aZ Suspect 2 was not engaged in a struggle with the victim
Fi F
a
i,X Suspect 1 was engaged in a struggle with the victim in the location of trace i
F ai,Z Suspect 2 was engaged in a struggle with the victim in the location of trace i
F¯ ai Neither suspect 1, nor suspect 2, was engaged in a struggle with the victim in the
location of trace i
Fj≠i F aj≠i,X Suspect 1 was engaged in a struggle with the victim in the location of trace j
F aj≠i,Z Suspect 2 was engaged in a struggle with the victim in the location of trace j
F¯ aj≠i Neither suspect 1, nor suspect 2, was engaged in a struggle with the victim in the
location of trace j
to suspect X, we shall assume that we observe first the non-matching trace j, and then
the matching trace i. The LR is computed for propositions HaX and H¯
a
X , given proposition
F aj≠i,Z , denoted in the following developments as F aj,Z :
LR = Pr(Yj ∣X,Z,F aj,Z ,HaX)
Pr(Yj ∣X,Z,F aj,Z , H¯aX) × Pr(Yi∣Yj ,X,Z,F
a
j,Z ,H
a
X)
Pr(Yi∣Yj ,X,Z,F aj,Z , H¯aX) . (10.27)
We define the observations as: Yj = Γj , Yi = Γi, Z = Γj and X = Γi.
For the numerator of the first ratio, the extension of the conversation over variables Bj ,
Tj , and TSj produces:
Pr(Yj ∣X,Z,F aj,Z ,HaX) = 1 × Pr(B¯j ∩ Tj ∩ TSj = Γj ∣Z,F aj,Z ,HaX) + γ′j × Pr(Bj ∩ T¯j ∣HaX)= b¯jtj × Pr(TSj = Γj ∣Z,F aj,Z) + γ′jbj t¯j .
Given F aj,Z and Z = Γj ,
Pr(TSj = Γj ∣Z,F aj,Z) = 1
such that
Pr(Yj ∣X,Z,F aj,Z ,HaX) = b¯jtj + γ′jbj t¯j .
For the denominator of the first ratio, we observe the same development:
Pr(Yj ∣X,Z,F aj,Z , H¯aX) = 1 × Pr(B¯j ∩ Tj ∩ TSj = Γj ∣Z,F aj,Z , H¯aX) + γ′j × Pr(Bj ∩ T¯j ∣H¯aX)= b¯jtj × Pr(TSj = Γj ∣Z,F aj,Z) + γ′jbj t¯j ,
with
Pr(TSj = Γj ∣Z,F aj,Z) = 1
such that
Pr(Yj ∣X,Z,F aj,Z , H¯aX) = b¯jtj + γ′jbj t¯j .
Given F aj,Z and Z = Γj , the event Yj = Γj is independent of the propositions pertaining
to suspect 1 (HaX and H¯
a
X). This makes the first ratio in Eq. (10.27) equal to 1.
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The extension of the conversation for the numerator of the second ratio produces:
Pr(Yi∣Yj ,X,Z,F aj,Z ,HaX) = 1 × Pr(B¯i ∩ Ti ∩ TSi = Γi∣X,F aj,Z ,HaX) + γ′i × Pr(Bi ∩ T¯i∣HaX)= b¯iti × Pr(TSi = Γi∣X,F aj,Z ,HaX) + γ′ibit¯i .
Given that suspect 1 was one of the assailants (proposition HaX), and that suspect 2 was
the assailant in the location of trace j (proposition F aj≠i,Z), suspect 1 must have been the
assailant in the location of trace i (proposition F ai,X). Therefore,
Pr(TSi = Γi∣X,F aj,Z ,HaX) = Pr(TSi = Γi∣X,F ai,X)= 1 ,
and
Pr(Yi∣Yj ,X,Z,F aj,Z ,HaX) = b¯iti + γ′ibit¯i .
For the denominator of the second ratio, we obtain:
Pr(Yi∣Yj ,X,Z,F aj,Z , H¯aX) = 1 × Pr(B¯i ∩ Ti ∩ TSi = Γi∣H¯aX) + γ′i × Pr(Bi ∩ T¯i∣H¯aX)= b¯it′i × Pr(TSi = Γi∣H¯aX) + γ′ibit¯′i .
Under H¯aX , suspect 1 was not one of the assailants, and trace i must have been transferred
by an unknown assailant if it was transferred during the assault. This other assailant has
characteristic Γi with a probability of γi:
Pr(TSi = Γi∣H¯aX) = γi ,
and
Pr(Yi∣Yj ,X,Z,F aj,Z , H¯aX) = b¯it′iγi + γ′ibit¯′i .
Therefore, Eq. (10.27) is equal to:
LR = b¯jtj + γ′jbj t¯j
b¯jtj + γ′jbj t¯j × b¯iti + γ
′
ibit¯i
b¯it′iγi + γ′ibit¯′i
= 1 × b¯iti + γ′ibit¯i
b¯it′iγi + γ′ibit¯′i= b¯iti + γ′ibit¯i
b¯it′iγi + γ′ibit¯′i .
This LR is equal to the activity level LR for a single trace (Eq. (10.4)).
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Chapter 11
The Database Search Problem:
A Question of Rational Decision
Making
Abstract
This paper applies probability and decision theory in the graphical interface of an
influence diagram to study the formal requirements of rationality which justify
the individualization of a person found through a database search. The decision-
theoretic part of the analysis studies the parameters that a rational decision
maker would use to individualize the selected person. The modeling part (in the
form of an influence diagram) clarifies the relationships between this decision
and the ingredients that make up the database search problem, i.e., the results
of the database search and the different pairs of propositions describing whether
an individual is at the source of the crime stain. These analyses evaluate the
desirability associated with the decision of ‘individualizing’ (and ‘not individu-
alizing’). They point out that this decision is a function of (i) the probability
that the individual in question is, in fact, at the source of the crime stain (i.e.,
the state of nature), and (ii) the decision maker’s preferences among the possible
consequences of the decision (i.e., the decision maker’s loss function). We discuss
the relevance and argumentative implications of these insights with respect to
recent comments in specialized literature, which suggest points of view that are
opposed to the results of our study.
11.1 Introduction
The ‘classical’ database search problem, as it is known throughout forensic and legal theory
and practice, relates to a question of the following kind: “What is the strength of the
evidence against a given individual found through a database search, when that individual
is the only person in the database who presents the same analytical characteristics (such as
a DNA profile) as those observed on a crime stain?” After intense and controversial debates,
starting in the mid-1990s, and which seemed to have been settled during the last decade, the
Reprinted from Forensic Science International, 222, S. Gittelson, A. Biedermann, S. Bozza,
and F. Taroni, The database search problem: A question of rational decision making, pages
186-199, Copyright (2012), with permission from Elsevier.
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database search problem has once more become the object of several publications (Schneider
et al., 2010; Taroni et al., 2011; Fimmers et al., 2011; Biedermann et al., 2011a). In particular,
Schneider et al. (2010) and Fimmers et al. (2011) recently claimed that a single matching
profile found through a database search reduces the evidential value of this match compared
to a match found by other investigational means (i.e., a situation in which no database
search was conducted). However, there are now ample counterarguments demonstrating that
this is a misconception (e.g., Balding and Donnelly, 1996; Evett and Weir, 1998; Donnelly
and Friedman, 1999; Evett et al., 2000a; Dawid, 2001; Balding, 2002) dating back to the
NRC reports (National Research Council (NRC) Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic
Science, 1992; National Research Council (NRC) Committee on DNA Forensic Science: An
Update, 1996) and writings by Stockmarr (1999). These latter accounts are constructed
around a conceptually unsuitable pair of propositions, defined as follows:
Hdb: the source of the crime stain is in the database;¬Hdb: the source of the crime stain is not in the database.
This contradicts probabilistic arguments that demonstrate an increase in the evidential value
of a single database match when one considers the conventional and procedurally appropriate
pair of propositions, which take the form of:
Hi: the crime stain comes from individual i;¬Hi: the crime stain comes from someone else unrelated to individual i;
where i = 1, . . . ,N , and N is the size of the population of individuals who could have been
at the source of the crime stain. The increase for this pair of propositions is due to the
exclusion of n−1 non-matching profiles (where n denotes the size of the database searched).
This argument is now covered to a great extent in existing literature (e.g., Balding and
Donnelly, 1996; Evett and Weir, 1998; Donnelly and Friedman, 1999; Evett et al., 2000a;
Dawid, 2001; Balding, 2002; Balding and Donnelly, 1995; Kaye, 2009), and currently appears
to accumulate the most widespread support.
In their recent publication, Fimmers et al. (2011) seek to take their argument in support
of a decrease in the value of a database match a step further: they addressed the act of
convicting a suspect and the probability that this conviction is false. That is, they passed
from a purely probabilistic discourse to an argument invoking the act of choosing a particular
option among several possible options. Their argumentation consists of a hypothetical case,
in which investigators search for the individual at the source of a biological stain recovered on
a crime scene. The investigators in this case consider a population of 100 million individuals
(N = 108) as the population of potential sources, and possess a database containing the
profiles of one million of these individuals (n = 106). In this population, the DNA profile of
the crime stain has a match probability of γ = 10−6. However, in their example, Fimmers
et al. (2011) assume that the true source of the crime stain is not in the population considered
by the investigators, that is, not among the N = 108 individuals, and consequently, not
among the n = 106 profiles in the database (since the database contains profiles taken from
the population of the N = 108 individuals). Assuming that “a suspect will certainly be
convicted in every case in which the rarity of the corresponding DNA profile is [at least] one
in a million” (Fimmers et al., 2011, page 4),1 that is, when γ ≤ 10−6, they then compare
the probability of a false conviction in a probable cause case2 to the probability of a false
conviction in a database search case3 for an incriminating profile with a match probability
of 10−6:
1Translation by the current authors, and words in square brackets added by the current authors.
2In a probable cause case (also referred to as the confirmation case (Donnelly and Friedman, 1999; Kaye,
2009)), a suspect found on the basis of information not related to the DNA profile has a profile that is
subsequently found to match the crime mark’s profile.
3In a database search case (also referred to as the trawl case (Donnelly and Friedman, 1999; Kaye, 2009)),
a search in a database results in a single hit with an individual, who then becomes a suspect in this case
because of the matching profile.
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 probable cause case: “There is a suspect. The DNA profile of that person is determined
and found to correspond to that of the crime stain. The person is going to be convicted
on the sole basis of this correspondence. Given the assumptions in this example, we
know that the conviction is erroneous, because the true author has escaped. How high
are the odds, in our scenario, of this to happen by chance? The probability of the
DNA profile is 1:1,000,000 and this is the probability for a correspondence by chance
with the stain. The probability for a false decision is thus 0.000001.” (Fimmers et al.,
2011, page 4)4
 database search case: “There is no suspect. A search in the database is conducted,
and exactly one person is found. That person is convicted on the basis of the same
argument as that in scenario 1 [the probable cause case]. The conviction is of course,
again, false, because the data of the true author are not stored in the database. What
is the probability for such a false decision? The answer is somewhat more complicated
than that in scenario 1 [the probable cause case]. An error occurs notably when
exactly one person is found in the database. (. . . ) We will find exactly one person
with a probability of 0.368 (that is in approximately every third similar case), and
this person will subsequently be convicted, even though the true author is not in the
database. The probability for an error in scenario 2 [the database search case] is
therefore considerably greater than in scenario 1 [the probable cause case].” (Fimmers
et al., 2011, page 4)5
Based on this reasoning, Fimmers et al. argue (page 4):
“The simple evaluation using a likelihood ratio, as proposed by Taroni et al.
(2010) is appropriate for the first scenario [the probable cause case], yet pro-
duces an unjustifiably high number of false decisions in the second scenario [the
database search case]”.5
This is questionable, however, because a likelihood ratio in no way amounts to a categor-
ical conclusion with respect to the process of individualization (i.e., the attribution of the
trace to a single source to the exclusion of all other potential sources) (Biedermann et al.,
2011a). In Fimmers et al. (2011)’s framework, every match results in a wrong individual-
ization. Since every comparison of the crime stain’s profile with the profile of an individual
in the population has a probability of 10−6 of leading to a match, every comparison has a
probability of 10−6 of leading to a false individualization. It is therefore hardly surprising
that Fimmers et al.’s probability of a false individualization increases with the number of
comparisons performed. In other words, one comparison in the probable cause case has a
probability of
γ = 10−6
of matching the crime stain’s profile, whereas one million comparisons in the database search
case have a probability of
nγ(1 − γ)n−1 = 0.368
of leading to a match with the crime stain’s profile. This reasoning process consists of an
unrealistic deduction based solely on the evidence (i.e., the observed match and the match
probability of the crime stain’s profile). It is combined with an unusual definition of a
population of potential sources, which does not contain the true source, and a definition of
the decision as a categorical consequence of a match whenever γ ≤ 10−6.
There are many points to discuss regarding the arguments advanced by Fimmers et al.
(2011). This paper treats the following three aspects:
A) the decision of ‘individualizing’ an individual as the source of a crime stain having a
match probability of γ = 10−6 in a population of 100 million potential souces (N = 108)
4Translation by the current authors.
5Translation by the current authors, and words in square brackets added by the current authors.
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after obtaining a single hit with this individual in a database containing 1 million of
these potential sources (n = 106);
B) the assumption that the true source of the crime stain is not in the population considered
by the investigators; and
C) the conclusion that a probability of a false individualization is considerably greater in
the database search case than in the probable cause case.
Throughout this paper, we will refer to these claims as points A, B and C.
11.2 Structure and contents of this paper
In this paper, we invoke decision theory to analyze the issue of how to decide to ‘convict’,
or rather to ‘individualize’, the matching individual found in a database. The aim is to
compare Fimmers et al. (2011)’s conclusions (points A, B and C) with the results obtained
from a decision-theoretic approach to the database search problem. Section 11.3 will present
a decision-theoretic approach to the database search problem, using the visual representa-
tion of an influence diagram to clarify the relationships between the set of target decisions
and the variables that pertain to the database search scenario formulated in its traditional
version (which focused solely on probabilistic inference, rather than on decision making).
This section uses the influence diagram to examine points A and B. We study the normative
decision-theoretic framework in further detail in Section 11.4, in order to determine in which
situations a rational decision maker would individualize the selected person. This section
discusses point A in further detail. Section 11.5 examines the probability of a false individ-
ualization for a rational decision maker, and studies how this probability is regulated by the
decision maker’s personal objectives and preferences. It concludes by comparing our results
with the assertion made in point C. Section 11.6 summarizes the insights provided by this
study, and discusses them with regard to Fimmers et al. (2011)’s argument.
Note that the decision of ‘convicting’ or ‘individualizing’ is made on the basis of the
probability distribution over the propositions, and must therefore be on the same hierarchical
level as the propositions in the hierarchy of propositions (Cook et al., 1998b). Fimmers
et al. (2011)’s hypothetical case addresses the decision at the crime level in this hierarchy,
speaking of ‘convicting’ as the decision. In this paper, we prefer staying at the source level
(the decision of ‘individualizing’), since all of our propositions (see Section 11.1) are on this
level. Note that, mathematically, the crime level analysis is equivalent to the source level
analysis if one assumes maximal relevance for the crime stain (i.e., if one assumes that the
crime stain certainly comes from the perpetrator) (e.g., Aitken and Taroni, 2004).
11.3 A decision-theoretic approach to the database search
problem
11.3.1 Preliminaries
Decision theory has provided a logical framework for solving several forensic decision prob-
lems (Taroni et al., 2005, 2007; Biedermann et al., 2008a; Taroni et al., 2010). Here, we are
interested in the process of ‘individualization’, that is, the attribution of a trace to a single
source to the exclusion of all other potential sources. Notably, the act of ‘individualizing’, or
‘not individualizing’, a person or an object can be conceptualized as a decision made on the
basis of the inferences resulting from the probabilistic evaluation of evidence (Biedermann
et al., 2008a). This idea is also applicable to a situation in which an individual is selected
through a database search. In this section, we present the database search problem from
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such a decision-theoretic point of view. Section 11.3.2 defines the ingredients for a decision-
theoretic approach, and Section 11.3.3 translates these concepts into an influence diagram
to clarify the logical relationships between the decision of individualizing and the variables
in the database search problem.
11.3.2 Elements of decision theory
Decision theory provides a normative model for making rational decisions under uncertainty.6
It provides a mechanism for combining a measurement of the uncertainty relating to the
target propositions that are an integral part of the decision problem, with a measurement of
the decision maker’s preferences concerning the possible outcomes of the decision (e.g., von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Savage, 1951; Pratt et al., 1964). Its application follows
a set of well defined rules invoking the theoretical notions defined and explained below.
Actions
A decision consists of choosing one action from a set of possible actions. For this, the initial
set of possible actions must be an exhaustive list of mutually exclusive actions from which
the decision maker will choose exactly one.
The decision that interests us here is that of formally individualizing an individual i,
i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, as the source of the trace recovered on the crime scene. For the sake of
illustration, let us call individual i Mr. Smith. With regard to Mr. Smith, an investigator
(e.g., an investigating magistrate, hereafter referred to as the decision maker) has an action
space consisting of:
ai: individualize Mr. Smith as the source of the trace recovered on the crime scene;¬ai: not individualize Mr. Smith as the source of the trace recovered on the crime scene.
The difficulty in choosing one of these two actions resides in the uncertainty surrounding
the true state of nature (defined below). That is, the outcome of the decision does not
depend exclusively on the action chosen, but also upon the true state of one or several
variables, on which the decision maker has no influence.
States of nature
In decision theory, the variables that affect the degree of satisfaction the decision maker
obtains from choosing a particular action are called the states of nature (or the states of the
world). Their true state is unknown to the decision maker at the time of making the decision,
and may remain unknown to the decision maker even after having made the decision.
In the case of individualizing a suspect, the satisfaction obtained from the outcome
depends on whether the trace truly comes from that individual: that is, a correct individu-
alization is desirable, whereas a wrong individualization is undesirable (Biedermann et al.,
2008a). For actions ai and ¬ai, the states of nature are therefore the pair of propositions:
Hi: the crime stain comes from Mr. Smith;¬Hi: the crime stain comes from someone else unrelated to Mr. Smith.
Since the actual source of the crime stain is never known with certainty (e.g., Kaplan,
1968), the decision maker requires a probability distribution over the possible states. This
probability distribution will depend on the information available to the decision maker
at the time of making the decision. In this paper, we consider the decision after having
searched the database and found a single match with Mr. Smith. Therefore we consider
6Rational decision making is understood here as a coherent decision making process that obeys the laws
of probability (Lindley, 1985). We use the term ‘rational’ as a synonym of ‘coherent’ meaning the opposite
of ‘incoherent’, in the sense that ‘incoherent’ decisions may lead to losses such as Dutch books (e.g., Lindley,
1985; Press, 2003).
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Table 11.1: Combining the possible actions, ai (individualize Mr. Smith) and ¬ai (not individualize
Mr. Smith) with the possible states of nature, Hi (the crime stain comes from Mr. Smith) and ¬Hi (the
crime stain does not come from Mr. Smith) forms four possible consequences, denoted Ck, k = 1, . . . ,4. To
describe the desirability of each of these consequences, we assign a loss value to each one: a minimal loss
of 0 for a correct conclusion, and losses of λ and 1 for incorrect conclusions, such that the loss of a miss
(incorrectly not individualizing Mr. Smith) is a fraction λ of the loss of a false individualization.
ai ¬ai
Hi ¬Hi Hi ¬Hi
consequence: C1 C2 C3 C4
loss: l(C1) = 0 l(C2) = 1 l(C3) = λ l(C4) = 0
a situation where Mr. Smith is an individual registered in the database, that is, where
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We denote the probabilities of Hi and ¬Hi posterior to the database search as
Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) and Pr(¬Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn), where
Mi, represents a match between the crime stain’s DNA profile and Mr. Smith’s DNA
profile, and Xj , j = 1, . . . , n and j ≠ i, a non-match between the crime stain’s DNA profile
and the DNA profile of individual j.
Consequences
The combination of the states of nature with the possible actions produces the possible
outcomes, or consequences, of the decision. In this case, the combination of ai and ¬ai
with Hi and ¬Hi produces four possible consequences (Table 11.1). We denote these Ck,
k = 1, . . . ,4:
C1: correctly individualize Mr. Smith as the source of the crime stain;
C2: incorrectly individualize Mr. Smith as the source of the crime stain;
C3: incorrectly not individualize Mr. Smith as the source of the crime stain;
C4: correctly not individualize Mr. Smith as the source of the crime stain.
Of these four consequences, the decision maker considers the correct conclusions C1 and
C4 as desirable outcomes, and the incorrect conclusions C2 and C3 as undesirable outcomes.
To represent these preferences, the decision maker must quantify the ‘satisfaction’ obtained
from each consequence. Several scales exist for this quantification. What is important is not
so much which scale (because one can translate the values from one scale into another scale),
but how the different values assigned to the possible consequences relate to each other. Here,
we have chosen losses with a scale ranging from 0 to 1, because (i) this scale allows us to
introduce 0’s for the most desirable outcomes, which reduces the complexity of the equations
that follow, and (ii) it facilitates the quantification of the desirability or undesirability of
intermediate consequences (see Appendix).
Losses
A loss, denoted l(Ck), k = 1, . . . ,4, is defined as a non-negative number, such that the
larger this value, the less desirable the consequence it describes (e.g., Lindley, 1985; Press,
2003). Here, we use a scale ranging from 0, for the best consequence, to 1, for the worst
consequence.7 The best consequence therefore has a minimal loss value of 0. Here, we
consider the best consequence as that of reaching a correct conclusion, and assign loss values
of 0 to consequences C1 and C4:
l(C1) = 0 and l(C4) = 0 .
7For a more detailed and technical explanation of this scale, the loss function and how these relate to
utilities, we refer the interested reader to the Appendix.
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For the incorrect conclusions, the loss values l(C2) and l(C3) reflect the extent of the loss
of one false conclusion with regard to the loss of the other false conclusion (Taroni et al.,
2010, pp. 337-338). The legal principle that it is better to acquit a guilty offender than
to convict an innocent person (e.g., Blackstone, 1765-1769; Hale, 1847; Fortescue, 1917)8
advocates associating a greater loss with a false individualization (C2) than with the miss
of an individualization (i.e., an incorrect non-individualization, C3):
9
l(C2) > l(C3) . (11.1)
We therefore assign the maximal loss value of 1 to a false individualization:
l(C2) = 1 ,
and use the parameter λ to designate the loss of a missed individualization:
l(C3) = λ .
Generally, λ is defined as 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, yet if Eq. (11.1) is true and with C1 and C4 being the
most favorable outcomes, we have 0 < λ < 1. Table 11.1 presents a summary of the losses
associated with each of the four possible consequences.
The loss of a miss is a fraction λ of the loss of an incorrect individualization. The exact
value for λ will vary from one decision maker to another, because it reflects that decision
maker’s personal preferences among the possible consequences of the decision. For example,
someone who believes that 1 false individualization is as undesirable as 10 missed individu-
alizations will act according to λ = 1
10
, and somebody who believes 1 false individualization
to be as undesirable as 100 missed individualizations will act according to λ = 1
100
. For a
more technical explanation of this loss function, see the Appendix.
Minimizing the expected loss
The most rational action is the one that minimizes the expected loss (e.g., Lindley, 1985;
Press, 2003). The rational decision maker will therefore choose the action with the minimum
expected loss. The expected loss of each action, denoted l¯(⋅), is the sum of the losses of the
possible consequences of that action, weighted by the probabilities of these consequences
actually occurring:
l¯(ai) = l(C1)Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)+l(C2)Pr(¬Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)= Pr(¬Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) , (11.2)
and
l¯(¬ai) = l(C3)Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)+l(C4)Pr(¬Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)= λ × Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) . (11.3)
Given that
Pr(¬Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) = 1 − Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) ,
the expected losses are both linear functions of Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn). The
expected loss for ai is a decreasing function of Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn), with
a constant slope of -1. It does not depend on any other variables. The expected loss for ¬ai
8See for example Kaplan (1968).
9Here, we have extended the legal principle addressing the crime level to the issue treated at the source
level (see Cook et al. (1998b) for an explanation on source and crime levels in the hierarchy of propositions).
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Figure 11.1: The expected losses of individualizing, ai, and not individualizing, ¬ai, are linear func-
tions of Pr(Hi∣Mi,X2, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn). The rational decision maker chooses the action with
the smallest expected loss, indicated here with the bold lines. The point of intersection marking the
transition point between choosing ¬ai and choosing ai is a function of λ (i.e., the loss associated
with missing an individualization). This point corresponds to 1
1+λ . (a) For λ = 110 , this transition
point lies at Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) = 0.9090909. (b) For λ = 1100 , this transition is at
Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) = 0.9900990.
is an increasing function of Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn), with a slope equal to λ.
It will therefore vary according to the numerical value specified for λ. Fig. 11.1(a) plots the
two expected losses for λ = 1
10
, and Fig. 11.1(b) plots them for λ = 1
100
. The rational decision
maker will always choose the action with the smallest expected loss (indicated by the bold
lines in Fig. 11.1). The rational decision maker will therefore individualize the suspect if
and only if
l¯(ai) < l¯(¬ai) ,
in other words when
Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)
Pr(¬Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) > 1λ . (11.4)
This corresponds to intuition, which says that an individualization may only be justified
when the odds that the crime stain comes from this suspect are high. According to this
approach, there is a threshold value for these odds equal to 1
λ
, above which the decision
maker should individualize the suspect.
This is equivalent to saying, in terms of the probability that the crime stain comes from
the selected individual Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn), that an individualization is
rational for
Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) > 1
1 + λ . (11.5)
The expression 1
1+λ designates the transition point at which the decision maker is indif-
ferent between ai and ¬ai. This point is the point of intersection of the two functions in
each of the graphs in Fig. 11.1 (i.e., 0.9090909 for λ = 1
10
in Fig. 11.1(a), and 0.9900990
for λ = 1
100
in Fig. 11.1(b)). Again in agreement with intuition, these graphs show that
the smaller λ, the smaller the range of Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) for which the
decision maker chooses ai. In other words, a decision maker who regards 1 false individual-
ization as being as undesirable as 100 missed individualizations (λ = 1
100
) requires a higher
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Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) to justify an individualization than a decision maker
who valuates 1 false individualization as being as undesirable as only 10 missed individual-
izations (λ = 1
10
).
We discuss the meaning and implications of this threshold in further detail in Section
11.4. The next section explains how the decision of individualizing a suspect fits into the
entire context of the database search problem.
11.3.3 Influence diagrams
The authors in Biedermann et al. (2011a) presented a Bayesian network modeling the deci-
sion as a categorical consequence according to the reasoning described in Fimmers et al.’s
example. We can reformulate this model, made up entirely of probabilistic nodes, by intro-
ducing elements of decision theory. A decision theoretic approach consists of constructing
an influence diagram.
Influence diagrams, or Bayesian decision networks, extend probabilistic models, such as
Bayesian networks, to incorporate loss functions and action nodes (e.g., Jensen and Nielsen,
2007; Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008). These allow the user to compute expected losses for
the possible actions, in addition to updating probability distributions over the unknown
variables. Representing the database search problem as an influence diagram allows us to
clarify the relationships existing between the variables in this problem and the decision of
individualizing a suspect.
The aim of this section is to illustrate how each of the two pairs of propositions presented
in the introduction (see Section 11.1) relates to the decision of individualizing a source. For
this, we consider pair {Hi,¬Hi}, concerning whether the crime stain comes from Mr. Smith
(i.e., individual i), in a node labeled Hi, and pair {Hdb,¬Hdb}, concerning whether the
source of the crime stain is in the database, in a node labeled Hdb. This database contains
the profiles of individuals 1, . . . , n. Since we defined i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the profile of Mr. Smith
is registered in the database.
Fig. 11.2 presents two possible influence diagrams for the database search problem. In
addition to nodes Hi and Hdb, these models contain:
 Node N : This numerical node allows the user to specify the size of the population of
potential sources considered by the investigators. Here, we set N = 108.
 Node n: This numerical node indicates the size of the database representing the pop-
ulation of interest. We set n = 106.
 Node γ: This numerical node gives the match probability of the crime stain’s profile
in the population of interest. We set γ = 10−6.
 Node S in N : This is a Boolean node that indicates whether the source of the crime
stain is actually in the population of size N considered by the investigators as the
population of potential sources.
 Node Mi: This node contains state Mi, describing a match between the crime stain’s
profile and Mr. Smith’s profile, and state ¬Mi, for the absence of such a match. The
probability of the match depends on whether the crime stain comes from Mr. Smith.
If it comes from Mr. Smith, we assume that no laboratory errors are possible such
that a match is certain. If it comes from someone else, the probability of observing a
match with the profile of Mr. Smith is given by the profile’s match probability, γ, in
the population of potential donors. The probability table for this node is:
Hi: Hi ¬Hi
Mi: Pr(Mi) 1 γ
Pr(¬Mi) 0 1 − γ
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 Node X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn: This node contains the state
X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn to describe the event of observing a non-match for individu-
als 1, . . . , i−1, i+1, . . . , n in the database. Its complement, ¬{X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn},
describes all of the other possible results of a comparison of these registered profiles
with the crime stain’s profile. The probability of obtaining exactly n − 1 non-matches
in a database search follows a binomial distribution with n−1 trials and a success prob-
ability of γ. Assuming that no laboratory errors occurred and that there’s a match
between the crime stain’s profile and Mr. Smith’s profile, there are only two situations
in which it is possible to obtain n−1 non-matches: (i) when the crime stain comes from
Mr. Smith, and (ii) when Mr. Smith is not the donor of the crime stain and the true
donor is not in the database. For, if the true donor is in the database and this donor
is not Mr. Smith, one would observe n − 2 non-matches, since there would have to
be an additional match with this true donor. Therefore, the conditional probabilities
associated with X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn depend on both Hi and Hdb, as shown in
the following probability table:
Hi: Hi ¬Hi
Hdb: Hdb ¬Hdb Hdb ¬Hdb
X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn:
Pr(X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) (1 − γ)n−1 n/a 0 (1 − γ)n−1
Pr(¬{X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn}) 1 − (1 − γ)n−1 n/a 1 1 − (1 − γ)n−1
The ‘n/a’ in the second column of the table stands for ‘not applicable’. The combi-
nation of the states Hi and ¬Hdb is in fact impossible because Mr. Smith is in the
database. In other words, if the crime stain comes from Mr. Smith (proposition Hi),
then the source of the crime stain must be in the database (proposition Hdb), since
Mr. Smith is in the database.
 Node A: This is the action node. It contains ai, the action of individualizing Mr.
Smith, and ¬ai, the action of not individualizing Mr. Smith.
 Node L: This node contains the losses defined for each of the possible consequences
(see Table 11.1).
There are two possibilities for constructing an influence diagram containing these nodes
(Fig. 11.2(a) and 11.2(b)). The difference between the two lies in the direction of the arrow
between nodes Hi and Hdb. This dependence relationship may be modeled in both directions,
and produces the same result:
 Hi → Hdb (Fig. 11.2(a)): In this case, we first consider whether Mr. Smith is at the
source of the trace, and then, in a second step, specify for proposition ¬Hi whether
the ‘someone else’ is in the database. It is clear that if the source of the crime stain
is not in the population of size N considered by the investigators (i.e., S in N =
false), then the marginal probabilities of propositions Hi and Hdb are both equal to
0 (see Biedermann et al. (2011a)). If, however, the source of the crime stain is in the
population considered (i.e., S in N = true), then we relate the probabilities for Hi
and Hdb to the size of this population of potential sources and the size of the database
as follows:
S in N : true
Hi: Pr(Hi) 1N
Pr(¬Hi) 1 − 1N
S in N : true
Hi: Hi ¬Hi
Hdb: Pr(Hdb) 1 n−1N−1
Pr(¬Hdb) 0 N−nN−1
For a situation in which S in N = true, the marginal probability of proposition Hi
is thus one over the total number of individuals in the population of interest, and
135
CHAPTER 11. THE DATABASE SEARCH PROBLEM: A QUESTION OF
RATIONAL DECISION MAKING
γ
N
A S in N
n
M
H
L
dbH
i
i
(a)
n1 i+1X ,...,X    ,X    ,...,Xi−1
γ
N
A S in N
n
M
H
L
dbH
(b)
i
i
n1 i+1X ,...,X    ,X    ,...,Xi−1
Figure 11.2: Two influence diagrams representing the decision of individualizing a suspect found as the only
match in a database search. The square node A contains the possible actions, in this case, ‘individualizing’
or ‘not individualizing’ the suspect as the source of the crime stain, and the diamond-shaped node L the
loss values defined by the decision maker for each of the possible consequences. The rest of the nodes are
variables. All of the probabilities in these nodes are determined by three variables: the size of the population
considered N , the size of the database representative of this population n, and the match probability γ of the
crime stain’s profile in the population of interest. Node S in N allows the user to introduce uncertainty on
whether the crime stain’s source is in the population considered. Node Mi describes the event of finding a
match between the crime stain’s profile and the profile of the suspect Mr. Smith (denoted here as individual
i), and node X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn the event of not finding a match with the crime stain’s profile among
the n − 1 other profiles in the database (denoted here as individuals 1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n). Nodes Hi and
Hdb differentiate between two pairs of propositions: node Hi contains the pair of propositions on whether
Mr. Smith (individual i) is the source of the crime stain, and node Hdb the pair of propositions on whether
the crime stain’s source is in the database. Note that the dependance relationship between these two pairs
of propositions may be modeled in either direction, producing two different structures for this influence
diagram: (a) Hi → Hdb, and (b) Hdb → Hi. The two influence diagrams produce the exact same results.
The text in section 11.3.3 describes the nodes in further detail, and presents the probability tables.
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the marginal probability of proposition Hdb reduces to the ratio of the number of
individuals in the database to the number of individuals in the population of interest:
Pr(Hdb∣S in N = true) = Pr(Hdb∣Hi, S in N = true) × Pr(Hi∣S in N = true)+ Pr(Hdb∣¬Hi, S in N = true) × Pr(¬Hi∣S in N = true)= 1 × 1
N
+ n − 1
N − 1 × N − 1N= n
N
. (11.6)
This ratio is equal to the probability assigned to Pr(Hdb∣S in N = true) in the prob-
ability table of node Hdb in the influence diagram of Fig. 11.2(b) (see below). It shows
that the marginal probability of proposition Hdb given S in N = true is identical in
the two influence diagrams.
This approach of conditioning the probability distribution over the pair of propositions
{Hdb,¬Hdb} on the pair of propositions {Hi,¬Hi} corresponds to Kaye’s reasoning
(Kaye, 2009): the probability of the donor not being in the database given the trace
does not come from Mr. Smith, i.e. N−n
N−1 in the table above, is equal to Kaye’s θ
(figuring in the appendix of Kaye (2009)).
 Hdb → Hi (Fig. 11.2(b)): Here, we first specify whether the donor of the crime stain
is in the database, and then, in the second step, consider whether this donor is Mr.
Smith. Again, the marginal probabilities of propositions Hi and Hdb are equal to 0
when the source of the crime stain is not in the population considered (S in N =
false) (Biedermann et al., 2011a). If the source of the crime stain is in the population
(S in N = true), then generic probability assignments to this population of potential
sources produces the following probability tables:
S in N : true
Hdb: Hdb ¬Hdb
Hi: Pr(Hi) 1n 0
Pr(¬Hi) 1 − 1n 1
S in N : true
Hdb: Pr(Hdb) nN
Pr(¬Hdb) 1 − nN
For a situation in which S in N = true, the marginal probability of proposition Hdb
is the number of individuals in the database divided by the number of individuals in
the population of interest, and the marginal probability of Hi reduces to one over the
size of the population of interest:
Pr(Hi∣S in N = true) = Pr(Hi∣Hdb, S in N = true) × Pr(Hdb∣S in N = true)+ Pr(Hi∣¬Hdb, S in N = true) × Pr(¬Hdb∣S in N = true)= 1
n
× n
N
+ 0 × N − n
N= 1
N
. (11.7)
This ratio is equal to the probability assigned to Pr(Hi∣S in N = true) in the proba-
bility table of node Hi in the influence diagram of Fig. 11.2(a) (see above). It shows
that the marginal probability of proposition Hi given S in N = true is identical in the
two influence diagrams.
Hence, the approaches in Fig. 11.2(a) and 11.2(b) produce identical results, so that either of
them may be used. For the rest of this paper, we have chosen to use the influence diagram
in Fig. 11.2(b).
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Figure 11.3: Expanded representation of the influence diagram presented in Fig. 11.2(b) for Fimmers
et al.’s scenario, in which it is assumed that the crime stain’s source is not in the population of size N
considered by the investigators (i.e., S in N = false). Node A indicates the expected losses on a scale from
0 (the minimum loss) to 1 (the maximum loss), and node L the arithmetic mean of the expected losses of all
of the possible actions. The losses are defined in Table 11.1, here with λ = 1
10
. The rest of the nodes indicate
probabilities in %. The nodes with bold borders are the nodes instantiated by the user, i.e., containing states
whose probabilities have been set to 1. (a) The most rational action before searching the database is not
to individualize individual i. (b) After finding a single match in the database with individual i, the most
rational action is still to ‘not individualize’ this person.
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Figure 11.4: Expanded representation of the influence diagram presented in Fig. 11.2(b) for the scenario
where the crime stain’s source is in the population of size N considered by the investigators (i.e., S in N
= true). Node A indicates the expected losses on a scale from 0 (the minimum loss) to 1 (the maximum
loss), and node L the arithmetic mean of the expected losses of all of the possible actions. The losses are
defined in Table 11.1, here with λ = 1
10
. The rest of the nodes indicate probabilities in %. The nodes with
bold borders are the nodes instantiated by the user, i.e., containing states whose probabilities have been set
to 1. (a) The most rational action before searching the database is not to individualize individual i. (b)
The result of a single match with individual i after searching the database has decreased the expected loss
of individualizing this person and increased the expected loss of not individualizing him/her, yet the most
rational action remains ‘not to individualize’.
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11.3.4 Example
Fig. 11.3 shows the results produced by the influence diagram described in Section 11.3.3
(i.e., Fig. 11.2(b)) for the case presented by Fimmers et al. (2011). Here, we investigate the
scenario using the numerical values summarized in point A, with the assumption given in
point B, which prescribes that S in N = false. We oppose this case to a situation in which
S in N = true (Fig. 11.4), in other words, where we relax the assumption of point B, and
use only the numerical values of point A. For the purpose of illustration, we set λ = 1
10
.
Node A gives the expected losses for ‘individualizing’ and ‘not individualizing’ Mr. Smith.
We observe that:
 For S in N = false (Fig. 11.3), the result of the database search has no impact on the
decision. The expected loss of ‘not individualizing’ Mr. Smith has the minimal value
of 0 before searching the database, and remains 0 after this search. In this case, the
rational decision maker will definitely not individualize Mr. Smith. As an alternative
representation, Fig. 11.5(a) gives the decision tree for this decision process.
 For S in N = true (Fig. 11.4), the expected loss for ‘individualizing’ decreases from
1 to 0.99, and the expected loss for ‘not individualizing’ increases from 10−9 to 10−3.
This change is due to the evolution of the probability distribution over propositions
Hi and ¬Hi, which determines the expected losses according to Eq. (11.2) and (11.3).
Notice how the influence diagram clearly demonstrates that this change in expected
losses cannot come from the probability distribution over propositions Hdb and ¬Hdb
since, in this particular case, this probability distribution is the same before and after
observing the single match in the database.10 According to the updated expected
losses, however, the most rational decision is still ‘not to individualize’ Mr. Smith,
even after this individual produced the one and only match in the database. This
decision process is shown as a decision tree in Fig. 11.5(b).
These observations lead to the following conclusions:
 Between the two pairs of propositions {Hi, ¬Hi} and {Hdb, ¬Hdb}, it is pair {Hi,¬Hi} which has a direct impact on the decision of individualizing Mr. Smith. Pair
Hdb only has an impact when it changes the probability distribution in node Hi. That
is, given the probability distribution over pair {Hi, ¬Hi}, the rational decision maker
does not need to know the probability distribution over pair {Hdb, ¬Hdb} to choose
between ‘individualizing’ and ‘not individualizing’ Mr. Smith. This reflects the states
of nature in this decision problem, which are {Hi, ¬Hi}, not {Hdb, ¬Hdb}.
 Clearly, it is unreasonable to individualize the suspect in the scenario described by the
numerical values in point A. In the situation presented by Fig. 11.3 (which includes
point B), we know that the suspect is not the source. In the situation presented by
Fig. 11.4 (without point B), the suspect only has a probability of 0.01 of being the
source. In either case, it is unsafe to ‘individualize’ the selected person.
In view of these analyses, it thus appears that Fimmers et al. (2011) should not proceed
with an individualization in their hypothetical scenario. The question that now remains
is in what situations one could individualize a single matching individual found through a
database search. We explore this question in the next section.
10This is a coincidence due to the numerical values of N = 108, n = 106 and γ = 10−6. Before the database
search, the marginal probability of Hdb is equal to
n
N
, and after finding a single hit in the database, this
probability is 1
1+γ(N−n) (Balding and Donnelly, 1995). With N = 108, n = 106 and γ = 10−6, this gives us
n
N
= 106
108
= 1
100
and 1
1+γ(N−n) = 11+10−6(108−106) = 1100 . Notice also how the influence diagram presents the
concept of post-data equivalence between the two pairs of propositions. That is, the database search updates
the marginal probability of Hi from
1
N
to 1
1+γ(N−n) after finding a single match in the database. This is
the same posterior probability as for Hdb, because the exclusion of all the other individuals in the database
has made the propositions logically equivalent (Dawid, 2001).
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Figure 11.5: The decision tree for individualizing or not individualizing Mr. Smith, with λ = 1
10
. The
branches branching off of a square indicate the possible actions, and the branches branching off of a circle
the states of nature. The numbers below the latter indicate the probability distribution over the states of
nature. The values at the end of each branch, on the right-hand side, indicate the loss of the consequence
obtained by following the branches from left to right to that end of the tree. The expected losses for each
action are given at the end of each action branch, below each circle. The rational decision maker chooses the
action which minimizes the expected loss, denoted here as the optimal action aopt ∈ {ai,¬ai}. This action’s
expected loss is indicated below the square. The double lines bar the branch of the irrational action (i.e.,
the action that does not minimize the expected loss). (a) The tree for S in N = false, corresponding to the
situation modeled by the influence diagram in Fig. 11.3. (b) The tree for S in N = true, corresponding to
the situation modeled by the influence diagram in Fig. 11.4.
11.4 Decision-theoretic analysis of individualizing a sus-
pect found through a database search
11.4.1 Preliminaries
According to Figs. 11.3 and 11.4 where the loss function is specified for λ = 1
10
, it is not
rational to individualize a suspect found through a database search given the numerical
values presented in Fimmers et al.’s hypothetical case (i.e., N = 108, n = 106 and γ = 10−6 as
given in point A). If the assumption in point B holds (i.e., S in N = false), it is impossible for
the crime stain to come from Mr. Smith, because the crime stain does not come from someone
in the population considered by the investigators, and Mr. Smith is in this population
considered by the investigators. Therefore the assumption in point B produces
Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) = 0 ,
such that Eq. (11.2) and (11.3) are equal to
l¯(ai) = 1 and l¯(¬a1) = 0 ,
respectively. In this case, the most rational action is always ¬ai, regardless of the value of
λ. If we relax the assumption made in point B such that the crime stain’s source is in the
population considered by the investigators (an assumption we shall maintain throughout the
rest of this paper to make a decision-theoretic analysis of the problem possible), the decision
of individualizing Mr. Smith rests on two values (Eq. (11.5)):
 Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn), the probability that Mr. Smith is the source
of the crime stain, and
 λ, the relative loss of missing an individualization with regard to the loss of falsely
individualizing a source.
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In this section, we analyze the decision of individualizing Mr. Smith with regard to each of
these parameters. Section 11.4.2 examines the impact of Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)
on this decision, and Section 11.4.3 the impact of λ.
11.4.2 Impact of Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) on the decision
of individualizing
Consider a decision maker for whom λ = 1
10
(i.e., this decision maker considers 1 false
individualization to be as undesirable as 10 missed individualizations). For a decision maker
with a predefined value for λ, the decision of individualizing will depend entirely on the
posterior probability of the person in question being the source of the trace. According to
Eq. (11.5), the decision maker will individualize a person whenever
Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) > 0.9090909 .
Assuming that each member of the population of potential sources initially has the same
probability of being at the source of the crime stain, a single hit in the database with Mr.
Smith produces a posterior probability of
Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) = 1
1 + γ(N − n) (11.8)
that this individual is at the source of the crime stain (Balding and Donnelly, 1995). The
posterior probability for Hi is therefore a function of the match probability of the crime
stain’s profile, the number of individuals in the population of potential sources, and the
number of these individuals who are registered in the database searched. Note that this
posterior probability is also a function of the prior probability of the selected individual
being the source of the crime stain, Pr(Hi).11 Here, this analysis assigns a prior probability
of 1
N
, so that the dependence of the posterior probability of Hi on the population size N
also reflects the dependence of this posterior probability on its prior probability.
First, let us consider a crime stain profile with a match probability of γ = 10−6 in the
population of interest. In this case, the decision maker will only individualize the sin-
gle matching individual if the search in the database has excluded enough individuals to
raise the posterior probability above the threshold of 0.9090909. For N = 108, this is at-
tained when the database size exceeds 99.8999989% of the population of interest. Therefore
Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) increases as the proportion of the members of the
population of interest who are registered in the database increases. For the purpose of
illustration, Fig. 11.6(a) shows Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) in function of this
proportion, i.e. n
N
, for γ = 10−6 and N = 108. In a population of 100 million (N = 108),
99.8999989% of this population corresponds to a database of size n = 99,899,999. This is
the size necessary to individualize a single matching individual in the database search. It
leaves us with 100’001 people outside the database about whom we know nothing on the
11Bayes’ theorem, together here with the law of total probability, provides the relationship between the
posterior probability Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) and the prior probability Pr(Hi) (e.g., Aitken
and Taroni, 2004):
Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)
= Pr(Mi∣Hi) × Pr(Hi∣X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)
Pr(Mi∣X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)
= Pr(Mi∣Hi) × Pr(Hi∣X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)
Pr(Mi∣Hi) × Pr(Hi∣X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) + Pr(Mi∣¬Hi) × Pr(¬Hi∣X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)
= Pr(Mi∣Hi)Pr(X1,...,Xi−1,Xi+1,...,Xn ∣Hi) × Pr(Hi)Pr(X1,...,Xi−1,Xi+1,...,Xn)
Pr(Mi∣Hi) × Pr(X1,...,Xi−1,Xi+1,...,Xn ∣Hi) × Pr(Hi)Pr(X1,...,Xi−1,Xi+1,...,Xn) + Pr(Mi∣¬Hi) × Pr(X1,...,Xi−1,Xi+1,...,Xn ∣¬Hi) × Pr(¬Hi)Pr(X1,...,Xi−1,Xi+1,...,Xn)
= Pr(Mi∣Hi)Pr(X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn∣Hi)Pr(Hi)
Pr(Mi∣Hi)Pr(X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn∣Hi)Pr(Hi) + Pr(Mi∣¬Hi)Pr(X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn∣¬Hi)Pr(¬Hi) ,
with Pr(¬Hi) = 1 − Pr(Hi).
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Figure 11.6: The probability of a single matching individual in a database to be at the source of the crime
stain is a function of the size of the population of potential crime stain donors N , the number of these
individuals who are registered in the database n, and the match probability of the crime stain’s profile γ.
(a) For γ = 10−6 and N = 108, the proportion of individuals in the database has a small impact on this
probability, unless the database covers almost the entire population of interest. (b) and (c) In general,
the individualization threshold (Eq. (11.5)) may be reached by either increasing n
N
(x-axis in (b) and the
different curves in (c)) or decreasing Nγ (x-axis in (c) and the different curves in (b)).
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matching status. This is not unreasonable, because the prior probabilities are very low for
each person. Thus, in this case, a rational decision maker will only individualize a single
matching individual from a database search when the database contains practically the entire
population of potential crime stain donors.
The above calculations for the database size are for γ = 10−6. This corresponds to a trace
whose match probability is 100 times greater than the inverse of the population size (i.e.,
γ = 100×N−1). In other words, one would expect to obtain about 100 matches (i.e., Nγ) in
this population if the crime stain’s profile were compared with every one of its members. If
the crime stain’s profile is rarer in the population considered (i.e., the match probability is
smaller), the proportion of individuals from the population of interest who are registered in
the database can be smaller and still justify the individualization of the matching individual.
Fig. 11.6(b) shows Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) in function of nN for Nγ equal to
10−2, 10−1, 100, 101, 102, and 103. The smaller γ, the smaller the proportion n
N
required to
attain a given Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn). Thus, the individualization threshold
can be reached by either increasing n
N
, or decreasing Nγ.
Second, let us concentrate on the latter point, and study the impact of γ on the probabil-
ity Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn). Fig. 11.6(c) illustrates how the difference in the
order of magnitude between the match probability and the size of the population of poten-
tial sources (represented here by log10(Nγ)) affects Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn).
For example, for N = 108 and n = 106 (this corresponds to a proportion of 1
100
members of
the population of interest registered in the database, and is depicted by the curve with the
continuous line in Fig. 11.6(c)), a value of
γ < 1.010101 × 10−9
raises Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) above the threshold of 0.9090909. This means
that for n
N
= 1
100
, a rational decision maker for whom λ = 1
10
will individualize a single
matching individual in the database whenever the match probability is approximately ten
times smaller than the inverse of the population size.
When the proportion of individuals registered in the database increases to much higher
values, the match probability required for individualizing increases (curves with
non-continuous lines in Fig. 11.6(c)). That is, an individualization may be justified for
a more common profile if almost the entire population of potential sources is registered in
the database. In the extreme case where the entire population is in the database, the match
probability has no impact on Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn), which attains certainty
after obtaining only one match (this situation is depicted by the dashed, horizontal line for
‘ n
N
= 1’ in Fig. 11.6(c)).
Hence, it is possible to justify an individualization of a matching source found through
a database search when either n or γ attain extreme values with regard to N . This is the
case when n
N
tends towards 1, and when γ becomes particularly small with regard to the
population size, that is, when Nγ tends towards 0. Practically speaking, it is difficult to
imagine a case satisfying either of these criteria.12 A rational decision maker will therefore
require further evidence supporting proposition Hi in order to justify an individualization.
In this section, we analyzed the decision of an individualization for a decision maker with
λ = 1
10
. A decision maker with a different assessment of λ will require a different individu-
alization threshold. In the next section, we continue investigating point A by maintaining
the numerical values for N , n and γ fixed, and evaluating how large λ must be to justify an
individualization in Fimmers et al.’s hypothetical case.
12This is even more so if one takes into account the false positive probability (which is highly recommended
for an accurate approach to a real case (Thompson et al., 2003)), because this decreases the posterior
probability of Hi, with an increasing effect for smaller match probabilities (see Thompson et al. (2003) for
a detailed explanation on the impact of the false positive probability on the value of a DNA match).
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11.4.3 Impact of λ on the decision of individualizing
The value of λ determines the threshold value of the probability of Hi marking the boundary
between choosing ai and choosing ¬ai (Eq. (11.5)). For a given
Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn), the rational decision maker will choose ¬ai if this
probability is below the threshold value, and ai if this probability is above this threshold.
With N = 108, n = 106 and γ = 10−6 (point A), the probability of Hi after finding a single
match with Mr. Smith in the database is equal to 0.01 (Eq. (11.8)). In this case, there is a
probability of 1− 0.01 = 0.99 that Mr. Smith is not the source of the crime stain. To justify
an individualization for such a small value of Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn), λ must
be very large: λ must be so large that the intersection of the two expected loss functions
presented in the graphs of Fig. 11.1 is to the left of Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) =
0.01.13 To find this value for λ, we solve Eq. (11.5) for λ:
λ > 1
Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) − 1 .
This gives us the expression for calculating the value of λ for an individualization occurring
for a particular probability of Hi. With Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) = 0.01, we
obtain
λ > 1
0.01
− 1> 99 .
The individualization of a suspect in this case is only justified when λ is greater than 99.
This means that the decision maker who individualizes under these conditions perceives
the loss of missing an individualization as at least 99 times greater than the loss of a false
individualization.
However, this contradicts our loss function that ranges from 0 to 1 (see the definition
of the losses in Section 11.3.2). According to our loss function, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 when the condi-
tion in Eq. (11.1) is relaxed, the loss associated with a missed individualization cannot be
smaller than the minimum loss associated with a correct conclusion (0), nor greater than
the maximum loss associated with a false individualization (1). The maximum value for λ
is therefore 1. When λ = 1, this means that the loss of a missed individualization is equal
to the loss of a false individualization. In this case, we obtain the expected loss functions
plotted in Fig. 11.7. With both false conclusions being equally undesirable, and both cor-
rect conclusions remaining equally desirable, the threshold for individualizing the selected
individual lies at Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) = 0.5. For 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, this is the mini-
mum probability for Hi that may lead the decision maker to individualize Mr. Smith. For all
Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) < 0.5, the most rational action is therefore always ¬ai,
that is, not to individualize Mr. Smith. This can be seen in Fig. 11.7, which shows action¬ai as having the minimum expected loss for all probabilities ranging from 0.0 to 0.5. Hence,
an individualization can never be rational for Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) = 0.01,
since 0.0 < 0.01 < 0.5 and our loss function prescribes that action ¬ai will always minimize
the expected loss for this probability of Hi.
A situation where λ > 1 would mean that the loss of missing an individualization is greater
than the loss of a false individualization. This contradicts Eq. (11.1), where we specified
that the loss of missing an individualization (incorrectly not individualizing the suspect) is
smaller than that of a false individualization (i.e., λ < 1). This analysis reveals that the
decision maker who individualizes in the above described case (with N = 108, n = 106 and
γ = 10−6 as described in point A) must have objectives and preferences that are in opposition
with the fundamental legal concept that it is better to let a guilty person go free than to
convict an innocent person. If this is the case, the decision maker will have a loss function
13That is, we can shift the point of intersection between the two expected loss functions towards the left
in the graph by increasing the slope of the expected loss function of action ¬ai. This slope is λ.
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Figure 11.7: For the maximum value λ = 1 when the condition in Eq. (11.1) is relaxed (i.e., the loss of
missing an individualization is equal to the loss of a false individualization), the rational decision maker
will choose not to individualize Mr. Smith, ¬ai, for Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) < 0.5, and
individualize Mr. Smith, ai, whenever Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) > 0.5 (indicated by the bold
lines). Increasing the value of λ has moved the transition point to the left (compared with λ = 1
10
and λ = 1
100
in Fig. 11.1), increasing the range of Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) for which the decision maker
chooses ai.
different from the one described in this paper, and this loss function will lead to different
choices. A different loss function is therefore the only thing that will lead a rational decision
maker to individualize an individual when the posterior odds for this individual being at the
source of the trace are actually in favor of the alternative proposition.
In the next section, we examine the probability of a false individualization, and how this
probability relates to the parameters discussed in this section. This will allow us to address
point C.
11.5 Probability of a false individualization
Fig. 11.8 extends the influence diagram presented in Section 11.3.3 to include the probability
of a false individualization in a node labelled C, in the same way as was done in Biedermann
et al. (2011a). This node describes the event of a correct conclusion as a Boolean variable
that takes the state of
true for { Hi ∩ ai¬Hi ∩ ¬ai , and (11.9)
false otherwise.
This influence diagram shows that, logically, the probability of a false individualization is
equal to Pr(¬Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) in nodeHi, in a situation where the decision
maker chooses action ai.
According to Eq. (11.5), the decision maker chooses ai when
Pr(Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) > 1
λ + 1 .
In terms of Pr(¬Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn), the decision maker chooses ai whenever
Pr(¬Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) < λ
1 + λ . (11.10)
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Figure 11.8: The influence diagram in Fig. 11.4(b) with the additional Boolean node C describing a correct
decision. The nodes instantiated by the user are shown with bold borders. Node A gives the expected losses
on a scale from 0 (the minimum loss) to 1 (the maximum loss), and the other nodes indicate probabilities
in %. If the decision maker individualizes a source found as the only match in a database search, in a
case where N = 108, n = 106, γ = 10−6 and the crime stain’s source is in the population considered, there
is a probability of 0.01 (state true of node C) that this is a correct individualization. There is therefore a
probability of 0.99 (state false of node C) that this is a false individualization.
This means that the probability of a false individualization is limited to the range of prob-
abilities smaller than λ
1+λ (Fig. 11.9).
Since the value of λ is defined by the decision maker, the decision maker fixes the maxi-
mum probability of ¬Hi (Eq. (11.10)) for which he or she will conclude an individualization.
Therefore, it is the decision maker himself, or herself, who determines the maximum proba-
bility of falsely individualizing a person.
Recall that λ represents the decision maker’s preferences among the false conclusions.
It describes the extent of the loss perceived when obtaining one false conclusion relative to
the loss perceived when obtaining the other false conclusion.14 By defining λ, the decision
maker thus determines his or her risk of concluding a false individualization. The greater
λ, the greater the loss of missing an individualization and the smaller the loss of falsely
individualizing a source.15 Now, the smaller the loss for a false individualization (relative
to the loss of a missed individualization) the greater is the probability of obtaining a false
individualization. For 0 < λ < 1, the probability of a false individualization will lie between
0 and 0.5 (Fig. 11.9).
If, however, a decision maker were to associate a greater loss with a missed individualiza-
tion than with a false individualization, i.e., λ > 1, this decision maker’s probability of falsely
individualizing a source would exceed 0.5. This result, however, would only be possible with
a loss function different from the one presented in this paper.
Thus, it is the fixation of λ which determines the probability of a false individualization,
not the means by which the suspect has been selected as a possible source of the crime
stain (i.e., probable cause case vs. database search case), as was asserted by point C. The
decision maker establishes the probability of a false individualization when he or she assigns
the numerical value to λ. This value is the same for the probable cause case as for the
database search case. Therefore, the probability of a false individualization is exactly the
same in both scenarios, contradicting point C.
14Recall, for example, that λ = 1
10
meant that the decision maker considers the loss of 1 false individual-
ization to be equal to the loss of 10 missed individualizations (see Section 11.3.2).
15We refer the interested reader to the Appendix for a more theoretical explanation of the definition of λ.
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Figure 11.9: The shaded area represents the range of values for the probability of a false individualization in
function of λ. The probability of a false individualization is equal to Pr(¬Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)
when the decision maker chooses action ai. Since the decision maker will only choose ai when
Pr(¬Hi∣Mi,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) < λ1+λ , the probability of a false individualization lies between 0
and λ
1+λ .
11.6 Discussion and conclusions
Fimmers et al. (2011) concluded that the probability of a false individualization16 is greater
in the database search case than in the probable cause case. Their conclusion (point C) is the
result of a hypothetical case analysis (summarized in points A and B), in which the decision
is a categorical consequence of observing a match for a profile with a match probability of
γ ≤ 10−6. According to this line of reasoning, the probability of a false individualization
increases with the number of comparisons, causing the database search case (where the
number of comparisons is equal to the size of the database) to have a higher probability of a
false individualization than the probable cause case (where there is only a single comparison).
The decision-theoretic approach presented in this paper reaches a different conclusion.
According to this approach, the decision of individualizing individual i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, as the
source of the crime stain is a function of
(i) the probability of proposition Hi, that is, the probability that individual i is the source
of the crime stain (i.e., this is the probability distribution over the states of nature);
and
(ii) the decision maker’s perception of the losses associated with falsely individualizing and
falsely not individualizing a suspect (i.e., this is the decision maker’s loss function).
A rational decision maker individualizes individual i whenever the probability of Hi exceeds
a particular threshold. Note that, in agreement with Balding and Donnelly (e.g., 1996);
Evett and Weir (e.g., 1998); Donnelly and Friedman (e.g., 1999); Evett et al. (e.g., 2000a);
Dawid (e.g., 2001), it is the probability distribution over propositions {Hi, ¬Hi} which is
relevant, not the probability distribution over propositions {Hdb, ¬Hdb}. For an individual
selected through a database search, the decisive threshold may be attained when
16In the orginal paper (Fimmers et al., 2011), they spoke of ‘conviction’, which is the crime level equivalent
of ‘individualization’. Here, we have preferred to stay at the source level to remain coherent with the
propositions, which we formulated at the source level (Cook et al., 1998b). A source level analysis produces
the same results as a crime level analysis assuming maximal relevance for the crime stain (e.g., Aitken and
Taroni, 2004).
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 n
N
→ 1, that is, when almost the entire population of potential crime stain sources is
registered in the database searched; or when
 Nγ → 0, that is, when the crime stain has an extremely rare characteristic in the pop-
ulation of potential sources, so that the expected number of matches in this population
tends towards zero.
The exact transition probability marking the threshold may vary from one decision maker to
another. It is entirely determined by the decision maker’s loss function. This loss function
describes the decision maker’s preferences among the two types of false conclusions. In other
words, a decision maker who considers a false individualization a lot less desirable than a
missed individualization will have a high decision threshold, whereas a decision maker who
considers a false individualization only slightly less desirable than a missed individualization
will have a much lower decision threshold. This threshold is independent of the circumstances
and probabilities in a particular case, and is therefore the same for the database search case
as for the probable cause case. The use of a loss function therefore provides a coherent
approach to both of these different scenarios (Lindley, 1976). Thus, the only difference
between these two cases lies in the probability of Hi: the database search case involves
different prior probabilities and observations than a probable cause case, which inevitably
lead to a different evaluation of the posterior probability of Hi. Given the decision maker’s
loss function, which determines the threshold, the decision is based on the probability of
Hi, regardless of whether this value results from evidence from a database search, or from
evidence from other leads in the case. As a result, the probability of concluding a false
individualization is independent of how individual i became a suspect in the case.
With a decision-theoretic approach, the probability of falsely individualizing a suspect
found through a database search is exactly the same as the probability of falsely individual-
izing a suspect found by other investigational means. This probability is determined by the
probability of ¬Hi when the decision maker chooses to individualize individual i. It therefore
depends on the probability of Hi and on the decision threshold. Since the decision maker
fixes the threshold when he or she defines the loss function, it is actually the decision maker
who imposes his or her own maximum probability of a false individualization. For example,
a decision maker with a high decision threshold for individualizing will have low probabilities
of a false individualization, and a decision maker with a lower decision threshold will have
higher probabilities of a false individualization.
The results of a database search are items of evidence, which update the probability
distribution over the states of nature {Hi, ¬Hi} according to the same logic as any other type
of evidence. The framework used to evaluate evidence in a probable cause case is therefore,
not only an adequate framework for evaluating the evidence in a database search case, but
the method of choice for a coherent evaluation in view of the decision of individualizing the
suspect.
11.7 Appendix: Deriving the loss function
In this paper, we quantify the satisfaction obtained by each consequence in the form of a loss
function. The formal definition of the loss associated with a consequence k, that is l(Ck),
defines this value as the difference between the utility of the most desirable consequence,
which we will call u(C∗), and the utility of consequence k, denoted u(Ck) (e.g., Lindley,
1985; Press, 2003):
l(Ck) = u(C∗) − u(Ck) . (11.11)
Any utility function may therefore be translated into a loss function. In terms of describing
the desirabilities of the consequences, the two functions are identical. The loss function is
therefore based on the utility scale, and its properties follow from the properties of the utility
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function. In the following paragraphs, we describe these properties and explain how they
appear in our loss function.
The usual utility scale ranges from 0, describing the least desirable outcome, which we
will denote c∗, to 1, describing the most desirable outcome C∗. According to this scale, the
utility of any intermediate consequence Ck, u(Ck), is equal to the probability Pr(C∗) which
makes the decision maker indifferent between the following two gambles (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1947; Pratt et al., 1964; Lindley, 1976):
gamble 1 - obtain consequence Ck for sure;
gamble 2 - obtain consequence C∗ with a probability of Pr(C∗) and consequence c∗
with a probability of Pr(c∗) = 1 − Pr(C∗).
In other words, it can be proved that
u(Ck) = u(C∗) × Pr(C∗) + u(c∗) × Pr(c∗)= 1 × Pr(C∗) + 0 × Pr(c∗)= Pr(C∗) . (11.12)
This definition provides the decision maker with a coherent way for evaluating the utility
values associated with a decision’s possible consequences.
Translating the utility function into a loss function using Eq. (11.11), produces a scale
ranging from 0, describing this time the most desirable outcome C∗, to 1, describing the
least desirable outcome c∗:
l(C∗) = u(C∗) − u(C∗)= 1 − 1= 0 , (11.13)
and
l(c∗) = u(C∗) − u(c∗)= 1 − 0= 1 . (11.14)
From Eq. (11.11) and (11.12), it follows that the loss assigned to consequence Ck, l(Ck),
is equal to the probability Pr(c∗) which makes the decision maker indifferent between the
above two gambles:
l(Ck) = 1 − u(Ck)= 1 − Pr(C∗)= Pr(c∗) .
In other words, with Eq. (11.13) and (11.14), it can be proved that:
l(Ck) = l(C∗) × Pr(C∗) + l(c∗) × Pr(c∗) ,= 0 × Pr(C∗) + 1 × (Pr(c∗))= Pr(c∗) . (11.15)
We can thus define the desirabilities of the consequences as either utility or loss values.
For the consequences of individualizing and not individualizing a selected person, the most
desirable consequences C1 and C4 (i.e., the consequences describing correct conclusions) take
utility values of 1 and loss values of 0, and the least desirable consequence C2 (i.e., a false
individualization) has a utility of 0 and a loss of 1:
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ai ¬ai
Hi ¬Hi Hi ¬Hi
consequence: C1 C2 C3 C4
utility: 1 0 u(C3) 1
loss: 0 1 l(C3) 0
The satisfaction obtained by consequence C3 (i.e., a missed individualization) usually lies
somewhere inbetween the two extremes of a correct conclusion and a false individualization.
We quantify the desirability of this intermediate outcome by comparing the following two
gambles:
gamble 1 - obtain consequence C3 for sure;
gamble 2 - obtain a correct conclusion (i.e., consequence C1 or C4) with a probability of(1 − λ) and a false individualization (consequence C2) with a probability of
λ;
where λ ∈ [0,1]. According to Eq. (11.12), the utility value for C3 corresponds to the
probability of obtaining a correct conclusion when the decision maker is indifferent between
gamble 1 and gamble 2:
u(C3) = u(C1 or C4) × (1 − λ) + u(C2) × λ= 1 × (1 − λ) + 0 × λ= 1 − λ .
According to Eq. (11.15), the loss associated with C3 is equal to the probability of obtaining
a false individualization when the decision maker is indifferent between gamble 1 and gamble
2:
l(C3) = l(C1 or C4) × (1 − λ) + l(C2) × λ (11.16)= 0 × (1 − λ) + 1 × λ= λ .
Therefore λ is the loss value associated with a missed individualization. This parameter
describes the decision maker’s preferences among the false conclusions: the decision maker
finds a missed individualization (C3) as undesirable as risking a probability of λ of obtaining
a false individualization (C2).
For assigning a numerical value λ to define the decision maker’s loss function, we speak,
in this paper, of the decision maker’s indifference between 1 false individualization and a
number λ−1 of missed individualizations. This relationship is obtained by solving Eq. (11.16)
for l(C2), given l(C1) = l(C4) = 0:
l(C2) = l(C3) × λ−1 .
Thus, the decision maker perceives one false individualization as producing the same loss as
λ−1 missed individualizations.
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Chapter 12
Decision Analysis for the
Genotype Designation in
Low-template-DNA Profiles
Abstract
What genotype should the scientist specify for conducting a database search to
try to find the source of a low-template-DNA (lt-DNA) trace? When the scien-
tist answers this question, he or she makes a decision. Here, we approach this
decision problem from a normative point of view by defining a decision-theoretic
framework for answering this question for one locus. This framework combines
the probability distribution describing the uncertainty over the trace’s donor’s
possible genotypes with a loss function describing the scientist’s preferences con-
cerning false exclusions and false inclusions that may result from the database
search. According to this approach, the scientist should choose the genotype
designation that minimizes the expected loss. To illustrate the results produced
by this approach, we apply it to two hypothetical cases: (1) the case of observing
one peak for allele xi on a single electropherogram, and (2) the case of observing
one peak for allele xi on one replicate, and a pair of peaks for alleles xi and xj ,
i ≠ j, on a second replicate. Given that the probabilities of allele drop-out are
defined as functions of the observed peak heights, the threshold values mark-
ing the turning points when the scientist should switch from one designation to
another are derived in terms of the observed peak heights. For each case, sen-
sitivity analyses show the impact of the model’s parameters on these threshold
values. The results support the conclusion that the procedure should not focus
on a single threshold value for making this decision for all alleles, all loci and in
all laboratories.
12.1 Introduction
12.1.1 Genotype designation in forensic DNA profiling
DNA database searches have become a popular investigative tool for searching for possible
sources of biological traces recovered on a crime scene. Such a database search requires the
scientist to specify the genotype of the trace’s DNA profile. For this, the scientist observes
S. Gittelson, A. Biedermann, S. Bozza, and F. Taroni. Decision analysis for the genotype
designation in low-template-DNA profiles. Forensic Science International: Genetics, in revision,
2013.
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the trace’s alleles1 for each locus on the electropherogram (EPG), and chooses a homozygous
genotype designation of type {xi, xi} for the observation of a single peak for allele xi, and a
heterozygous genotype designation of type {xi, xj} for the observation of a pair of peaks for
alleles xi and xj . This way of proceeding correctly describes the DNA profile of the crime
stain’s donor for traces not subject to stochastic effects in the DNA’s amplification process.
However, for DNA traces that have been called low-template-DNA (lt-DNA for short) Gill
and Buckleton (2010), stochastic effects of allele drop-out and allele drop-in may cause the
trace’s resulting EPG to contain peaks for a different allelic configuration than that of its
donor Taberlet et al. (1996); Gill et al. (2000); Whitaker et al. (2001):
 If allele drop-out occurs, an allele present in the donor’s profile does not appear in
the crime stain’s profile. For example, the donor may be heterozygote {xi, xj}, yet if
allele xj has dropped-out in the crime stain’s profile, this leads to only a single peak
for allele xi at this locus.
 If allele drop-in occurs, a signal for an allele not possessed by the donor shows up in
the crime stain’s profile. For example, the donor may be homozygote {xi, xi}, yet if
allele xj has dropped-in in the crime stain’s profile, this produces two peaks, for alleles
xi and xj , at this locus.
As a result, the observation of a single peak for xi in an lt-DNA profile may come either
from a homozygous donor {xi, xi}, or from a heterozygous donor where the non-xi allele
has dropped-out. Conversely, the observation of two peaks, for xi and xj , in an lt-DNA
profile may come from a heterozygous donor {xi, xj}, or from a homozygous donor {xi, xi}
or {xj , xj} where, respectively, an allele xj or an allele xi has dropped-in. In both of
these cases, the designation of the donor’s genotype is not straightforward. This raises an
important issue regarding the genotype assignment for lt-DNA profiles in view of a DNA
database search: which genotype should the investigator specify for conducting the database
search in order to try to narrow down the population of the crime stain’s possible donors?2
There have been several pragmatic approaches to this question. For a locus where the
trace’s profile shows only a single peak, let us say for allele xi, one approach consists of com-
paring this peak’s height (or area), denoted here by hxi , with a pre-determined threshold T
Buckleton et al. (2005); Gill et al. (2009): if hxi > T , the locus is designated as a homozygote{xi, xi}, and if hxi < T , the locus is designated as {xi, F}, where F represents any one of the
alleles at that locus so that {xi, F} matches any profile at that locus with at least one allele
xi Gill et al. (2000). The use of F in the designation of the genotype indicates that allele
drop-out is possible. Another approach, this time for a locus for which the trace’s profile
shows one or several peaks, is the multiple tube approach. In this case, the scientist obtains
several EPGs for the same crime stain prior to retaining a consensus profile formed by the
alleles observed a particular number of times over all of the replicates Taberlet et al. (1996).
In all of these cases, the designation of the genotype is made in view of the perceived
risk of false exclusions and inclusions produced by a database search Gill et al. (2009); Gill
and Buckleton (2009):
 A false exclusion occurs for example when a crime stain coming from a heterozygous
donor {xi, xj} is designated as being a homozygote {xi, xi} or {xj , xj}, or any genotype
1Note that here and in the rest of this paper, we consider only the electropherogram’s peaks that the
scientist has designated as alleles.
2Note that the genotype designation problem is not restricted to database search cases. It is also present
in what have been called probable cause cases Balding and Donnelly (1996) (or confirmation cases Donnelly
and Friedman (1999)), that is, cases where the profile of a potential source is available for comparison
purposes from the case’s circumstancial information or investigational leads unrelated to the DNA profile.
To avoid biaises when comparing the trace’s profile with the potential source’s profile, the scientist should
also designate the trace’s genotype before comparing the two profiles. The ideas presented here for a database
search case therefore also apply to probable cause cases, yet the latter are not treated in this paper.
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containing an allele different from xi and xj , so that a database search does not retain
individuals having the genotype {xi, xj} as possible sources of the crime stain.3
 False inclusions occur whenever the designation {xi, F} is chosen for a donor who
possesses at least one copy of allele xi, because the search results in the database will
include all profiles with at least one allele xi, instead of only the individuals with the
donor’s genotype.
An extreme case of false inclusions occurs if the scientist decides not to specify anything
for the locus in question when conducting the search. This corresponds to choosing
the designation {F,F}. In this case, the search results for this locus include all the
profiles in the database. Among these, all of the individuals that do not have the
donor’s genotype are considered false inclusions.
The two pragmatic approaches described above (i.e., comparing the observed peak height
to a threshold or counting the number of occurrences of an allele in multiple replicates) are
empirical approaches established on the basis of controlled laboratory experiments with the
aim of reducing the risks of false exclusions and false inclusions. The true allelic constitution
of the trace’s donor, however, remains something that is unknown. For this reason, any
designation of the genotype amounts to a choice made by the scientist. Fundamentally, this
problem is therefore one of making a decision under conditions of uncertainty. In this paper,
we formalize a normative approach for this decision problem.
12.1.2 Aim and outline of this paper
The aim of this paper is to present a normative approach to the decision of choosing between
several possible genotype designations for an lt-DNA profile. A normative analysis of this
problem falls into the domain of decision theory, and may be modeled by an influence
diagram.
The model we present considers the genotype of a single locus of a biological trace.
Because it is important to add further complications in a stepwise and informed way—so
as to keep track of the model’s increasing complexity—the combination of the genotypes of
several loci is beyond the scope of this paper. Currently, this model is for a trace supposed
to come from a single contributor. It is not applicable for a mixture of several contributors.4
Other than the alleles coming from the crime stain’s source, the model considers that the
only other peaks that are possible are due to drop-in alleles, which are considered to be
spurious and independent appearances of single alleles coming from multiple sources (Gill
et al., 2007, p. 130). These initial assumptions may appear restrictive, but turn out to be
crucial for developing a tractable, normative approach to the problem treated here. This
is demonstrated by the subtle technicalities involved in the formal development outlined in
the forthcoming sections.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 12.2 describes the decision-theoretic frame-
work. We then discuss the application of this model through two examples. In the first
example, we examine the case treated in Gill et al. (2009) of observing a single EPG with a
single peak for the locus in question (Section 12.3). In the second example, we extend this
case to the observation of two replicates, where the first replicate shows a single peak and
the second replicate a pair of peaks (the one observed in the first replicate plus another one)
for this locus (Section 12.4). The discussion and conclusions follow in Section 12.5.
3Note that even if the stain would be correctly designated as {xi, xj}, and the database search would not
‘exclude’ an individual with genotype {xi, xj}, this does not mean that this individual is the source of the
crime stain.
4Traces from a single contributor affected by gross contamination (i.e., contamination from a single source
that affects the entire profile Gill and Buckleton (2010)) are also considered mixtures of several contributors,
because they produces a mixed profile.
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12.2 Normative model for the designation of the geno-
type
12.2.1 Preliminaries
What genotype should the scientist assign to the source of a crime stain based on the ob-
servations made on the EPG(s) obtained from a DNA analysis of the trace? A normative
approach to this decision problem models the decision as a function of the scientist’s un-
certainty on the genotype of the trace’s source and on the utilities or losses the scientist
associates with the decision’s possible outcomes. This approach shows what designation the
scientist should choose so as to maximize his or her expected utility or minimize his or her
expected loss Lindley (1985). This section defines the elements necessary for applying this
approach. Section 12.2.2 presents the notation for the donor’s genotype, the possible actions
and the possible outcomes. Section 12.2.3 then associates losses with each of the possible
outcomes. Section 12.2.4 presents the expressions for the expected losses. Section 12.2.5
shows how this approach takes into account the DNA profiling results. And Section 12.2.6
presents this approach in the form of a graphical model.
12.2.2 Donor’s genotype, possible actions and outcomes
The decision-theoretic model constructed here considers a single locus X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn},
for which x1, x2, . . . , xn is the exhaustive list of this locus’s possible alleles.
5 The genotype
of the crime stain’s donor at this locus consists of a maternal allele, which we will call Θm,
and a paternal allele, which we will call Θp. Each of these is equal to one of X ’s alleles.
The genotype {Θm = xv,Θp = xv}, v ∈ {1,2, . . . , n}, describes a homozygous donor, and{Θm = xv,Θp = xw}, v,w ∈ {1,2, . . . , n}, v ≠ w, a heterozygous donor. We will abbreviate
the donor’s genotype with a single Θ followed by the genotype’s two alleles as two subscripts
to Θ as follows:
Θxvxv = {Θm = xv,Θp = xv}, v ∈ {1,2, . . . , n}, for a homozygous donor, and
Θxvxw = {(Θm = xv,Θp = xw)}, v,w ∈ {1,2, . . . , n}, v ≠ w, for a heterozygous donor.
Since the profile of the crime stain’s donor is unknown to the scientist, there is a probability
distribution over the donor’s possible genotypes, reflecting the scientist’s knowledge at the
moment when he or she must decide what genotype to search for in the database.
In addition to this probability distribution, the model defines a space of possible actions.
Let A be this action space. The actions in A are the genotype designations the scientist
can specify for a database search. These cover all of the genotypes formed by X ’s alleles,
all combinations of one of X ’s alleles with a wildcard F (where F represents any one ofX ’s alleles), and the designation formed by two wildcards F (this option represents not
specifying any alleles for locus X when conducting the database search). Let a lowercase
letter a, followed by the genotype designation as a subscript, denote each individual action
as follows:
axixi - designating the genotype as a homozygote {xi, xi}, i ∈ {1,2, . . . , n},
axixj - designating the genotype as a heterozygote {xi, xj}, i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . , n}, i ≠ j,
axiF - designating the genotype as {xi, F}, i ∈ {1,2, . . . , n},
aFF - designating the genotype as {F,F}.
The combination of each of the possible actions in the action space with each of the
possible genotypes of the DNA’s source produces outcomes that fall into one of the following
5According to this notation, xi, ∀i ∈ {1,2, . . . , n}, is the number naming the allele (Sections 12.3 and 12.4
will present concrete examples for loci TH01 and D21S11).
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four categories:
O1 - a correct genotype designation without using F ,
O2 - an incorrect genotype designation (i.e., at least one of the alleles is incorrect),
O3 - a correct genotype designation using one F (i.e., the non-F allele is correct), and
O4 - an uninformative designation {F,F}.
For example, if the donor’s genotype is heterozygous {xv, xw} (i.e., state Θxvxw holds),
for v,w ∈ {1,2, . . . , n}, v ≠ w, then axixj leads to outcome O1 whenever i = v and j = w,
otherwise it leads to outcome O2. Action axiF leads to outcome O3 whenever i = v or i = w,
otherwise it leads to outcome O2. Action axixi always leads to outcome O2, and action aFF
always leads to outcome O4, regardless of the donor’s genotype. Note that the dimension of
a decision table formed by combining the four possible actions axixi , axixj , axiF and aFF
with each of the donor’s possible genotypes is 4 × [n + n(n−1)
2
],6 with n equal to the locus’s
total number of alleles, yet each of these combinations leads to one of the four outcomes
described above.
12.2.3 Losses
Associated with each of these possible outcomes, there is a value (i.e., a utility or a loss)
representing how desirable this outcome is for the scientist making the decision. We will
need these values to formulate a decision-making criteria in Section 12.2.4. These values
depend on the scientist’s objective when conducting the database search. The purpose of
a database search is to narrow down the population of potential crime stain donors by
excluding individuals with a DNA profile different from that of the crime stain’s donor
(e.g., Biedermann et al., 2011a). Hence, the scientist perceives the above outcomes as more
desirable or less desirable in function of how the database search results narrow down this
population. Ideally, the search only retains those individuals who have the genotype of the
trace’s source. This is what we obtain with outcome O1. The scientist therefore perceives
O1 as the most desirable of the four outcomes defined above. Conversely, a database search
with an incorrect genotype designation (outcome O2) does not retain the individuals with
the genotype of the trace’s source. This is a highly undesirable consequence because it does
not correctly delimit the population of potential sources: if the trace’s donor is registered
in the database, the database search leads to a false exclusion. Outcomes O3 and O4,
on the other hand, both avoid the possibility of a false exclusion. A correct designation
using the wildcard F (outcome O3) narrows down the population of potential sources to a
population including individuals with the genotype of the trace’s donor, yet this reduced
population also contains individuals having a genotype with a one-allele difference to the
donor’s genotype, that is, it produces false inclusions. Having these false inclusions in the
population of potential sources is undesirable because it increases the number of individuals
to investigate. Finally, an uninformative designation {F,F} (outcome O4) does not narrow
down the population of potential sources at all. All of the individuals in the database are
retained as potential sources. The increased number of false inclusions in this case with
regard to outcome O3 make outcome O4 less desirable than O3.
The exact preference ordering of these outcomes depends on the scientist’s objectives
and preferences regarding a false exclusion and false inclusions. This preference ordering
may depend on the severity of the case, the number of adventitious matches in the database
expected from outcome O3, and the probability that the trace’s source is registered in the
database. Here, we will consider the incorrect designation (outcome O2) as the least desirable
outcome, followed by the uninformative designation (outcome O4), the correct designation
using F (outcome O3), and finally the desired, correct designation (outcome O1). We there-
6This decision table’s dimension is 4×n2 when the donor’s genotype is represented by Θm and Θp, as is
the case in the influence diagram presented in Section 12.2.6.
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fore assume that:
O1 ≻ O3 ≻ O4 ≻ O2 ,
where the symbol ‘≻’ means ‘is preferred to’.
To qualify the desirability of each of these outcomes, we assign a loss value to each. The
use of losses, rather than utilities, allows us to highlight the scientist’s negative perception
of the false exclusions and inclusions the database search may lead to. A loss, denoted
by l(⋅), ranges here on a scale from 0 (i.e., minimal loss) to 1 (i.e., maximal loss). We
assign the minimum loss value of 0 to the most desirable outcome, O1, of a correct genotype
designation:
l(O1) = 0 . (12.1)
The maximum loss value of 1 is assigned to the least desirable outcome, O2, of an incorrect
genotype designation:
l(O2) = 1 . (12.2)
The losses associated with the intermediate outcomes O3 and O4 are somewhere between
0 and 1. To determine these values, the scientist may compare two gambles von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1947). Loss l(O3) is equal to the probability η1 that makes the decision
maker indifferent between choosing gamble 1 and choosing gamble 2, where these gambles
are defined as follows:
gamble 1 - obtain outcome O3 (a correct designation with an F ) for sure;
gamble 2 - obtain the worst outcome, O2 (an incorrect designation), with a probability
of η1 and the best outcome, O1 (a correct designation without F ), with a
probability of 1 − η1.
Analogously, loss l(O4) is equal to the probability η2 that makes the decision maker indif-
ferent between choosing gamble 1 and choosing gamble 2, when these gambles are defined,
this time, as:
gamble 1 - obtain outcome O4 (an uninformative designation) for sure;
gamble 2 - obtain the worst outcome, O2 (an incorrect designation), with a probability
of η2 and the best outcome, O1 (a correct designation without F ), with a
probability of 1 − η2.
Values assigned to η1 and η2 should be coherent, so they must also make the decision maker
indifferent between the following two pairs of gambles (e.g., Taroni et al., 2010):
gamble 1 - obtain outcome O3 (a correct designation with an F ) for sure;
gamble 2 - obtain outcome O4 (an uninformative designation) with a probability of
η1
η2
and the best outcome, O1 (a correct designation without F ), with a proba-
bility of 1 − η1
η2
;
and
gamble 1 - obtain outcome O4 (an uninformative designation) for sure;
gamble 2 - obtain the worst outcome, O2 (an incorrect designation), with a probability
of η2−η1
1−η1 and outcome O3 (a correct designation with an F ), with a probability
of 1 − η2−η1
1−η1 .
In the decision analyses that follow in Sections 12.3 and 12.4, we will use, as an example,
a loss function with η1 = 0.2 and η2 = 0.5. Note that a different choice for η1 and η2, repre-
senting different objectives for the decision maker, will lead to different decision strategies
than the ones we present in Sections 12.3 and 12.4, yet the underlying model remains the
same.
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12.2.4 Expected losses
A normative approach assumes that the scientist wants to minimize the loss produced by the
database search. But since the scientist does not know the genotype of the trace’s source,
he or she can only choose the action that minimizes the expected loss. The action that
minimizes the expected loss is called the Bayes action, and is the action we will determine
in the decision analyses in Sections 12.3 and 12.4. An action’s expected loss, denoted by
l¯(⋅), is the sum of the losses of each of that action’s possible outcomes, weighted by the
probabilities of each of these outcomes actually occurring if the action in question is chosen.
For axixi , axixj , axiF and aFF , the expected losses are given by the following equations:
l¯(axixi) = l(O1) × Pr(Θxixi) + l(O2) × [1 − Pr(Θxixi)]= 1 − Pr(Θxixi) , (12.3)
l¯(axixj) = l(O1) × Pr(Θxixj) + l(O2) × [1 − Pr(Θxixj)]= 1 − Pr(Θxixj) , (12.4)
l¯(axiF ) = l(O3) × Pr(Θxi−) + l(O2) × [1 − Pr(Θxi−)]= 1 + (η1 − 1)Pr(Θxi−) , (12.5)
l¯(aFF ) = l(O4) × 1= η2 , (12.6)
where Pr(Θxi−) denotes the probability that the donor’s genotype contains at least one
copy of allele xi. Note that here and from now on we will make the notation easier by
using Pr(Θxixi) = Pr(Θxvxv) and Pr(Θxixj) = Pr(Θxvxw). The probabilities Pr(Θxixi),
Pr(Θxixj) and Pr(Θxi−) are conditional probabilities of the donor’s genotype. A priori,
these probabilities reflect the occurrence of the possible genotypes in the population of
potential crime stain donors based on the background information in the case.7 A DNA
analysis of the crime stain produces an EPG containing signals for locus X ’s alleles, which
update this original probability distribution through Bayesian inference. For brevity, the
mathematical notation that follows will omit the background information, and only indicate
the observations made on the EPG(s) after a conditioning bar in the expressions for the
probabilities and expected losses in Eqs. (12.3)-(12.6).
12.2.5 DNA profiling results
The model represents the results of the DNA analysis as a Boolean vector describing whether
or not the scientist observes an allelic peak8 for each of X ’s alleles on the EPG. Let us call
this result R. For example,
R = {x1 = 0, x2 = 0, . . . , xi−1 = 0, xi = 1, xi+1 = 0, . . . , xn−1 = 0, xn = 0}
describes the observation of a single peak for allele xi. For brevity, we will abbreviate this
vector with an R followed by the observed allele(s) as subscrips to the R. So R = {x1 =
0, x2 = 0, . . . , xi−1 = 0, xi = 1, xi+1 = 0, . . . , xn−1 = 0, xn = 0} becomes Rxi . Analogously, Rxixj
represents the observation of a pair of peaks for alleles xi and xj . The result(s) observed on
the EPG(s) figure after the conditioning bar in the expressions for the expected losses and
the conditional probabilities in Eqs. (12.3)-(12.6).
The results of a DNA analysis depend on the genotype of the DNA’s donor and on the
stochastic effects of allele drop-out and allele drop-in. Here, we have modeled these results
based on the following assumptions:9
7Here, the model assumes a Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium for this distribution.
8Signals that the scientist has not designated as an allele are not considered.
9For the technical details, see 12.6.
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Figure 12.1: Object-oriented influence diagrams for the genotype designation of a trace’s source (node
A) based on the trace’s DNA profiling results: (a) These results consist of a single replicate (instance node
RE). (b) These results consist of two replicates (instance nodes RE and RE′—the prime symbol is used
to distinguish the second replicate from the first). These influence diagrams evaluate the expected losses for
each of the possible genotype designations based on the probability distributions over the donor’s maternal
and paternal alleles (nodes Θm and Θp, respectively), and the losses assigned to the decision’s possible
outcomes (node l). The instance nodes RE and RE′ belong to the class Result presented in 12.6.
 when there is no allele drop-out and no allele drop-in, the DNA profiling results accu-
rately reflect the donor’s genotype—uncertainty on the occurrence of allele drop-out
and allele drop-in induces uncertainty on the true donor’s genotype given the profiling
results;
 the probability of allele drop-out is an increasing function of an allele’s mean peak
height calculated over all of the analyzed loci on the EPG (we will call this mean peak
height H) according to the relationship described by Tvedebrink et al. Tvedebrink
et al. (2009), and does not depend on the drop-out probabilities for previous replicates;
 the appearance of a drop-in allele is an independent event,10 for which we assign here
a probability of 0.05 according to Taberlet et al. (1996); Gill et al. (2007);
 there can be no more than two drop-in alleles in one replicate for the locus in question.
12.2.6 Graphical model
To handle the complexity caused by the numerous random variables and probabilistic rela-
tionships necessary to model the DNA results, and to combine this probabilistic part with
the outcomes’ losses for evaluating each action’s expected loss, we constructed an object-
oriented influence diagram (Fig. 12.1). An influence diagram, or Bayesian decision network,
combines probability and decision theory in a graphical model (e.g., Jensen and Nielsen,
2007; Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008). It provides the user with an interface to reason about
decision making under uncertainty. Object-orientation presents an organized way to model
a repetitive pattern of identical components as objects Kjaerulff and Madsen (2008). In
Figures 12.1(a) and 12.1(b), the square node A contains the action space, the circular nodes
Θm and Θp are the random variables representing the donor’s maternal and paternal alleles,
respectively, and a diamond-shaped node l contains the loss function over the space of possi-
ble outcomes (formed by combining A, Θm and Θp). Every analytical result obtained from
the DNA analysis of the trace updates the probability distribution over the donor’s genotype
10The model considers the appearance of a drop-in allele to be independent of the observed peak heights
in the EPG and of the donor’s true genotype. Concerning the latter, studies have shown that oversized
stutters (sometimes described as drop-in alleles) are another stochastic effect that occurs in lt-DNA profiles
(e.g., Gill et al., 2000; Petricevic et al., 2010; Benschop et al., 2011; Grisedale and Daal, 2012; Mitchell et al.,
2012). However, the present model only considers spurious and independent appearances of single alleles as
drop-in alleles, leaving this oversized-stutter effect for a future extension of this model.
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(i.e., the probability distributions over the donor’s possible maternal and paternal alleles).
The rectangle RE is an object, or instance, representing one such analytical result (i.e., the
observations made on one replicate). It is an instance of a network class Result, which
models the results of the DNA analysis in function of the donor’s genotype, the occurrence
of 0, 1 or 2 allele drop-outs, and the presence of 0, 1 or 2 drop-in alleles (see 12.6 for the
complete network structure). Here, Figure 12.1(a) shows the influence diagram’s structure
for a single replicate, and Figure 12.1(b) its structure for two replicates. When there is
more than one replicate, we assume that the result of the additional replicate is independent
of the result of the previous replicate given the genotype of the trace’s donor. With this
assumption, the extension of the model only requires the user to add another instance of the
network Result to obtain one copy for each replicate. Here, and in the rest of this paper, we
will use a prime symbol to distinguish the elements of the second replicate from the elements
of the first replicate. The next two sections apply this model to two hypothetical cases.
12.3 Case 1: Observation of a single peak for allele xi
Consider a case where the crime stain’s DNA profiling results consist of a single EPG. For
locus X , the scientist observes a single peak on this EPG, let us say for allele xi. Based on
this result, denoted by Rxi , we want to find the Bayes action.
The influence diagram in Fig. 12.1(a) evaluates the expected losses of each of the actions
in A (in node A) when the user sets xi = 1 and xk = 0, ∀ k ∈ {1,2, . . . , n}/{i}. This updates
the probability distribution over the donor’s possible genotypes, which in turn updates the
expected losses of the actions in A according to Eqs. (12.3)-(12.6).
Following the model’s assumptions presented in Section 12.2, the updated probability
distribution for the donor’s genotype depends on:
 the allele probabilities Puch-Solis et al. (2012) of the locus’s alleles in the population of
the crime stain’s potential sources, in particular the allele probability of the observed
allele, which we will call γxi ;
 the allele probability of the observed allele in the population of possible drop-in alleles,
which we will call γc,xi ;
 the drop-out probabilities, which are determined by a locus-specific parameter β0 and
H, the mean peak height of a single allele in the EPG (see 12.6 for further details).
For the sake of illustration in this case study, we reduce the number of parameters in
this problem by assuming that the allele probability of the observed allele in the population
of possible drop-in alleles is equal to the allele probability of the observed allele in the
population of the crime stain’s potential sources, so that γc,xi = γxi . This leaves us with
the allele probabilities of the locus’s alleles, the locus, and an allele’s mean peak height as
parameters.
The observation of a single peak for allele xi reduces the expected loss for all of the
genotype designations containing allele xi. In most cases, the Bayes action will be either
the homozygous designation for xi, action axixi , or the designation that uses a wildcard F
to say that the genotype has at least one copy of xi, action axiF . However, for a scientist
who is very reluctant to risk the possibility of a false designation, the Bayes action may
also be action aFF . All the other possible actions in A will have an expected loss that is
greater than at least one of these three actions (i.e., axixi , axiF , aFF ), meaning that they
will never be the Bayes action in this situation. For this reason, we will not comment them
here. We will thus focus on the possible Bayes actions axixi , axiF and aFF , and analyze
the effect of the parameters on these three actions’ expected losses. Section 12.3.1 describes
the parameters’ effect on the expected losses l¯(axixi ∣Rxi) and l¯(axiF ∣Rxi). The expected
loss l¯(aFF ∣Rxi), on the other hand, is equal to η2 (Eq. 12.6), and is therefore insensitive to
variation in the parameters. Section 12.3.2 then compares the three expected losses for the
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observation of a selection of alleles of loci TH01 and D21S11 and presents the Bayes action
for each situation.
12.3.1 Sensitivity analyses of the expected losses l¯(axixi ∣Rxi) and
l¯(axiF ∣Rxi)
The expected losses l¯(axixi ∣Rxi) and l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) are functions of an allele’s mean peak height
H, the observed allele’s probability γxi , and the locus-specific parameter β0. In addition,
l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) also depends on the value of η1 (Eq. 12.5). Figure 12.2 illustrates the expected
losses’ dependence on H and γxi by plotting l¯(axixi ∣Rxi) and l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) in function of
H for six different allele probabilities γxi . Figure 12.3 highlights the expected losses’ de-
pendence on β0 by comparing the expected loss functions for two alleles with similar allele
probabilities, but of different loci. The chosen loci are D21S11 and TH01, because these
present minimum and maximum values for β0, generating minimum and maximum drop-out
probabilities Tvedebrink et al. (2009). The alleles’ probabilities in this study are based on
the population data for the Swiss Caucasian population Centre Universitaire Romand de
Me´decine Le´gale (CURML) (2008). The expected losses l¯(axixi ∣Rxi) and l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) de-
pend on H, γxi and β0 as follows:
Peak height H: The expected loss l¯(axixi ∣Rxi) generally increases as the mean peak height
decreases (Fig. 12.2(a) and 12.2(b)). This relationship is due to the increasing drop-out
probabilities for decreasing peak heights (see Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) in 12.6). However, the
increase is not constant, for there is a drop in each of the curves, where l¯(axixi ∣Rxi) decreases
as the mean peak height decreases. This is a consequence of the relationship between the
probability of a single heterozygous allele dropping out and the peak height H. That is, first,
as H decreases, the probability of a single, heterozygous allele dropping out increases, which
decreases Pr(Θxixi ∣Rxi) and increases the expected loss l¯(axixi ∣Rxi). Then, as H continues
to decrease, there comes a moment where the probability of a single, heterozygous allele
dropping out decreases due to the increase of the probability that both heterozygous alleles
drop out. This increases Pr(Θxixi ∣Rxi), decreasing l¯(axixi ∣Rxi). Then, as the probability of
two allele drop-outs increases, the probability that we are acually observing a drop-in allele
increases, and this decreases Pr(Θxixi ∣Rxi), provoking again an increase in l¯(axixi ∣Rxi).
The expected loss l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) also increases as the mean peak height decreases, yet this
increase only occurs for very low peak heights (Fig. 12.2(c) and 12.2(d)). For high values
of H, Pr(Θxi−∣Rxi) is very close to 1, so that l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) can be approximated with the
constant function l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) = η1. For smaller peak heights, the drop-out probabilities be-
come so important that they reduce Pr(Θxi−∣Rxi), causing a drastic increase in l¯(axiF ∣Rxi).
Allele probability γxi : The smaller γxi , the greater are the expected losses l¯(axixi ∣Rxi)
and l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) (e.g., compare the expected losses of alleles 9.3 (γ9.3 = 0.342) and 10
(γ10 = 0.018) in Fig. 12.2(a) and 12.2(c), or the expected losses of alleles 29 (γ29 = 0.255) and
33 (γ33 = 0.004) in Fig. 12.2(b) and 12.2(d)). That is, the rarer allele xi is in the population
of interest, the smaller are Pr(Θxixi ∣Rxi), the probability that the donor’s genotype is a
homozygote for this allele, and Pr(Θxi−∣Rxi), the probability that the donor’s genotype
contains at least one copy of this allele. The smaller these probabilities, the greater are the
expected losses of axixi and axiF .
For l¯(axixi ∣Rxi), the allele probability γxi also has a second effect: the smaller γxi , the less
pronounced is the drop in the curve due to the decrease of the probability of a single, het-
erozygous allele dropping out. This is due to a decrease of the probability Pr(Θxi−) which
reduces the influence of the probability of a single, heterozygous allele dropping out on the
resulting probability Pr(Θxixi ∣Rxi), and hence on the expected loss l¯(axixi ∣Rxi).
Locus (parameter β0): According to Tvedebrink et al. (2009), the drop-out probability
varies according to the locus. To take this variation into account, the equations proposed
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Figure 12.2: (a) and (b) The graphes plot the expected loss l¯(axixi ∣Rxi) in function of an allele’s
mean peak height H (in rfu) for xi = 6,7,8,9,9.3,10 of locus TH01 and for xi = 27,28,29,31,32,33 of locus
D21S11, respectively. (c) and (d) The graphes plot the expected loss l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) in function of H for
the same alleles of locus TH01 and the same alleles of locus D21S11, respectively. The probabilities of the
alleles are based on the population data for Caucasians in Switzerland Centre Universitaire Romand de
Me´decine Le´gale (CURML) (2008): for TH01, γ6 = 0.219, γ7 = 0.194, γ8 = 0.083, γ9 = 0.144, γ9.3 = 0.342
and γ10 = 0.018; and for D21S11, γ27 = 0.025, γ28 = 0.148, γ29 = 0.255, γ31 = 0.054, γ32 = 0.007, γ33 = 0.004.
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Figure 12.3: The locus-specific parameter β0 (figuring in Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) in 12.6) is responsible for
the horizontal translation of the curves for the expected losses in function of H: the larger β0, the greater
the drop-out probability for a particular H. Here, we compare the expected losses for xi = 28 of locus D21S11
and for xi = 9 of locus TH01, two alleles with similar allele probabilities (γ28 = 0.148 and γ9 = 0.144 Centre
Universitaire Romand de Me´decine Le´gale (CURML) (2008)) from loci with different β0 values: β0 = 17.45
for D21S11 and β0 = 19.40 for TH01 Tvedebrink et al. (2009). (a) The graph plots l¯(axixi ∣Rxi). (b) The
graph plots l¯(axiF ∣Rxi).
by Tvedebrink et al. Tvedebrink et al. (2009) (see Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) in 12.6) and used
in this model include a locus-specific parameter β0. This parameter is greater for TH01
(β0 = 19.40) than for D21S11 (β0 = 17.45) Tvedebrink et al. (2009). The greater β0, the
greater the drop-out probabilities for a particular H. Thus, locus TH01 has greater drop-out
probabilities than locus D21S11. A greater drop-out probability translates the curve for the
expected loss in function of the peak height to the right, that is, towards greater values of
H (Figure 12.3(a) and 12.3(b)). As a consequence, the general increase of the expected loss
for locus TH01 occurs for higher values of H than for locus D21S11.
To summarize, l¯(axixi ∣Rxi) is low when an allele’s mean peak height is high, and high
when the mean peak height is low, and l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) tends towards a constant function equal
to η1 when the mean peak height is high, and increases for a very low mean peak height.
The next section compares l¯(axixi ∣Rxi), l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) and l¯(aFF ∣Rxi) to determine which
action the scientist should choose in which situation.
12.3.2 Bayes action
Since l¯(axixi ∣Rxi) and l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) depend on the locus, the observed allele, the mean peak
height of a single allele in the profile, and the value defined for η1, so does the Bayes action.
In addition, the Bayes action also depends on η2, since l¯(aFF ∣Rxi) = η2. Here we will
determine the Bayes action for a loss function given by η1 = 0.2 and η2 = 0.5.
For this loss function, Figs. 12.4 and 12.5 plot the expected losses l¯(axixi ∣Rxi), l¯(axiF ∣Rxi)
and l¯(aFF ∣Rxi) in function of H for the observation of each of the alleles presented in
Fig. 12.2. These graphs show that the Bayes action is axixi for high peak heights, axiF
for lower peak heights, and aFF for extremely low peak heights. The points of intersection
between the different curves represent the threshold values in terms of the mean peak height
H for which the scientist should switch from one designation to another. The values of these
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Figure 12.4: Graphs plotting l¯(axixi ∣Rxi), l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) and l¯(aFF ∣Rxi) in function of H for each of the
six alleles of locus TH01 presented in Fig. 12.2(a) and 12.2(c), ordered here from the most common allele
to the rarest allele. The loss function is defined here by η1 = 0.2 and η2 = 0.5. Table 12.1 presents the
threshold values that mark the turning points where the Bayes action changes. Note that the peak heights
for which these turning points occur are different for each of the alleles.
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(a) D21S11 allele 29
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Figure 12.5: Graphs plotting l¯(axixi ∣Rxi), l¯(axiF ∣Rxi) and l¯(aFF ∣Rxi) in function of H for each of the
six alleles of locus D21S11 presented in Fig. 12.2(b) and 12.2(d), ordered here from the most common allele
to the rarest allele. The loss function is defined here by η1 = 0.2 and η2 = 0.5. Table 12.1 presents the
threshold values that mark the turning points where the Bayes action changes. Note that the peak heights
for which these turning points occur are different for each of the alleles.
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Table 12.1: The threshold values for H (rounded to the nearest rfu) that minimize the expected loss in
the choice between axixi , axiF and aFF for η1 = 0.2 and η2 = 0.5. These values correspond to the points of
intersection of the expected losses plotted in Fig. 12.4 and 12.5.
X xi γxi aFF is the axiF is the axixi is theBayes action for Bayes action for Bayes action for
TH01 9.3 0.342 H ≤ 17 rfu 18 rfu ≤H ≤ 157 rfu 158 rfu ≤H
6 0.219 H ≤ 26 rfu 27 rfu ≤H ≤ 183 rfu 184 rfu ≤H
7 0.194 H ≤ 27 rfu 28 rfu ≤H ≤ 190 rfu 191 rfu ≤H
9 0.144 H ≤ 30 rfu 30 rfu ≤H ≤ 208 rfu 209 rfu ≤H
8 0.083 H ≤ 35 rfu 36 rfu ≤H ≤ 241 rfu 242 rfu ≤H
10 0.018 H ≤ 39 rfu 40 rfu ≤H ≤ 349 rfu 350 rfu ≤H
D21S11 29 0.255 H ≤ 15 rfu 16 rfu ≤H ≤ 111 rfu 112 rfu ≤H
28 0.148 H ≤ 19 rfu 20 rfu ≤H ≤ 131 rfu 132 rfu ≤H
31 0.054 H ≤ 23 rfu 24 rfu ≤H ≤ 171 rfu 172 rfu ≤H
27 0.025 H ≤ 25 rfu 26 rfu ≤H ≤ 206 rfu 207 rfu ≤H
32 0.007 H ≤ 25 rfu 26 rfu ≤H ≤ 278 rfu 279 rfu ≤H
33 0.004 H ≤ 26 rfu 27 rfu ≤H ≤ 316 rfu 317 rfu ≤H
thresholds are locus-specific, allele-specific, and depend on the loss function. Table 12.1
presents these values for the situations plotted in Figs. 12.4 and 12.5:
 for locus TH01, the threshold between axixi and axiF , above which the scientist should
choose axixi , ranges from 157 rfu (for the observation of a common allele) to 349 rfu
(for the observation of a rare allele), and the threshold between axiF and aFF , below
which the scientist should choose aFF , from 18 rfu (for the observation of a common
allele) to 40 rfu (for the observation of a rare allele);
 for locus D21S11, these thresholds range from 111 rfu (for the observation of a common
allele) to 316 rfu (for the observation of a rare allele) for the choice between axixi and
axiF , and from 16 rfu (for the observation of a common allele) to 27 rfu (for the
observation of a rare allele) for the choice between axiF and aFF .
In summary, both of the thresholds are lower for a locus with smaller drop-out probabilities,
and for the observation of a more common allele.
12.4 Case 2: Observation of a single peak for allele xi
in the first replicate and a pair of peaks for alleles
xi and xj in the second replicate
Consider now a case where the crime stain’s DNA profiling results consist of two replicates.
The aim of this multiple tube approach is not to produce a concensus profile, but to use the
results produced by each of the replicates to produce a more informed probability distribution
over the possible genotypes of the crime stain’s donor Gill et al. (2000); Curran et al. (2005);
Gill et al. (2007); Balding and Buckleton (2009). So, imagine that for locus X , the scientist
observes a single peak for allele xi on the first EPG, and a pair of peaks for alleles xi and
xj , i ≠ j, on the second EPG. The observation on the first replicate is denoted by Rxi , and
the observation on the second replicate by R′xixj (remember that the prime symbol is used
to distinguish the elements of the second replicate from those of the first replicate). Again,
we want to find the scientist’s Bayes action.
The influence diagram in Fig. 12.1(b) evaluates these expected losses when the user sets
xi = 1 and xk = 0, ∀ k ∈ {1,2, . . . , n}/{i} in the instance network RE, and x′i = 1, x′j = 1 and
x′k = 0, ∀ k ∈ {1,2, . . . , n}/{i, j} in the instance network for the second replicate RE′. The
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expected losses of the actions in A are evaluated according to Eqs. (12.3)-(12.6) using the
updated probability distribution over the donor’s possible genotypes given Rxi and R
′
xixj .
In addition to being dependent on the allele probabilities γxi and γc,xi , the locus-specific
parameter β0 and the mean peak height of a single allele in the EPG H, the probability dis-
tribution over the donor’s possible genotypes also depends on the allele probabilities γxj and
γc,xj , since the scientist observed a peak for allele xj in the second replicate. Furthermore,
the fact that the observations were made on two separate replicates implies that there is an
H, a γc,xi and a γc,xj for the first replicate and an H
′, a γ′c,xi and a γ′c,xj for the second
replicate. To reduce the number of parameters, we assume that each of the allele probabili-
ties of the observed alleles in the population of possible drop-in alleles is equal to the allele
probabilities of these alleles in the population of the crime stain’s potential sources, so that
γc,xi = γ′c,xi = γxi and γc,xj = γ′c,xj = γxj . This leaves us with the alleles’ probabilities, the
locus, an allele’s mean peak height in the first EPG H, and an allele’s mean peak height in
the second EPG H ′ as parameters.
The observation of Rxi and R
′
xixj makes the Bayes action one of the following genotype
designations:
 the homozygous designation, axixi : in this case, xj in the second replicate is considered
to be a drop-in allele;
 the heterozygous designation, axixj : in this case, there was a drop-out of xj in the
first replicate;
 the use of a wildcard F to say that the genotype has at least one copy of allele xi,
axiF : this action reflects some uncertainty on whether xj is a drop-in allele or an allele
present in the donor’s genotype;
 the uninformative designation aFF .
The decision analysis in this section therefore focuses on these four possible actions. Sec-
tion 12.4.1 studies the impact of the parameters on the expected losses l¯(axixi ∣R′xixj ,Rxi),
l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) and l¯(axiF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi). Remember that the expected loss l¯(aFF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi)
is equal to η2 and remains insensitive to variation in the parameters, and is therefore not
studied in Section 12.4.1. The Bayes action is then presented for a selection of situations for
locus TH01 by comparing the expected losses for all four actions in Section 12.4.2.
12.4.1 Sensitivity analyses of the expected losses l¯(axixi ∣R′xixj ,Rxi),
l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) and l¯(axiF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi)
The expected losses l¯(axixi ∣R′xixj ,Rxi), l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) and l¯(axiF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) are func-
tions of the mean peak heights H and H ′, the allele probabilities γxi and γxj , and the
locus-specific parameter β0. We have already discussed the impact of β0 in Section 12.3.1,
and will not repeat it here. The focus will be on the impact of the two mean peak heights,
H and H ′, and of the allele probabilities of the two observed alleles, γi and γj . Figure 12.6
illustrates the variation due to these parameters by plotting each of the expected losses in
function of H ′, for different values of H, γxi and γxj . In particular, the expected losses’
dependence on each of these parameters is the following:
Peak height H ′: The lower the mean peak height H ′, the lower is the probability of there
not being any allele drop-out in the second replicate. The probability of Θxixj , given that
the EPG shows peaks for alleles xi and xj , is therefore high for high values of H
′ and low
for low values of H ′. For a low H ′, the observation of this pair of peaks becomes more
probable if Θxixi is true, that is, if there was no drop-out of the homozygous peak of al-
lele xi, and peak xj comes from a drop-in allele, because the event of no allelic drop-out
is more probable for a homozygous peak than for heterozygous peaks. This decreases the
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Figure 12.6: Graphs (a) and (b) plot the expected loss l¯(axixi ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) in function of H′, (c) and (d)
the expected loss l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi), and (e) and (f) the expected loss l¯(axiF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi). Each graph plots
the expected loss for the observation of alleles 9.3 and 10 of locus TH01, with γ9.3 = 0.342 and γ10 = 0.018
Centre Universitaire Romand de Me´decine Le´gale (CURML) (2008). Graphs (a), (c) and (e) plot the
expected losses for xi = 10 (a rare allele) and xj = 9.3 (a very common allele) for H = 25,50,100,150 rfu,
and graphs (b), (d) and (f) the expected losses for xi = 9.3 (a very common allele) and xj = 10 (a rare
allele) for H = 25,50,100,150 rfu.
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expected loss l¯(axixi ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) and increases the expected loss l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) for lower
values of H ′. Apart from extremely low peak heights for H ′ (i.e., H ′ ≤ 50 rfu), this makes
the expected loss of the homozygous designation, l¯(axixi ∣R′xixj ,Rxi), an increasing function
of H ′ (Figs. 12.6(a) and 12.6(b)), and the expected loss of the heterozygous designation,
l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi), a decreasing function of H ′ (Figs. 12.6(c) and 12.6(d)). For extremely
low values of H ′, the drop-out probability of a homozygous peak increases, increasing the
expected loss of the homozygous designation.
As for the expected loss l¯(axiF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi), it tends towards η1 as H ′ increases (Figs. 12.6(e)
and 12.6(f)). This expected loss is slightly greater than η1 for low peak heights H
′ and H
because the increased probability of allele drop-out of the donor’s alleles gives more weight
to the possibility that the observed allele xi is actually a drop-in allele, which increases the
possibility of axiF being a false designation. As H
′ increases, the drop-out probabilities
decrease, so that Pr(Θxi−∣R′xixj ,Rxi)→ 1, and l¯(axiF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi)→ η1.
Peak height H: The dependence of l¯(axixi ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) on H in Fig. 12.6(b) corresponds
to the relationship described in the previous section (see, for example, Fig. 12.2(a)): the ex-
pected loss is generally greater for small values of H than for large values of H, yet presents
a drop around 50 rfu, which is greater when xi is a common allele than when xi is a rare
allele (see explanations on page 161). This behavior is due to the probability that one of
the alleles in a heterozygous profile drops-out, which first increases as H decreases, then
decreases due to the increase of the probability that both alleles in a heterozygous profile
drop-out.
The opposite behavior is observed for l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) in Fig. 12.6(d): the expected loss
is generally smaller for small values of H than for large values of H, because the drop-out
of a heterozygous allele in the first replicate is more probable for smaller values of H. The
increase of the probability of an allele drop-out in a heterozygous profile raises the prob-
ability of observing a single peak xi given that the donor’s genotype is Θxixj , decreasing
l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi). Instead of a drop of the expected loss around 50 rfu, there is now an
increase around 50 rfu, noticeable when xi is a common allele. This is because the decrease
of the probability of a single allele drop-out in a heterozygous profile, due to the increase of
the probability of both alleles dropping out, decreases the probability of Rxi given Θxixj ,
thus increasing l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi).
The expected loss l¯(axiF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) in Figs. 12.6(e) and 12.6(f) tends towards η1 as H
increases. As explained above under Peak height H ′, the expected loss is slightly greater
than η1 for low peak heights H and H
′ because the increased probability of allele drop-
out of the donor’s alleles gives more weight to the possibility that the observed allele xi is
actually a drop-in allele, which increases the possibility of axiF being a false designation.
When H increases, the drop-out probabilities decrease, so that Pr(Θxi−∣R′xixj ,Rxi) → 1,
and l¯(axiF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi)→ η1.
Allele probabilities γxi and γxj : With regard to allele xi, the expected loss l¯(axixi ∣R′xixj ,Rxi)
is greater for a rare allele, because the probability of this genotype is smaller for a rare xi.
For a rare allele xi, it is more probable to observe a heterozygote than a homozygote. This
increases the probability of the donor being a heterozygote, and decreases the expected loss
l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi). As for allele xj , its allele probability has practically no impact on the
expected loss l¯(axixi ∣R′xixj ,Rxi), yet the expected loss l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) is greater for a
rare allele (in particular for low peak heights H ′). A rare allele xj reduces the probability
of the heterozygous genotype Θxixj , and this reduces the probability that axixj leads to a
correct designation, especially when the observation R′xixj is subject to increased stochastic
effects.
The increase of the expected loss l¯(axiF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) for low values of H ′ and H is greater
for a rare allele xi then for a common allele xi, as discussed earlier in Section 12.3.1.
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To summarize, l¯(axixi ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) is low when an allele’s mean peak height is low in
the second replicate and allele xi has a high allele probability in the population of interest,
l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) is low when an allele’s mean peak height is high in the second replicate,
and l¯(axiF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) tends towards a constant function equal to η1 as an allele’s mean
peak height in either replicate increases.
The next section compares l¯(axixi ∣R′xixj ,Rxi), l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi), l¯(axiF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) and
l¯(aFF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) in several situations to determine the Bayes action.
12.4.2 Bayes action
The Bayes action depends on the locus, the observed alleles, the mean peak heights of an
allele in each of the EPGs, and on the values of η1 and η2. Like for Case 1, we determine
the Bayes action for a loss function given by η1 = 0.2 and η2 = 0.5.
Figure 12.7 plots the expected losses l¯(axixi ∣R′xixj ,Rxi), l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi),
l¯(axiF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) and l¯(aFF ∣R′xixj ,Rxi) in function of H ′ for the observation of alleles
9.3 and 10 of locus TH01, for H values ranging from 50 rfu to 150 rfu. According to these
graphs, the Bayes action is axixj for high values of H
′, and axiF for lower values of H ′. If
allele xi is very common in the population of potential sources, then action axixi is the Bayes
action for a limited range of very low peak heights H ′. Table 12.2 presents the threshold
values in terms of H ′ for which the scientist should change from one designation to another
for the situations plotted in Fig. 12.7. In these cases, the thresholds take the following
values:
 for xi = 10 and xj = 9.3 (i.e., xi is rare), the threshold between axiF and axixj , above
which the scientist should choose axixj , ranges from 57 rfu to 62 rfu;
 for xi = 9.3 and xj = 10 (i.e., xi is very common), the threshold between axiF and
axixj , above which the scientist should choose axixj , ranges from 80 rfu to 105 rfu,
and there are two further thresholds delimiting the range for which the Bayes action is
axixi , with the lower limit ranging from 14 rfu to 29 rfu, and the upper limit ranging
from 41 rfu to 55 rfu.
In this scenario, the greatest influence on the thresholds determining the Bayes action comes
from the rarity of the observed alleles in the population of potential sources. For a rare xi,
the Bayes action is a heterozygous designation, yet for a common xi, the Bayes action may
also be a homozygous designation when H ′ is low.
This case study illustrates how complex this decision problem can get for the observation
of several replicates. In this case, the different results in each of the replicates make the
decision problem particularly challenging. The Bayes action cannot be clearly stated based
on the observed alleles alone. It depends on the parameters, and will therefore vary from
one situation to another.
12.5 Discussion and conclusions
The genotype designation of a trace’s source is a decision. Applying a normative approach to
this decision problem shows that there is no single, universal threshold for deciding between
any two designations. Here, we have shown how this threshold varies in function of the locus,
the observed alleles’ probabilities in the population of potential sources, and an allele’s mean
peak height in the EPGs of the previously obtained replicates. In addition, the thresholds
depend on the model’s assumptions for allele drop-outs and drop-ins, and on the scientist’s
preferences regarding false exclusions and false inclusions. These parameters vary in function
of the case, the scientist and the laboratory: the observed alleles and mean peak heights
in the replicates are case-specific; the model’s assumptions for allele drop-outs and drop-ins
will vary from one laboratory to another, because they should represent each laboratory’s
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Figure 12.7: Graphs plotting l¯(axixi ∣R′xixj ,Rxi), l¯(axixj ∣R′xixj ,Rxi), l¯(axiF ∣R′xixj ,Ri) and
l¯(aFF ∣R′xixj ,Ri) in function of H′ for the observation of alleles 9.3 and 10 of locus TH01, with γ9.3 = 0.342
and γ10 = 0.018 Centre Universitaire Romand de Me´decine Le´gale (CURML) (2008). Graphs (a) and (b)
are for H = 50 rfu, graphs (c) and (d) for H = 100 rfu, and graphs (e) and (f) for H = 150 rfu. Graphs
(a), (c) and (e) plot the expected losses when xi = 10 (a rare allele) and xj = 9.3 (a very common allele),
and graphs (b), (d) and (f) the expected losses when xi = 9.3 (a very common allele) and xj = 10 (a rare
allele). These two combinations represent the minimum and maximum expected losses among the possible
combinations of the alleles presented in Fig. 12.2(a) and (c). Table 12.2 indicates the optimal decision
strategy for each of the H values and allele combinations represented here.
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performances; and the scientist’s preferences will vary from one scientist to another, and
may also vary from one case to another in function of the severity of the case. As a result,
the numerous parameters involved make that this decision problem has no single threshold
that leads to the Bayes action in every case.
According to the decision-theoretic framework proposed in this paper, the Bayes ac-
tion is a function of the scientist’s loss function and the probability distribution over the
trace’s donor’s possible genotypes in a particular case. This model provides a case-specific
approach, that can be adapted to incorporate each laboratory’s drop-out and drop-in as-
sumptions. When the model contains numerous random variables with complex probabilistic
relationships, the construction of an influence diagram provides a practical means to eval-
uate the expected losses for each of the possible genotype designations. An object-oriented
approach further allows the scientist to overcome the difficulty caused by the increasing com-
plexity of the calculations for an increasing number of replicates. With object-orientation,
this model allows the scientist to “copy and paste” the network substructure for the result of
a single replicate (an instance of the network Result) as many times as required, and per-
form calculations for as many replicates as desired. This model therefore provides a logical,
case-specific approach for addressing the genotype designation problem for lt-DNA profiles
without requiring a universally pre-defined stochastic threshold.
12.6 Appendix: Network class ‘Result’
The network class Result models the probability distribution over the DNA analysis’s possi-
ble results (i.e., the observed and the unobserved alleles) in function of the donor’s genotype
and the stochastic effects. The instance nodes RE and RE′ in the influence diagrams shown
in Fig. 12.1 are instances of this class. Figure 12.8 shows the network class Result we used
in this study (the nodes are defined in Table 12.3). This is one possible structure for this
Z D
ΘpΘmo o Γc
C Γc Γc
Γc
H
x1 x2 xn
ΘpΘm
1 2
o
1 2
o
Figure 12.8: The network class Result. This network is composed of the nodes with the continuous
contours (Table 12.3 presents the definitions of these nodes). The nodes with the dashed contours represent
nodes Θm and Θp in the influence diagrams in Fig. 12.1, which are input nodes for this network.
network class, inspired by Mortera et al. Mortera et al. (2003) for nodes x1, x2, . . . , xn, and
by Dawid et al. (2002, 2007) for the nodes of the observed alleles. Nodes x1, x2, . . . , xn,
representing each of X ’s alleles, are Boolean nodes for the presence or absence of each allele
in the trace’s DNA profile. The network assumes that a maximum of four alleles may be
observed at the same time: these are the donor’s maternal and paternal alleles for a het-
erozygous donor in a case with no allele drop-outs plus two drop-in alleles. Nodes Θom and
Θop indicate the observed alleles coming from the donor, and nodes Γ
o
c1 and Γ
o
c2 the observed
drop-in alleles. Node xk, k = 1,2, . . . , n, will take the value of true whenever at least one of
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Table 12.3: Definitions of the nodes in the network class Result shown in Fig. 12.8.
Node Definition
Θom Observed donor’s maternal allele
Θop Observed donor’s paternal allele
Z Zygosity of the donor’s genotype
H Mean peak height of a single allele in the EPG
D Event of 0, 1 or 2 allele drop-outs
C Event of 0, 1 or 2 allele drop-ins
Γc1 (First) allele that drops in for 1 or 2 allele drop-ins
Γc2 Second allele that drops in for 2 allele drop-ins
Γoc1 Observed drop-in allele 1
Γoc2 Observed drop-in allele 2
x1
x2⋮
xn
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭ Presence or absence of each of locus X ’s alleles
these four nodes is equal to xk:
∀ xk ∈ X : xk = { true if (Θom = xk) ∪ (Θop = xk) ∪ (Γoc1 = xk) ∪ (Γoc2 = xk)false otherwise .
The rest of the network is divided into two parts: the left-hand side models the observed
alleles coming from the donor and the right-hand side the observed drop-in alleles (considered
to be independent of the donor’s alleles). Below we describe each of these parts in turn.
On the left-hand side, the observed donor’s alleles depend on the donor’s maternal and
paternal alleles (nodes Θm and Θp, respectively) and on the number of alleles that have
dropped out (node D). This number may be equal to 0, 1 or 2 for heterozygous genotypes,
and to 0 or 2 for homozygous genotypes. Let the states D0, D1 and D2 denote the events
of 0, 1 and 2 allele drop-outs, respectively. The states of Θom and Θ
o
p consist of each of the
locus’s possible alleles plus the observation of no allele, denoted here by ø. The conditional
probability table for node Θom is filled out as follows:
Pr(Θom = Θm) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if D =D0
0.5 if D =D1
0 if D =D2 ,
P r(Θom = ø) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if D =D0
0.5 if D =D1
1 if D =D2 ,
and 0’s for the rest of the possible states. The conditional probability table for node Θop is
filled out in the same way for D = D0 and D = D2, yet Pr(Θop = Θp) and Pr(Θop = ø) will
take values of either 1 or 0 when D = D1, depending on whether Θom = ø or Θom ≠ ø. The
conditional probability table for node Θop is therefore filled out as follows:
Pr(Θop = Θp) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if D =D0
1 if D =D1 and Θom = ø
0 if D =D1 and Θom ≠ ø
0 if D =D2 ,
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Pr(Θop = ø) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if D =D0
0 if D =D1 and Θom = ø
1 if D =D1 and Θom ≠ ø
1 if D =D2 ,
and 0’s for the rest of the possible states.
The probability distribution over D0, D1 and D2 (in node D) is a function of the observed
peak heights in relative fluorescence units (rfu)11 in the EPG (node H) and of the zygosity
of the donor’s genotype (node Z):
node H: The definition of H depends on the model used for assigning the drop-out proba-
bilities. For example, if one would retain the approach presented in Gill et al. (2009),
node H would represent the peak height of the single peak present at the locus under
examination. Or, if we adhere to the model presented in Tvedebrink et al. (2009), this
would suggest defining H as the mean peak height of a single allele calculated over
all of the analyzed loci on the EPG. For the purpose of the discussion in this paper,
we apply the model presented in Tvedebrink et al. (2009), so that the states of H
represent the mean peak height of an allele in the resulting profile. Using a Bayesian
network construction software (Hugin Researcher by Hugin Expert A/S), we modeled
the target range of possible peak heights as a set of intervals of 5 rfu. Based on the ob-
servations made on the EPG, the user instantiates this node (i.e., sets the probability
of the observed peak height to 1) in order to carry out the decision-theoretic analysis
for the obtained DNA profile.12 The node’s initial probability distribution is therefore
irrelevant.
node Z: This node has two states: state Zo describes a homozygous genotype and state Ze
a heterozygous genotype.
Empirical studies have shown that allele drop-out tends to be encountered more often as
the quantity of DNA in the trace material decreases Gill et al. (2000). The peak heights in
the resulting DNA profile reflect the quantity of analyzed DNA Tvedebrink et al. (2010).
For this reason, we model allele drop-out as a child13 node of the observed peak height
(node H). Several studies have produced models using logistic regression to model the
drop-out probability in function of the observed peak height Gill et al. (2009); Tvedebrink
et al. (2009). It is important to note that the actual relationship between the peak height
and the occurrence of drop-out depends on the laboratory’s equipment and protocol, and is
therefore established on the basis of each laboratory’s experimental data. This relationship
is also locus-specific Tvedebrink et al. (2009). In this paper, we apply the model presented
in Tvedebrink et al. (2009) to describe the relationship between H and D. According to
this model, the drop-out probability, let us call it d, is specified in function of the locus
(through a locus-specific parameter β0) and the mean peak height for one allele in the
profile (variable H). Given that a peak in a heterozygous genotype corresponds to one
allele, whereas a peak in a homozygous genotype corresponds to two alleles, the drop-out
probabilities are different for heterozygous (Ze) and homozygous (Zo) genotypes. These
drop-out probabilities, denoted here by dZe and dZo , respectively, are given by the following
expressions Tvedebrink et al. (2009):
dZe = exp [β0 − 4.35ln(H)]1 + exp [β0 − 4.35ln(H)] (A.1)
11Note that it could just as well be the peak area for a model of the drop-out probability in function of
the peak area.
12If the obtained EPG does not allow the scientist to determine the value or interval of values of the mean
peak height of a single allele, then it is also possible for the user to specify a probability distribution over
the possible values of H.
13If an arrow goes from node 1 to node 2, so that we have node 1 → node 2, then node 2 is called a child
of node 1. This means that the probability distribution over the states of node 2 is conditioned by the state
of node 1.
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Table 12.4: The probability distribution in node D depends on whether the donor’s genotype is homozygote
(state Zo) or heterozygote (state Ze). Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) give the expressions for dZe and dZo .
Z ∶ Zo Ze
Pr(D0) 1 − dZo 1 − 2dZe(1 − dZe) − (dZe)2
Pr(D1) 0 2dZe(1 − dZe)
Pr(D2) dZo (dZe)2
for the drop-out of a peak of a heterozygous genotype, and
dZo = exp [β0 − 4.35ln(2H)]1 + exp [β0 − 4.35ln(2H)] (A.2)
for the drop-out of the peak of a homozygous genotype. Hence, node D is also a child
of Z (indicating whether the donor is homozygote or heterozygote). Table 12.4 gives the
probability distributions in node D in function of Z. In the case studies in Sections 12.3 and
12.4, we apply this model to loci D21S11 and TH01. We chose these loci because D21S11
presents the minimum drop-out probabilities, with β0 = 17.45, and TH01 the maximum
drop-out probabilities, with β0 = 19.40, according to the data referred to in Tvedebrink
et al. (2009).
On the right-hand side, the observed drop-in alleles depend on the number of drop-in
alleles (node C) and on the probability distribution over the locus’s possible drop-in alleles
(nodes Γc1 and Γc2). C0 is the event of no allele drop-in at this locus, C1 the event that one
allele has dropped in, and C2 the event that two alleles have dropped in. We abbreviate the
probabilities of these two states with their lowercase equivalents: Pr(C0) = c0, Pr(C1) = c1
and Pr(C2) = c2. Since the drop-ins are considered to be independent appearances of single
alleles, we have c2 = c21 and c0 = 1 − c1 − c21. Thus, all we need to define the probability
distribution over C is a probability assignment for c1. This probabibility may vary from
one laboratory to another, so that each laboratory must determine its own value for c1.
14
Publications have reported average drop-in probabilities of 0.05 Gill et al. (2007), ≤ 0.05
Taberlet et al. (1996), 0.02 Cowen et al. (2011), 0.018 Mitchell et al. (2012) and 0.0134
Petricevic et al. (2010). In this study, we used c1 = 0.05. The states of nodes Γoc1 and Γoc2
consist of each of the locus’s possible alleles plus the obseration of no allele, ø. If 0 alleles
have dropped in, Γoc1 and Γ
o
c1 are both equal to ø. If a single allele has dropped in, node
Γc1 specifies which allele has dropped-in, node Γ
o
c1 copies the state of Γc1, and node Γ
o
c2
is equal to ø. If two alleles have dropped in, both nodes Γc1 and Γc2 specify which alleles
have dropped in, and node Γoc1 copies the state of Γc1, and node Γ
o
c2 the state of Γc2. The
conditional probability table for node Γoc1 is therefore filled out as follows:
Pr(Γoc1 = Γc1) = { 0 if C = C01 otherwise ,
P r(Γoc1 = ø) = { 1 if C = C00 otherwise ,
with 0’s for the remaining possible states. And the conditional probability table of Γoc2 is
filled out as follows:
Pr(Γoc2 = Γc2) = { 1 if C = C20 otherwise ,
14The literature proposes a way of assigning a value to c1 on the basis of negative controls Gill and
Kirkham (2004), for example by dividing the total number of alleles observed on these controls by the total
number of loci tested over all of the negative controls performed Gill et al. (2007).
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Pr(Γoc2 = ø) = { 0 if C = C21 otherwise ,
with 0’s for the remaining possible states.
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Chapter 13
Decision-theoretic Reflections
on Processing a Fingermark
Abstract
A recent publication in this journal (Neumann et al., 2011b) presented the re-
sults of a field study that revealed the data provided by the fingermarks not
processed in a forensic science laboratory. In their study, the authors were in-
terested in the usefulness of this additional data in order to determine whether
such fingermarks would have been worth submitting to the fingermark processing
workflow. Taking these ideas as a starting point, this communication here places
the fingermark in its context of a case brought before a court, and examines the
question of processing or not processing a fingermark from a decision-theoretic
point of view. The decision-theoretic framework presented provides an answer
to this question in the form of a quantified expression of the expected value of
information (EV OI) associated with the processed fingermark, which can then
be compared with the cost of processing the mark.
13.1 Introduction
“To process or not to process a fingermark?” That is the question examined by the field
study conducted by Neumann et al. (2011b). The question of processing or not processing
a fingermark is one of the decisions confronting a fingerprint examiner for each detected
fingermark (Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology
(SWGFAST), 2011). It is the decision of whether to submit a recovered trace to a fingermark
examination process, which seeks to associate the mark with its source1.
The study conducted by Neumann et al. (2011b) investigated the usefulness of finger-
marks not processed in a forensic laboratory. These unexploited fingermarks consisted of
fingermarks that were either not recovered on evidentiary items, or categorized as being
of no value during an initial analysis phase. The goal of their study was to bring to light
the results of comparing these marks with fingerprints of potential sources, and to compare
Reprinted from Forensic Science International, 226, S. Gittelson, S. Bozza, A. Biedermann,
and F. Taroni, Decision-theoretic reflections on processing a fingermark, pages e42-e47, Copy-
right (2013), with permission from Elsevier.
1The word source refers not only to a particular person, but to the particular area of the person’s friction
ridge skin that is at the origin of the mark. For simplicity we will only consider friction ridge marks coming
from fingers, and therefore speak of a finger as being the source of a fingermark (see Neumann et al. (2011a)
for an explanation of the difference between considering a finger and considering a person as being the source
of a fingermark). Yet, the ideas presented here for fingermarks may also be extended to other friction ridge
marks.
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these findings with the additional resources (in USD and in man-hours) required to obtain
this additional data. In doing this, they pursued the fundamental issue of whether it is
possible for the laboratory to make more beneficial decisions for processing or not process-
ing a fingermark. The results of their study indicated that the average cost for obtaining
an additional piece of evidence was about $3000, and they concluded that the laboratory’s
current procedures “are well optimized for cost-effectiveness” (Neumann et al., 2011b, p.
46).
When is it worth investing a laboratory’s resources in processing a fingermark? From a
decision-theoretic point of view, this question can be answered on the basis of a quantified
expression of the expected value of information (EV OI) associated with the processed
fingermark: a rational decision-maker would decide to process a fingermark when the EV OI
is greater than or equal to the cost of processing the mark. The objective of the pages
that follow is to present a decision-theoretic development for determining the EV OI for a
fingermark.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 13.2 describes the decision problem, Section
13.3 the decision-theoretic framework for approaching this problem, Section 13.4 the con-
struction of the corresponding influence diagram, and Section 13.5 summarizes the main
points with regard to a practical application of the model.
13.2 The question: “To process or not to process a fin-
germark?”
The fingermark examination process uses the laboratory’s resources (quantifiable in mon-
etary units and in man-hours) to compare a fingermark with the fingerprints of potential
sources. Submitting the fingermark to this process may produce data in the form of simi-
larities or dissimilarities with a comparison print. This data may lead to the association2 of
the mark with the print of a potential source and/or to exclusions of possible sources. Let
us call the fingermark’s true source finger F*. Now, if the data narrows down the pool of
possible sources to a smaller population containing F* (in the ideal case to a single finger
which is F*), it correctly supports a proposition of type “the fingermark comes from finger
F*” with regard to the alternative “the fingermark does not come from finger F*, it comes
from another finger in the pool of possible sources”. However, if the data leads to an erro-
neous conclusion (i.e., a false association or a false exclusion), or if processing the fingermark
does not produce any discriminatory data, the laboratory will have spent its resources in
vain, and an erroneous conclusion may lead to an erroneous verdict. A fingerprint examiner
deciding to process or not to process a fingermark will attempt to distinguish between these
two situations, that is, between: (i) cases where a fingermark’s discriminatory data will nar-
row down the pool of possible sources to a smaller population containing F*, and (ii) cases
where such discriminatory data will either be absent or lead to an erroneous conclusion.
The examiner will attempt to process only the fingermarks expected to fall into category (i).
Hence, a fingermark expected to lead to a strong association (such as an individualization)
with a print of the mark’s source, and sometimes also fingermarks expected to lead only
to correct exclusions, will be considered suitable for a comparison, and a fingermark that
does not fulfill this expectation will be categorized as being of no value for a comparison
(Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST),
2011).
If a fingermark’s value reduces to its ability to correctly support a proposition, then the
solution to the decision problem of processing or not processing a fingermark is to quantify
the expected support for a proposition, and compare it to a pre-defined threshold, above
which all marks would be processed. However, a fingermark suitable for a comparison does
2Note that by association we do not imply an individualization. An association is any conclusion tending
towards an individualization on a continuous scale of conclusions.
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not necessarily represent useful information. Neumann et al. (2011b) recognized this as they
stated on page 40:
“. . . all these extra associations were made in cases where at least one conclu-
sion of identification had already been expressed, hence reducing their potential
usefulness.”
For a fingermark to be of real value, it must not only support the correct proposition: it
must embody useful information. But what is useful information? In decision theory, the
usefulness of information depends on the decision maker’s objective. The definition of useful
information therefore depends on what the information will be used for. For this, let us take
a step back and look at the fingermark in its context in a case brought before a court. In
this context, processing a fingermark is one of many forensic analyses. By definition, every
forensic analysis brought before court has one and the same ultimate aim: to assist judicial
decision-making. Hence, the results of a comparison between a fingermark and a suspect’s
print is used to help a judicial decision-maker (i.e., a judge or a jury) decide on the verdict
of a case. The comparison results of the fingermark are thus useful information if they help
the judicial decision-maker reach a correct decision. Therefore, the value of the comparison
results for a given fingermark is its contribution to reaching a correct judicial decision.3
Thus, we are not interested in one decision, but in two decisions: (i) the decision to
process or not to process a fingermark, and (ii) the judicial decision in the fingermark’s case.
We will call the latter, the ultimate decision. This makes the decision of processing or
not processing a fingermark a preliminary decision: more precisely, it is a preliminary
decision of investing in generating data (i.e., by processing a mark) that may help the judicial
decision-maker make the ultimate decision. The decision of processing or not processing a
fingermark thus requires an evaluation of the expected value of any thus generated data with
regard to the ultimate decision. Decision theory provides a framework for this in terms of
the expected value of information (EV OI), which we present in the next section.
13.3 Decision-theoretic framework
A decision-theoretic framework allows us to specify the EV OI of a fingermark in a quanti-
tative way with respect to the ultimate decision (i.e., the judicial decision made by the judge
or jury in the context of the fingermark’s case). The framework we present here is based
on the existing works of Kaplan (1968), Lindley (1977a), Lempert (1977) and Kaye (1999).
As the ultimate decision, let us consider the judicial decision of convicting or acquitting a
defendant, whom we will call individual D. We define:
 an action space A consisting of the judicial decision-maker’s possible actions ai, i = 0,1:
a0 - acquit D,
a1 - convict D;
 a set Θ consisting of the unknown states of nature Θj , j = 0,1:
Θ0 - D is innocent of the alleged offence,
Θ1 - D is guilty of the alleged offence;
 and a set C = A × Θ of the possible consequences of the actions, where the elements
of this set, Cij , denote the consequence of having chosen action ai when the state of
nature Θj holds:
3This is true for the results of any forensic analysis, not just for the results of fingermark comparisons.
Actually, it is the value of any scientific finding brought before court. For explanations on the role of an
item of evidence in the logical framework of judicial decision-making, see for example Kaplan (1968); Lindley
(1977a); Lempert (1977).
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C00 - correct acquittal,
C01 - false acquittal,
C10 - false conviction,
C11 - correct conviction.
A utility function describes the satisfaction obtained from each of the consequences. The
utility of consequence Cij , denoted u(Cij), is a numerical description of how desirable this
consequence is (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). According to Lindley (1977a), this
utility function is imposed by the objectives and preferences of society.
If the decision maker wants to maximize this satisfaction, then the most rational action is
the one with the greatest expected utility. The expected utility of action ai, denoted u¯(ai∣·),
is the weighted average of the utilities of the consequences with respect to the probabilities of
each consequence occurring as a result of choosing action ai, given the information available
at the time of making the decision (this information is denoted here by the centered dot
after the conditioning bar):
u¯(ai∣·) = 1∑
j=0u(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣·) .
The probability Pr(Θj ∣·) is the conditional probability of Θj being true. This probability
is assigned on the basis of the information available to the decision-maker at the time he or
she chooses action ai. What information is available will depend on whether the fingermark
was processed or not processed.
For an unprocessed fingermark, the probability of the state Θj is conditioned on the
background information I, which includes the case circumstances and the other evidence
informing the judicial decision-maker’s probability distribution over Θ prior to obtaining
the results from a comparison of the fingermark with fingerprints of its potential sources.
We denote this probability Pr(Θj ∣I). The maximum expected utility of choosing an action
in A if the fingermark is not processed is therefore:4
maxi u¯(ai∣I) =maxi {u(Ci0)Pr(Θ0∣I) + u(Ci1)Pr(Θ1∣I)} . (13.1)
For a processed fingermark, the probability distribution over Θ is conditioned on both the
background information I and on the results obtained from processing the fingermark. We
denote this probability Pr(Θj ∣E, I) with E describing the results obtained from a comparison
of the fingermark with a fingerprint of finger F, one of the defendant’s ten fingers. These
results consist of the observations of a set of features on the fingermark and on the fingerprint
of finger F. Each of these features may be categorized as belonging to one of three levels:
Level 1 (general ridge flow), Level 2 (minutiae and individual ridge paths) and Level 3
(ridge shape and pores) (Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and
Technology (SWGFAST), 2011). To present here an illustrative example that keeps the
complexity in the equations that follow at a limited level, let us consider a case where
the observations are limited to Level 1 and Level 2 features. Further, let us assume that
comparing the fingermark with a fingerprint will lead either to the result that the features
of Level l, l = 1,2, are similar (i.e., fall within a pre-defined range of variation known
as the mark’s tolerance (Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and
Technology (SWGFAST), 2011)) or dissimilar (i.e., do not fall within this range of variation).
We will use the following notation:
El0 - dissimilarity of the features of Level l,
El1 - similarity of the features of Level l,
4This legal application of the formula for the maximum expected utility has been discussed elsewhere in
the literature (e.g., Kaplan, 1968; Lindley, 1977a; Lempert, 1977).
181
CHAPTER 13. DECISION-THEORETIC REFLECTIONS ON PROCESSING A
FINGERMARK
so that E = {E1k,E2m}, with k,m ∈ {0,1}.
However, when deciding whether or not to process the fingermark, the examiner has not
yet compared the fingermark with the fingerprint of finger F. At this moment, one does not
know yet what similarities and dissimilarities he or she will observe. The maximum expected
utility of choosing an action in A for a fingermark to be processed is therefore the weighted
average of the maximum expected utility obtained after each possible result with respect to
the probabilities of each of the possible results:
1∑
k=0
1∑
m=0 maxi u¯(ai∣E2m,E1k, I)Pr(E2m∣E1k, I)Pr(E1k ∣I)
= 1∑
k=0
1∑
m=0 maxi
1∑
j=0u(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣E2m,E1k, I)Pr(E2m∣E1k, I)Pr(E1k ∣I) ,
which, according to Bayes’ theorem, is equal to
= 1∑
k=0
1∑
m=0 maxi
1∑
j=0u(Cij)Pr(E2m∣E1k,Θj , I)Pr(E1k ∣Θj , I)Pr(Θj ∣I) .
(13.2)
The expected value of the information for a fingermark to be processed, denoted EV OI,
is the difference between Eqs. (13.2) and (13.1):
EV OI = 1∑
k=0
1∑
m=0 maxi u¯(ai∣E2m,E1k, I)Pr(E2m∣E1k, I)Pr(E1k ∣I) −maxi u¯(ai∣I)
= 1∑
k=0
1∑
m=0 maxi
1∑
j=0u(Cij)Pr(E2m∣E1k,Θj , I)Pr(E1k ∣Θj , I)Pr(Θj ∣I)
−maxi 1∑
j=0u(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣I) . (13.3)
This value is always greater than or equal to zero, reflecting the informative value of ob-
served results for making the ultimate decision (e.g., Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961; Good, 1967;
DeGroot, 1984). We must now compare this informative value with the cost of processing a
fingermark. If c is the financial cost of processing the fingermark, then δ is the most rational
decision rule for the preliminary decision:
δ = { process the fingermark if EV OI ≥ c
not process the fingermark if EV OI < c . (13.4)
This decision rule requires the EV OI to be expressed in the same units as c. The units of
the EV OI are the units of the utilities. The utility function over the space of consequencesC must therefore be defined in monetary units, such as dollars. On this scale, the utility can
be positive, negative, or zero. Thus, utilities u(C11) and u(C00) represent how much society
gains from a correct conviction and from a correct acquittal, respectively. Conversely, utili-
ties u(C10) and u(C01) quantify how much society pays as a result of a false conviction and
as a result of a false acquittal, respectively. These latter utilities therefore take negative val-
ues. The major challenge in implementing this framework lies in the difficulty of quantifying
these utilities. As stated above and emphasized by Lindley (1977a, pp. 209-210):
“(. . . ) the utility here is imposed by society, certainly not by the defendant and
not even by the judge.”
In addition to the utility function, the implementation of this decision-theoretic frame-
work requires the prior probability distribution over Θ and the conditional probability dis-
tribution over E given Θ. The judicial decision-maker assigns the former based on the
background information. This probability distribution is the result of taking into account
and combining all of the previously obtained knowledge informing the decision-maker’s belief
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Figure 13.1: A generic influence diagram for the decision-theoretic framework presented in this paper for
the decision of processing or not processing a fingermark (node process). This decision is a preliminary
decision for the judicial decision in node A. The continuous arrows represent the network’s functional
relationships, whereas the dotted arrow stands for a precedence link telling the user that the decision process
precedes decision A. The random variables Θ (whether the defendant is innocent or guilty of the alleged
offence), G (whether the fingermark comes from an offender’s finger), F (whether the fingermark comes
from finger F, where F is one of the defendant’s fingers), and E1 and E2 (the results of comparing the
fingermark with a print of finger F) are modeled according to the Bayesian network proposed by Garbolino
and Taroni (2002). The utility nodes c and u contain the cost of processing the fingermark, and the utility
function over consequences Cij , i = 0,1 and j = 0,1, respectively.
in the truth of the states of Θ (for example, statements from witnesses and the results of
other forensic analyses, such as DNA, fibres, etc.). We do not treat this aspect in further
detail in this paper. The latter probability distribution (i.e., the probability distribution
over E given Θ) requires the consideration of additional variables. To handle the uncer-
tainty related to these variables in a transparent way, we propose to construct a graphical
probability model. We propose an influence diagram, because influence diagrams handle un-
certainty and decision theory in a single model (e.g., Shachter, 1988; Howard and Matheson,
2005).
13.4 Influence diagram
An influence diagram is a graphical probability model which, in addition to probabilistic
calculations, also calculates expected utilities (e.g., Jensen and Nielsen, 2007; Kjaerulff and
Madsen, 2008; Korb and Nicholson, 2011). It is made up of circular nodes representing ran-
dom variables, rectangular nodes representing action nodes, and diamond-shaped nodes rep-
resenting utility nodes. Continuous arrows represent the network’s functional relationships
between the nodes (i.e., the dependence relationships that determine the model’s evaluation
process), and a dotted arrow stands for a precedence link indicating that one decision pre-
cedes another decision (e.g., Korb and Nicholson, 2011). The model calculates the expected
utilities for each of the actions based on the probability distributions associated with each
of the relevant random variables and the utility values specified in the utility nodes for each
of the possible consequences. Its graphical representation of the dependence relationships
between the nodes and rigorous computational methods underlying these relationships pro-
vides a structured and transparent approach for evaluating these expected utilities and the
probabilities required in complex decision problems involving uncertainty. Fig. 13.1 presents
the structure of an influence diagram for the decision-theoretic framework presented in this
paper. It implements the well known test-action sequence of decisions, because it consists
of two decisions, where the first (the preliminary decision) may produce observations that
help the decision-maker make the second decision (the ultimate decision). Fig. 13.1 models
this decision problem according to the general structure proposed by Korb and Nicholson
(2011, page 106), with the action nodes interpreted here as:
process - the preliminary decision of processing or not processing the fingermark,
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Table 13.1: Conditional probability table associated with node F , based on the tables presented by Taroni
et al. (2006a). The definitions of parameters p and w are given in the text on page 184.
Θ0 Θ1
G0 G1 G0 G1
F0 1 − p 1 1 1 −w
F1 p 0 0 w
A - the ultimate decision of convicting or acquitting defendant D;
the utility nodes as:
c - the cost of processing the fingermark,
u - the utilities assigned to consequences Cij ;
and the random variables as described earlier in Section 13.3:
Θ - the state of nature,
E1 - the comparison results of the fingermark’s Level 1 features,
E2 - the comparison results of the fingermark’s Level 2 features.
To model the relationship between Θ and {E1,E2}, the influence diagram uses the Bayesian
network presented by Garbolino and Taroni (2002), containing the Boolean random vari-
ables:
G - whether the fingermark comes from an offender’s finger,
F - whether the fingermark comes from finger F.
In node G, the user specifies a probability distribution over the states:
G0 - the fingermark does not come from an offender’s finger,
G1 - the fingermark comes from an offender’s finger;
based on information regarding the fingermark’s location and the case circumstances. Foren-
sic science literature (e.g., Stoney, 1991b; Evett, 1993; Stoney, 1994; Evett et al., 1998;
Aitken and Taroni, 2004; Taroni et al., 2006a) denotes these probabilities as Pr(G1∣I) = r
and Pr(G0∣I) = 1 − r.
Node F contains the states:
F0 - the fingermark does not come from finger F,
F1 - the fingermark comes from finger F;
with the probability distribution over these states defined as follows (see Table 13.1 for the
conditional probability table associated with node F ):
 If defendant D is innocent of the offence, and the fingermark does not come from an
offender’s finger (column 1 of Table 13.1), there is a probability of p that the fingermark
comes from finger F. This probability describes the possibility that finger F left the
fingermark as a result of an action unrelated to the commission of the offence, as well
as the possibility that the fingermark is a fake for which finger F served as a mold.
 If defendant D is innocent of the offence, yet the fingermark comes from one of an
offender’s fingers (column 2 of Table 13.1), it is impossible for the fingermark to come
from finger F.
 If defendant D is guilty of the offence, yet the fingermark does not come from an
offender’s finger (column 3 of Table 13.1), it is impossible for the fingermark to come
from finger F.
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Table 13.2: The conditional probability tables associated with nodes E1 and E2. The definitions of pa-
rameters d and f are given in the text on page 185. A prime symbol is added to the parameters in the
probability table of node E2 to distinguish these from the parameters in the probability table of node E1.
process not process
F0 F1 F0 F1
E1: E10 1 − f d 0 0
E11 f 1 − d 0 0
E1 0 0 1 1
E2: E20 1 − f ′ d′ 0 0
E21 f
′ 1 − d′ 0 0
E2 0 0 1 1
 If defendant D is guilty of the offence, and the fingermark comes from an offender’s
finger (column 4 of Table 13.1), there is a probability of w that the fingermark comes
from finger F. For example, in a case with a single offender where we assume that
each of the offender’s ten fingers has an equal probability of being the source of the
fingermark, w = 1
10
.5
If the fingermark is to be processed, the probabilities of observing E1k and E
2
m depend
on which state of node F is true. These probabilities are defined as follows (see Table 13.2
for the conditional probability tables associated with nodes E1 and E2):
 If the fingermark does not come from finger F (column 1 of Table 2), there is a proba-
bility of f of observing a similarity between the fingermark’s features and the features
of a print of finger F. This probability reflects the rarity of the features in the popula-
tion of potential sources. To distinguish this probability for the Level 1 features from
the corresponding probability for the Level 2 features, we call the former f and the
latter f ′.
 In a case where the fingermark comes from finger F (column 2 of Table 2), there is
a probability of d of observing a dissimilarity between the fingermark’s features and
the features of a print of finger F. This probability takes into account the possibility
that factors, such as a distorted fingermark, a morphological change on finger F during
the lapse of time between the creation of the mark and the print (such as scars and
warts), the nature of the transfer media, the properties of the substrate, the techniques
applied to detect and recover the mark, and the environmental conditions the mark was
subject to (Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology
(SWGFAST), 2011, Section 2), produce a dissimilarity of the observed features between
the mark and its source’s print. To distinguish between this probability for Level 1
and for Level 2 features, d refers to the Level 1 features and d′ to the Level 2 features.
The conditional probability tables of nodes E1 and E2 list a third state: E1 and E
2
 , re-
spectively. This state describes the absence of data, which is the case when the examiner
decides not to process the mark.
According to the influence diagram in Fig. 13.1, the probabilities of observing E1k and
E2m given Θj in Eq. (13.3) are a function of the parameters specified in the conditional
probability tables of nodes E1 and E2, the parameters in the conditional probability table
of node F , and the probability distribution over F ’s parent node G. Section 13.6 presents the
algebraic formula produced for evaluating the EV OI for processing a fingermark when all of
5Note that in this case of a single offender, w is equal to Neumann et al. (2011a)’s probability Pr(G = g∣I)
where g denotes the finger number of finger F.
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these parameters are introduced into Eq. (13.3) according to the probabilistic relationships
modeled by the influence diagram. In this case, the EV OI has been developed for only two
levels of features, with the simplifying assumption that processing the fingermark must result
in either a similarity or a dissimilarity in a comparison of each level of features with a print
of finger F (i.e., processing the fingermark cannot lead to the absence of data in the levels
considered). Relaxing this assumption, and extending the model to Level 3 features, would
make the computation of the conditional probabilities of E given Θ a lot more involved,
and this would considerably increase the complexity of the development of an algebraic
expression for the EV OI. However, an influence diagram allows its user to handle this
complexity by directly computing the expected utilities u¯(ai∣I) and u¯(ai∣E2m,E1k, I),6 and
the probabilities Pr(E1k ∣I) and Pr(E2m∣E1k, I) for evaluating the EV OI (see the first line in
Eq. (13.3)).
13.5 Discussion and conclusions
From a decision-theoretic point of view, the decision “To process or not to process a fin-
germark?” is a preliminary decision of investing or not investing in information that may
help a judicial decision-maker decide on the verdict of the case. If the results produced by
processing the fingermark contribute to reaching a correct verdict, then these results are
useful information. Quantifying the usefulness of this information on the same scale as the
cost of processing the fingermark allows us to formulate a decision rule based on a direct
comparison of these two values.
There are four factors that determine how useful the information of a processed finger-
mark is with regard to the judicial decision of determining the verdict of the case:
(1) the ability of the fingermark’s features to help the examiner correctly associate the
fingermark with a print of its source and exclude the other potential sources (i.e., the
fingermark’s suitability for a comparison (Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge
Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST), 2011));
(2) the fingermark’s relevance in the case;
(3) the other information in the case;
(4) the gain obtained from pronouncing a correct verdict, and the cost of pronouncing a
false verdict.
The decision-theoretic model presented in this paper incorporates all of these factors:
(1) parameters d and f , defined for each level of features, quantify each level’s ability to help
the examiner correctly associate the fingermark with a print of it’s source and exclude
the other potential sources;
(2) parameter r represents the fingermark’s relevance;
(3) the initial probability distribution over Θ describes the judicial decision-maker’s prior
beliefs in the case, based on the case’s other information;
(4) a monetary utility function quantifies the gain, or cost, of each verdict given each of the
possible states of nature (i.e., whether defendant D is innocent or guilty of the alleged
offence).
Defining the utility function in monetary units produces the EV OI of processing a finger-
mark also in monetary units. According to this approach, a rational decision maker processes
a fingermark when the fingermark’s EV OI is greater than or equal to the processing cost.
6Note that the influence diagram will actually compute u¯(ai∣E2m,E1k, I) − c instead of u¯(ai∣E2m,E1k, I).
To obtain the value of u¯(ai∣E2m,E1k, I) in Eq. (13.3), one must add c to the value indicated by the model.
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Neumann et al. (2011b)’s field study actually provides us with this processing cost for
a forensic laboratory: $138,000
1619
≈ $85 (or ≈ 44 minutes in man-hours). This means that this
laboratory’s most rational decision rule δ (Eq. (13.4)) for processing or not processing a
fingermark is:
δ = { process the fingermark if EV OI ≥ $85
not process the fingermark if EV OI < $85 .
However, this decision cannot be made by the forensic laboratory alone. A practical
application of this model requires the user to assign values to the parameters, a prior prob-
ability distribution over Θ, and a monetary utility function for the possible consequences.
The first of these three (assigning the values to the parameters) should be doable based on
the case’s circumstances and on appropriate data from fingerprint studies. The second point
(assigning the prior probability distribution over Θ) refers to the judicial decision-maker’s
degrees of belief, an aspect inherent in the judicial decision-making process. This probability
distribution can therefore only be assigned by the judicial decision-maker. And finally, the
third point (the definition of the utility function) remains the major challenge for apply-
ing such a decision-theoretic framework in practice (e.g., Taroni et al., 2010): this function
quantifies the benefits and costs of correct and false verdicts according to the objectives and
preferences of society (Lindley, 1977a). How can we define this function so that it accurately
represents the utilities imposed by society? The definition of this function is fundamental
for any practical application of the model, and thus produces the most important issue to
be solved for applying it in practice. Yet, applicable in practice or not, a normative decision
model such as the one presented here remains the rational means for justifying to process
(or not to process) a fingermark in the light of the uncertainty and the context of the case
that inevitably surround it.
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13.6 Appendix
Introducing parameters d, d′, f , f ′, p, r and w into Eq. (13.3), according to the proba-
bilistic relationships modeled by the influence diagram in Fig. 13.1, produces the following
expression for the EV OI for processing a fingermark:
EV OI = max {u(C00)[(1 − f ′)(1 − f)(1 − p + pr) + d′dp(1 − r)]Pr(Θ0∣I)+ u(C01)[(1 − f ′)(1 − f)(1 − rw) + d′dwr]Pr(Θ1∣I),
u(C10)[(1 − f ′)(1 − f)(1 − p + pr) + d′dp(1 − r)]Pr(Θ0∣I)+ u(C11)[(1 − f ′)(1 − f)(1 − rw) + d′dwr]Pr(Θ1∣I)}+ max {u(C00)[f ′(1 − f)(1 − p + pr) + (1 − d′)dp(1 − r)]Pr(Θ0∣I)+ u(C01)[f ′(1 − f)(1 − rw) + (1 − d′)dwr]Pr(Θ1∣I),
u(C10)[f ′(1 − f)(1 − p + pr) + (1 − d′)dp(1 − r)]Pr(Θ0∣I)+ u(C11)[f ′(1 − f)(1 − rw) + (1 − d′)dwr]Pr(Θ1∣I)}+ max {u(C00)[(1 − f ′)f(1 − p + pr) + d′(1 − d)p(1 − r)]Pr(Θ0∣I)+ u(C01)[(1 − f ′)f(1 − rw) + d′(1 − d)wr]Pr(Θ1∣I),
u(C10)[(1 − f ′)f(1 − p + pr) + d′(1 − d)p(1 − r)]Pr(Θ0∣I)+ u(C11)[(1 − f ′)f(1 − rw) + d′(1 − d)wr]Pr(Θ1∣I)}+ max {u(C00)[f ′f(1 − p + pr) + (1 − d′)(1 − d)p(1 − r)]Pr(Θ0∣I)+ u(C01)[f ′f(1 − rw) + (1 − d′)(1 − d)wr]Pr(Θ1∣I),
u(C10)[f ′f(1 − p + pr) + (1 − d′)(1 − d)p(1 − r)]Pr(Θ0∣I)+ u(C11)[f ′f(1 − rw) + (1 − d′)(1 − d)wr]Pr(Θ1∣I)}
− maxi 1∑
j=0u(Cij)Pr(Θj ∣I) .
The algebraic developments in this equation are based on the formulae published by Evett
(1993); Garbolino and Taroni (2002); Taroni et al. (2006a).
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